A Three Step Solution To Rebuild The Marine Corps

Authored by Gary Anderson via RealClearDefense,

I recently received a call from an old Marine Corps acquaintance who now works for the Corps as a contractor. He has been heavily involved in the controversial Force Design (FD) project begun by former commandant, General David Berger, and continued by his successor General Eric Smith. FD has caused an intellectual civil war within the Corps that has pitted the current senior leadership against many retired marines as well as a growing underground resistance in the active ranks.

I have been a particularly virulent critic of FD for six years and have gone so far as to recommend replacing General Smith with a commandant more open to an approach which would head the Corps back to becoming a balanced world-wide force in readiness rather than being a China-centric force as directed under FD.

I was asked what actions on the part of the current leadership would cause people like me to be less antagonistic toward General Smith and FD.

I started off by telling him that I don’t presume to speak for the other people who think that FD is a terrible idea, including every living former commandant, with the exception of Gen Berger. Every living USMC Medal of Honor winner, most of the former Marine Corps combatant commanders, and the editor of the alternative Marine Corps publication “Compass Points”.

However, I did outline three steps that would shut me up. All of them are designed to give future commandants some latitude to determine the future of the Corps. Right now, whoever the next commandant is, he will have one option, and that is FD.

First, conduct a real operational and tactical field test of FD. Most critics argue that it is a flawed concept at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Its operational assumption is that small groups of Marines known as Stand-in-Forces (SIF) can operate from the hundreds of isolated islets and shoals in China’s first island chain, firing sub-sonic NEMSIS anti-ship missiles at Chinese naval combatants. The theory is that they will “shoot and scoot” from islet to islet before the Chinese can develop a firing solution. They would theoretically be transported by light, yet to be built, Navy Medium Landing Ships (LSM).

Most of the critics of FD, myself among them, believe that the SIF will not be able to scoot fast enough to avoid Chinese detection and destruction. Although the personnel numbers are relatively small, the missiles, launchers, and radars are bulky and not easily transported. However, I for one, am willing to be proved wrong.

After six long years, the Marine Corps has exactly one SIF deployed to the Philippines. It could be declared an experimental unit and tested in deployment/employment exercises with the U.S. Navy playing the Chinese Red Team.

However, since the transport LSMs do not yet exist, the marines would have to borrow Army ships with similar capabilities for the experimental exercises. These exercises should be conducted and umpired by the Commander of the Indo-Pacific Command. Being the supported Combatant Commander, If he determines that the concept is as useless as many retired and current marines think it is, the concept can be scrapped before it does any more damage to the Corps in particular and national defense in general.

The second step is a logical follow-on to the first. The commandant should form two more experimental units, one of tanks and one of heavy engineers to include an assault bridging capability. If FD shows itself to be the fraud that I think it is, the next commandant will at least have something to build from.

The Army is looking at some lighter and more transportable tank and engineer capabilities that the Marine Corps discarded to afford the missiles and radars to support the SIFs for FD implementation. At least the new commandant would have something in the way of expertise with which to rebuild a semi-castrated Marine Corps.

A final step would be to insist that the Navy commit to a thirty-eight big deck amphibious ship fleet. When General Berger released the Navy from that requirement the then CNO promised him that the Navy could maintain the capability to maintain three Marine Expeditionary Units afloat world-wide 24/7.

The combination of incompetence and negligence the Navy has fallen far short of that promise. Incredibly, the other living commandants recently allowed Berger to sign on to a letter urging the Navy to expand its amphibious fleet. That is akin to letting the fox complain about hen house security.

I warned my former colleague that my recommendations would probably not be well received at Headquarters Marine Corps or at Quantico and that the current Marine Corps leadership has an unfortunate reputation for shooting the messenger. However, if General Smith wants to quiet the insurgents in the family, those recommendations would be a good place to start. To paraphrase Lynyrd Skynyrd – give me three steps General – and you won’t hear from me no more. 

Gary Anderson is a retired Marine Corps Colonel who also acted as a Special Advisor to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. He is the author of Beyond Mahan; a Naval Strategy for the 21st Century.