The Two Ugly Paths Now Facing The US Economy

Submitted by QTR’s Fringe Finance

I was watching Andrew Ross Sorkin on 60 Minutes last Sunday. Sorkin was on the show to promote his new book, 1929: Inside the Greatest Crash in Wall Street History — and How It Shattered a Nation.

When Leslie Stahl asked him during his interview whether we would have another crash, Sorkin answered: “The answer is, we will have a crash. I just can’t tell you when, and I can’t tell you how deep. But I can assure you, unfortunately, I wish I wasn’t saying this, we will have the crash.”

At one point he says “We are either living through some kind of remarkable boom, [or we’re reliving] 1929.”

I thought to myself: hell, I can do better than that, and I didn’t even write a book about 1929. Because at this point, the real question is not whether we are headed toward some sort of financial reckoning…the question is what form that reckoning takes.

And after looking at the current economic landscape, I increasingly believe there are only two realistic outcomes over the next several years: a soft default through inflation or a hard default through financial crisis. The former seems more likely than the latter, and can be confusing to people because nominal prices staying steady or rising while inflation runs out of control won’t look like a “crash” that most of 60 Minutes’ viewers will expect. It’ll be a crash upward.

To understand why, let’s start with where we are right now and summarize a lot of what I’ve written about over the past month or two. There’s four key things I’m watching:

1. inflation

2. market valuation

3. the consumer

4. the bond market

These four things have worked together to produce a combination that I believe is close to locking up the economy and taking away any response options from the Central Bank that won’t have immediate and ugly consequences.

Inflation remains structurally above the Federal Reserve’s target despite one of the most aggressive rate-hiking cycles in modern history. Even now, inflation is still running around 3.8%, nearly double the Fed’s stated objective. This is no longer a temporary post-pandemic distortion that policymakers can dismiss away with optimistic forecasts and revised models.

Inflation has become embedded across the economy, from housing and insurance to healthcare, wages, food, and government spending itself. The cost structure of modern American life has permanently shifted upward, while policymakers continue pretending that a return to stable 2% inflation is just around the corner. It’s not.

At the same time, financial markets continue to trade at historically stretched valuations. The Shiller P/E ratio sits around 42x versus its mean of 17.3x and market capitalization relative to GDP has surged above 230%, levels associated not with healthy long-term expansion but with periods of deep speculation and excess.

A better way to look at this instead of valuations are high is that the market is extraordinarily vulnerable to falling further in percentage terms. When valuations become detached from underlying economic reality, the downside risk grows larger because there is simply farther to fall once confidence breaks. Expensive markets do not automatically cause crashes, but they create the conditions where even modest disappointments can trigger violent repricing. Especially if the market’s rally has been on poor breadth and the result of speculation on options and the passive bid.

Beneath the surface, delinquency data shows that the consumer is tapped out. Student loan delinquencies have surged back toward record levels as repayments resume into an economy where borrowing costs and living expenses have both exploded higher.

Credit card delinquencies are now sitting at their highest levels since the aftermath of the financial crisis, while auto loan defaults, especially among subprime borrowers, have reached multi-decade highs. Americans are financing $50,000 vehicles with monthly payments exceeding $750 at interest rates that would have seemed absurd just a few years ago.

And the rate at which consumers are saving is dwindling significantly now.

But the most important warning signal in the economy is not the stock market or the consumer. It is the bond market.

Under normal economic conditions, weakening growth and financial stress would push long-term Treasury yields lower as investors seek safety and begin pricing in future Federal Reserve easing. Instead, the opposite is happening. The 10-year Treasury yield remains around 4.5%, while the 30-year Treasury has pushed above 5%. Those are not comforting numbers. They reflect a growing discomfort with the long-term fiscal trajectory of the United States itself.

This is the trap the United States now finds itself in.

The first, and in my view the more likely outcome, is the soft default. This is the inflationary path where policymakers ultimately choose to save the Treasury market through monetary intervention. They will not describe it as money printing, of course. They will use softer language such as liquidity support, balance sheet management, market stabilization, or yield curve control. But the mechanism is ultimately the same. The Federal Reserve creates money in order to purchase government debt and suppress long-term yields before the Treasury market becomes unstable.

This approach would almost certainly succeed in stabilizing borrowing costs in the short term. But it would come at the expense of the currency itself. That is why I increasingly believe the next major crash could actually be an upward crash. Stocks may continue rising in nominal terms. Gold could surge. Real estate and hard assets may inflate even further. On paper, asset values appear strong and financial markets may even seem resilient. But underneath the surface, the purchasing power of the dollar continues eroding year after year.

The second possibility is the hard default. This is the more chaotic and openly destructive scenario where policymakers lose control before they can inflate their way out of the problem. A hard default would not necessarily require the United States to formally announce that it is refusing to pay its debts. It could emerge through failed Treasury auctions, a debt ceiling accident, a severe liquidity freeze in the bond market, delayed government obligations, or a broader sovereign confidence crisis that causes investors to rapidly reassess the safety of U.S. debt.

In that environment, Treasury yields could spike violently higher while banks and financial institutions holding large amounts of long-duration government debt come under enormous pressure. Credit markets could freeze. Equity markets would likely experience a rapid downward repricing before policymakers responded with emergency interventions. Government spending cuts and forced austerity measures could suddenly become unavoidable not because Washington chose discipline voluntarily, but because markets imposed discipline externally.

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This is the scenario policymakers fear most because once sovereign confidence begins breaking apart, events move very quickly. Financial history repeatedly shows that debt crises tend to unfold slowly for years and then suddenly all at once. I see this as the less likely scenario, but between the two paths, I’d venture to guess we have 99% of what could possibly take place nailed down and out in the open.

I believe the soft default remains far more likely than the hard default for one simple reason: policymakers will do almost anything to avoid immediate collapse. They will print before they default. They will monetize debt before they accept a disorderly Treasury market. They will sacrifice the purchasing power of the currency before they willingly allow the government’s financing structure to implode.

Sorkin says he knows a crash is coming but does not know what form it will take. I think we can narrow it down much further than that. The next crisis will probably not look like 1929, and it may not even resemble 2008. The more likely scenario is an inflationary sovereign debt crisis disguised for a period of time as economic resilience. It will look like rising nominal asset prices, stubborn inflation, endless liquidity support, and growing pressure on the dollar itself as policymakers attempt to suppress yields and keep the Treasury market functioning.

Because ultimately, once long-term interest rates become politically intolerable, the Federal Reserve will face an impossible choice. It can defend the dollar by allowing yields to rise and risk detonating the debt structure, or it can defend the Treasury market through intervention and risk significantly higher inflation. Under a new Fed chair like Kevin Warsh, the options are still fundamentally the same. Policymakers can change the language, revise inflation metrics, redefine targets, and introduce new programs, but they cannot escape the underlying arithmetic.

History strongly suggests they will choose inflation. Not because it solves the problem, but because it delays the reckoning.

And that is ultimately where I disagree with Sorkin. I do not think the future crash is unknowable. I think the pressure points are already obvious. To me, the only real question is whether the United States defaults honestly through crisis or dishonestly through inflation. I’d bet on the latter, and as an investor it would make me keen to watch gold if it gets smacked lower an an initial shock to markets before the Fed intervenes. Because I could easily see a situation where gold keeps retreating, perhaps to $4,000 or lower, sharply moving lower during the initial shock, maybe to $3500 or lower, before doubling or tripling in the years after a Fed response that I believe could be very inflationary and push gold closer to $10,000 over time.

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