Five Lessons That Russia Can Learn From The Latest Israeli-Lebanese War

Authored by Andrew Korybko via substack.com,

The latest Israeli-Lebanese War and the Ukrainian Conflict are so different from one another as to be practically incomparable, but Russia can still learn some general lessons from Israel if it has the will.

The first is that prioritizing military goals increases the chances of achieving political ones. Russia’s special operation continues to be characterized by self-restraint, which is influenced by Putin’s magnum opus “On the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians”, unlike Israel’s conduct in its war with Lebanon.

The expectation was that the lightning-fast on-the-ground advances during the opening stage of the conflict would coerce Zelensky into agreeing to the military demands that were made of him. The only miniscule collateral damage that would have occurred could have then facilitated the process of Russian-Ukrainian reconciliation. This plan was predicated on Zelensky’s capitulation, which didn’t happen. Instead, he was convinced by former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson to keep fighting.

Israel never thought that a lasting deal is possible with Hezbollah, unlike what Russia thought and arguably still thinks is possible with Ukraine’s post-“Maidan” authorities, which is why Tel Aviv would never take a page from Moscow’s playbook by carrying out “goodwill gestures” in pursuit of that. From Israel’s perspective, political goals can only be achieved after a military victory, not the inverse like Russia believes with regard to the notion that a political victory can lead to the attainment of military goals.

The second lesson is the importance of superior intelligence. Russia was reportedly under the impression cultivated by its Ukrainian assets in the run-up to the special operation that the locals would greet its troops with flowers and then Zelensky’s government would collapse. Intelligence collection focused mostly on the socio-political situation in Ukraine, which turned out to be incredibly inaccurate, and not on military details. That’s why Russian troops were surprised by Ukraine’s Javelin and Stinger arsenals.

It also seems to be the case in retrospect that Russia’s Ukrainian assets told their handlers what they thought they wanted to hear, whether to deceive them or because they thought that telling tough truths could risk them being taken off the payroll. Russia either didn’t verify the socio-political intelligence that it received or the other sources that it relied on were driven by the same motives. In any case, an alternative reality was created, which reinforced the prioritization of political goals over military ones.

Israel is no doubt interested in Lebanon’s socio-political situation, but it cares much more about tangible military intelligence that can be verified with images than intangible impressions of public opinion that could be shaded by their source’s biases and aren’t as easy to verify. These different intelligence collection priorities are the natural result of the different conflicts that they planned to wage as explained in the preceding lesson that Russia can learn from Israel.  

The third is that Russia remains sensitive to global public opinion, which is another outcome of prioritizing political goals over military ones, while Israel is impervious to public opinion at home, in Lebanon, and across the world. Russia will therefore put its troops in harm’s way capturing locations block-by-block as opposed to practicing “shock and awe” like Israel is doing in Lebanon. Even though Russia’s approach led to a lot fewer civilian deaths, it’s still criticized much as Israel is, if not more.

Israel believes that fear inspires respect, while Russia doesn’t want to be feared since it thinks that this impression would assist the West’s efforts to isolate it in the Global South. Respect, Russia believes, comes from restraining itself in order to protect civilians even at the cost of its own troops. Russia has also criticized the US for the way in which it waged the Afghan, Iraqi, and Libyan Wars, et al., and thus doesn’t want to appear hypocritical by prioritizing military goals even at the expense of civilians’ lives.

Israel lacks the natural resources that Russia has so its opponents should have had a much easier time isolating it by at least getting others to impose symbolic sanctions, yet nobody has sanctioned Israel even though it’s responsible for many more civilian deaths than Russia. Even Russia itself won’t sanction Israel despite criticizing it. To be fair, the Global South hasn’t sanctioned Russia either, but it needs Russian resources so it likely wouldn’t sanction it even if it becomes responsible for many more civilian deaths.

Moreover, the Global South’s partnership with Russia accelerates multipolar processes to their collective benefit, while the EU’s anti-Russian sanctions were meant to decelerate them. It should therefore have been predictable that the first wouldn’t submit to American pressure while the second would. Neither’s calculations have anything to do with Russia’s responsibility for civilian deaths and everything to do with their own grand strategy. Russia’s sensitivity to global public opinion might thus be misplaced.

The fourth lesson is that Israel’s permanent military, intelligence, and diplomatic bureaucracies (“deep state”) are more convinced of their conflict’s existential nature than Russia’s appear to be. That’s not to say that say that the Ukrainian Conflict isn’t existential to Russia, which was explained here and here, but just that Russia would have prioritized military goals over political ones by now if its “deep state” fully shared this assessment. Israel’s certainly does regardless of whether one agrees with their conclusion.

Russia is still restraining itself by continuing to fight an improvised “war of attrition” with the West in Ukraine after it couldn’t successfully coerce Zelensky into agreeing to the military demands that were made of him during the special operation’s initial stage instead of escalating to “shock and awe”. It still won’t destroy any bridges across the Dnieper due to its prioritization of political goals over military ones and sensitivity to global public opinion and has even let several red lines be crossed already.

To be sure, the West won’t cross Russia’s ultimate red lines of directly attacking it or Belarus or relying on Ukraine to launch large-scale strikes against them by proxy since it doesn’t want World War III, but some hawks are now talking about the latter scenario, hence why Russia just updated its nuclear doctrine. By contrast, Hamas’ sneak attack on 7 October 2023 crossed one of Israel’s red lines but didn’t ipso facto represent an existential threat since it was beaten back, yet Israel’s “deep state” still saw it differently.

Although some differences of vision exist between various members thereof, this group as a whole is still convinced of the existential nature of the conflict that followed, ergo the prioritization of military goals over political ones that’s the opposite of Russia’s approach. To this day, despite compelling arguments from Russian officials about the existential nature of their country’s conflict, its “deep state” as a whole still doesn’t seem to be as convinced of this as their Israeli counterparts are of their own conflict.

A change in perceptions would lead to a change in how this conflict is fought, but that hasn’t yet happened despite drone attacks against the Kremlin, strategic airbases, and even early warning systems, among many other provocations including Ukraine’s invasion of Kursk Region. Time and again, despite reminding everyone about how existential this conflict is, Russia continues exercising self-restraint. Political goals are still prioritized over military ones and Russia is still sensitive to global public opinion.

That could change if it learns the last lesson from Israel about “radical decisiveness”. Philosopher Alexander Dugin wrote that “Those who act with decisiveness and boldness win. We, on the other hand, are cautious and constantly hesitate. By the way, Iran is also following this path, which leads nowhere. Gaza is gone. Hamas’ leadership is gone. Now Hezbollah’s leadership is gone. And President Raisi of Iran is gone. Even his pager is gone. Yet Zelensky is still here. And Kiev stands as if nothing has happened.

He ended on the ominous note that “We must either join the game for real or… The second option is something I don’t even want to consider. But in modern warfare, timing, speed, and ‘dromocracy’ decide everything. The Zionists act swiftly, proactively. Boldly. And they win. We should follow their example.” Dugin was the first to foresee the latent existential threat to Russia posed by 2014’s “EuroMaidan” and has thus been pressing since the start of the special operation for it to stop exercising self-restraint.

“Goodwill gestures” and self-restraint aren’t appreciated by Ukraine, which perceives them as proof of weakness that have only served to embolden it to cross more of Russia’s red lines. For as much as these policies have reduced civilian deaths, they haven’t yet advanced their envisaged political goals over two and a half years since the latest phase of this already decade-old conflict began. It might therefore be time to finally change them in light of how different the conflict has since become.

Putin’s noble plan of a grand Russian-Ukrainian reconciliation after the special operation ends appears to be more distant than ever, yet he still believes that it’s supposedly viable enough to justify staying the course by continuing to prioritize political goals over military ones. He’s the Supreme Commander-in-Chief with more information available to him than anyone else so he has solid reasons for this, but maybe Israel’s example in Lebanon will inspire him to see things differently and act accordingly.