U.S. Marine Corps: Put Me In Coach

Authored by Stephen Baird via RealClearDefense,

In some ways the U.S. military is like an NFL team.  We have an owner, the American people, represented by the U.S. Congress.  We have General Managers, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and the Chief of Space Operations who man, train, and equip their Service for employment by a coach.  The military has several coaches, the geographic Combatant Commanders (U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Southern Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central Command, and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command).  The Combatant Commanders develop game plans (campaign, contingency, and crisis plans) to support the National Security Strategy in their respective geographical areas of responsibility.

The Combatant Commanders have planning staffs.  They invite their Service Components (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, Space Force, and National Guard) to planning meetings where each Service Component planner identifies their capabilities that can support the Combatant Commander’s plan.  Based on the mission requirements for the plan, the Combatant Commander selects the capabilities from each Service required for mission success.

Prior to 2020, the Marine Corps were on the first team.  The Marine Corps had three robust combined arms Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs).  Each MEF was comprised of a Marine Division, a Marine Air Wing, and a Marine Logistics Group.  The operational capabilities of the MEFs enabled Marine Service Component planners to offer operational support to the Combatant Commanders across the spectrum of conflict.

With the implementation of Force Design 2030 in March 2020 (now called Force Design), the Marine Corps’ General Manager (CMC), General Berger, divested (cut) 21% of the personnel in infantry battalions, 100% of the tanks, 67% of the cannon artillery batteries, 33% of the assault amphibious companies, more than 25% of Marine aviation (since the initial FD divestments, the Marines have/will bring back almost 100 of the 200 aircraft divested, the percentage loss in the active force is now only about 17 percent), and almost all assault breaching equipment in the active forces.  This action when coupled with the Marine Corps’ abdication of its amphibious ship lift requirement neutered the Service Component planners’ ability to offer operational support across the spectrum of conflict and has relegated the Marine Corps to second team status.  Simply put, the “United States Marines are no longer capable of responding to global crises and contingencies quickly and ­effectively, and in some cases, at all”.

These “divestments” were made to “invest” in reorganizing and restructuring the Marine Corps to focus primarily on one geographic theater (Indo-Pacific) and one enemy, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).  Today, one infantry and one artillery regiment, have been reorganized and redesignated as Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs).  The MLRs conduct Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations and employ Stand-In-Force (SIF) missile units on pacific island chains to engage/deter the PLAN.  A second infantry regiment is scheduled to be redesignated in 2027.  One must assume that this new team capability supports the Indo-Pacific Commander’s warfighting requirements. 

But how about the support of the other geographic Combatant Commanders?  Did the Corps’ GM, General Berger, consult with the other coaches to assess the impact of his actions and how it affects their plans and warfighting requirements?  Was General Berger upfront with team’s owner, the American people, represented by the U.S Congress, on the impact of his actions to the Marine Corps Title X requirements (Title 10 USC 8063)?

We are now almost five years into the implementation of Force Design and the current General Manager (CMC), General Smith, has not changed course but instead doubled down.  In his statement on the posture of the Marine Corps before the Senate Appropriations Committee on 16 April 2024, he wrote: “I remain fully committed to Force Design and all its supporting efforts.”  Today, not one Stand-In-Force is operational and forward deployed on a pacific island.  Not one missile has been procured.  And, the Navy has postponed the procurement of the Landing Ship Medium (which will transport and resupply the SIFs).  

In the NFL, when the General Manager fails to effectively “man” his team with the right talent (capabilities) for the coach to employ, he is fired.  Once confirmed, the Secretary of the Navy, John Phelan, should consider bringing in a new General Manager (Marine Corps Commandant) who can begin the process of restoring the Marine Corps’ global response capability and restoring its ability to be the nation’s 911 force.  This will move the Marine Corps from the bench with the second team, to the bench with the first team.

Stephen Baird is a retired Marine Colonel. He served as the G-5 for 1 Marine Expeditionary Force, the Chief of Staff for the 1st Marine Division followed by his last assignment as the Chief of Staff for U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.