How The West Screwed Itself In Energy Geopolitics

Authored by Tilak Doshi via Substack,

The recent Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Tianjin, China, offered vivid optics of a shifting global order. Images of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping sharing smiles and warm embraces spoke volumes about a realignment that few could have predicted at the start of 2025. Against the backdrop of a “binding memorandum” for the Power of Siberia 2 (POS-2) pipeline supplying Russian natural gas to China, this summit was no mere public relations exercise.

The summit marks a profound shift in global energy geopolitics, one that underscores Europe’s slide into irrelevance, the competitive headwinds facing US LNG exports and the spectacular failure of former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski’s vision of US strategic supremacy over Russia largely constructed during the tumultuous 1990s. The United States, in its pursuit of Eurasian hegemony, has alienated a critical ally in India, pushed Russia and China closer together, and left Germany — once an industrial powerhouse — prostrate. This is a tale of hubris, miscalculation and unintended consequences.

The Tianjin Summit: A New Energy Axis

The Tianjin summit crystallised a new geopolitical reality. The warm camaraderie among the leaders of India, Russia, and China —three of the world’s five largest economies — signalled a growing alignment, not just in rhetoric and optics but in tangible energy partnerships. The “binding memorandum” for POS-2, a 50 billion cubic meter pipeline to deliver gas from Russia’s Yamal fields to China via Mongolia, is a cornerstone of this realignment.

Unlike the existing Power of Siberia 1, which draws gas from Irkutsk (north of Mongolia), POS-2 taps into the same Arctic reserves in Yamal that once fuelled Germany’s industrial might for half a century. For decades, German prosperity rested on a bargain: cheap Russian gas in exchange for high-value German manufactured exports. This was the essence of Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik and the foundation of Germany’s rise as Europe’s economic powerhouse.

Russia’s pivot to Asia – accelerated by Western sanctions since 2014 (after the annexation of Crimea) and intensified after the 2022 Ukraine invasion – is now consolidating. With POS-2 and the expansion of existing pipelines, Russia could supply China with up to 100 billion cubic metres (bcm) of gas annually after 2030 when the new pipeline would be up and running.

This is significantly less than the 150 bcm Russia once exported to Europe at its peak. Furthermore, the price for Russia’s natural gas sold to a price-sensitive China will be materially less than what it received from its European customers. But this re-orientation, while costing Russia lost revenues from lower prices and volumes, significantly alleviates Russia’s economic security after the Nordstream pipeline sabotage.

It also reduces China’s reliance on seaborne LNG, which is typically two to four times as expensive as piped gas. Critically, this reduces China’s vulnerability to US naval dominance in chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz and Straits of Malacca through which all Middle East gas exports to China must pass through.

For India, the Tianjin summit was a stage to assert its defiance. Reeling from the Trump administration’s decision to double trade tariffs from 25% to 50% — a punitive measure targeting India’s purchase of Russian crude oil — Prime Minister Modi has signalled a shift. Reports of Modi repeatedly refusing phone calls from President Trump are unprecedented. Few global leaders turn down a call from the president of the US.

India, the world’s fourth-largest economy in nominal GDP terms, has not only deepened diplomatic ties with Russia and China but is set to increase its imports of Russian oil this month in defiance of the US secondary sanctions. This underscores India’s refusal to be cowed by what its Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar called hypocritical US policy during his recent visit to Moscow. The Minister pointed out that China imports significantly more Russian oil and Europe remains the largest buyer of Russian gas, yet India alone faces such draconian tariffs. Three years into the Ukraine war, the US and European Union still import billions of dollars’ worth of Russian energy and commodities ranging from liquefied natural gas to enriched uranium.

The results of the sanctions regime have been contrary to what was predicted. In 2022, European Commission President Ursula Von Der Leyen said that the “Russian industry was in tatters” and it was “taking chips from dishwashers and refrigerators to fix their military hardware”. Von Der Leyen is eating crow now as Germany, France and the UK teeter on the edge of economic and political collapse while Russian shows little sign of being in “tatters”.

Russia has pivoted East to forge energy and trade ties with China and India as well as other countries such as Turkey and Brazil. The POS-2 deal, though not yet a finalised sales and purchase contract between buyer and seller, signals Russia’s success in finding alternative markets for its gas. The “binding memo” still lacks details on price, ‘take or pay’ terms, tenor of the long-term contract and relative contributions to capital costs. Nevertheless, the POS-2 memorandum signed in Tianjin shows that China is now willing to overcome its longstanding reservations over greater dependence on Russia’s energy resources. The gas that powered German factories and made the country the world’s manufacturing export powerhouse will now underpin China’s ambitions for continued economic dominance.

The US has gained a vassal in Germany, but at what cost? A deindustrialising Germany lacks the economic and diplomatic heft to bolster its own interests, let alone those of the US effectively. Meanwhile, the Tianjin summit showcased an alternative constellation of interests. China, India and Russia, despite their historical rivalries, are finding common cause. Border tensions between India and China persist, as do Russia’s fears of being dominated by China’s economic might.

Yet, the West’s aggressive posture — sanctions on Russia, tariffs on India and hostility towards China — has pushed these powers toward cooperation. Fuelled by the West’s own missteps, the BRICS grouping is gaining momentum with its focus on reducing dependence on the US dollar and the US-dominated SWIFT inter-bank payments system.

India: The Diplomatic Blunder of the Century

Perhaps the most egregious error in this saga is the U.S. treatment of India. For two decades, U.S.-India relations had been warming, driven by shared interests in countering China’s rise and India’s growing economic clout. During Modi’s visit to the U.S. during Trump’s first term, the prospect of a closer strategic partnership seemed bright. Since 2014, strategic cooperation between the two nations has deepenedand India was declared a “Major Defense Partner” of the United States in 2016. India and the United States had also stepped up their cooperation among multilateral groups such as the Quad.

India, with its deep defence ties to Russia, was seen by the US as a potential strategic partner to the West, weaning it away from Moscow’s orbit. President Trump’s decision to add an additional 25% tariff rate on Indian exports to the U.S. for buying Russian oil—a move not applied to China or Europe, despite their larger imports from Russia—is difficult to understand. And if Indo-American relations are not salvaged soon, it may backfire spectacularly.

Jaishankar’s pointed remarks in Moscow highlight the absurdity of this policy. Why single out India, a critical ally, when others engage in larger energy trade volumes with Russia? The tariffs, perceived as bereft of logic, have alienated India at a time when its geopolitical weight is growing. Modi’s presence at Tianjin, alongside Putin and Xi, was a deliberate signal: India will not be bullied.

By increasing Russian oil imports, India is not only defying U.S. sanctions but also aligning closer with the BRICS framework which potentially offers an alternative to Western-dominated financial and trade systems. The US risks pushing India—a democracy of 1.4 billion people and a rising economic power—into the arms of Russia and China. The U.S. may thus squander a strategic opportunity, turning a potential ally into a wary partner. As David Blackmon notes in his Substack, India’s geopolitical choice may already be made, driven by the West’s own miscalculations.

Europe’s Self-Inflicted Wound

Europe’s plight is equally instructive. The EU, in its zeal to punish Russia, has “managed to pull off one of the greatest self-owns you could ever imagine”, as veteran journalist Brian MacDonald puts it. By severing ties with Russian gas — available at its doorstep at competitive prices — Europe has condemned itself to expensive LNG imports. Western sanctions intended to cripple Russia have instead crippled Europe’s economic vitality. The POS-2 deal exacerbates this.

Germany, once the engine of European growth, now faces deindustrialisation and rising unemployment. The loss of cheap Russian gas has forced reliance on costly US and Qatari LNG, driving up energy costs and eroding competitiveness. German standards of living are declining, burdened by debt and an overstretched welfare state. Western sanctions on Russia have boomeranged, creating an energy and food crisis that has hit Europe hardest. While the end of cheap Russian gas is not the only factor in the economic malaise and social divisions facing Europe, it’s certainly a major contributor.

By redirecting Yamal gas to China, Russia not only secures a new market but also undermines US LNG exports. China’s reduced reliance on seaborne LNG — estimated at up to 40 million tons per annum (mtpa) once POS-2 is operational in the 2030s — deals a blow to US energy export ambitions. For context, 40 mtpa represent just over half of China’s total imports of LNG in 2024. US tariff threats against China and talk of future military confrontation have only accelerated Beijing’s pivot to Russian gas, which is cheaper and secure from Western sanctions.

In a further twist, US Energy Secretary Chris Wright told the Financial Times in an interview published on Monday that the European countries must halt imports of Russian oil and gas if they expect Washington to escalate sanctions against Moscow. He said that the Trump administration is prepared to invoke more sanctions on Putin and Russia, but it is contingent on EU countries halting their ongoing purchases of Russian oil and gas. Furthermore, the EU would also need to commit similar secondary sanctions as the US.

Whether the EU – with Germany, France and the UK teetering on the edge of economic and political crises – is capable of imposing secondary sanctions on large countries such as China, India, Brazil etc., without bringing even more harm on itself, is doubtful. Under current EU plans, the bloc will phase out Russian oil fully by 2028. It is also important to note that not all EU member states are on board in cutting energy links with Russia.

However, it would be ironic to blame Putin for German deindustrialisation, even though much of what passes for analysis in the mainstream media these days are variations of ‘Putin did it’. Germany was on the ‘green’ road to reducing the use of fossil fuels well before the Ukraine war. Cutting back on fossil fuels was a top priority of Energiewende (energy transition) policies adopted in 2010. German deindustrialisation is a process of economic suicide at which the German ruling class was already hard at work towards achieving since the Green party became a political force in the 1980s and 1990s.

The Unravelling of Brzezinski’s Legacy

At the heart of the geopolitical shifts signified in the Tianjin summit lies the failure of Zbigniew Brzezinski’s vision articulated in his 1997 book The Grand Chessboard. This vision became a central tenet of America’s neocon movement which straddled both Democrat and Republican administrations.

Brzezinski – National Security Advisor in the Carter administration – argued that US hegemony over the Eurasian landmass required severing the natural economic complementarity between Germany and Russia. The former provided manufacturing prowess in exchange for the latter’s cheap energy and other natural resources. By disrupting this relationship, the US aimed to prevent the emergence of a Eurasian Berlin-Moscow axis that would challenge its dominance.

The sanctions on Russia, escalated since 2014 (after the annexation of Crimea) and intensified after 2022 (after the invasion of Ukraine), were designed to cripple Russia’s economy, isolate it diplomatically, and pave the way for confronting China. The sanctions regime hasn’t worked, and the Russian economy is neither crippled nor isolated. There also seems to be no let-up in Russian advances on the Ukrainian battlefront.

Brzezinski’s strategy has unravelled. By weaponising the US dollar and SWIFT, the West incentivised Russia, China, India and others in the Global South to diversify their financial systems as much as possible. By targeting Russia’s energy exports to Europe, the US handed Moscow the impetus to forge closer ties with Asia. And by alienating India with hypocritical tariffs, the US has pushed a key ally toward its adversaries.

It is not as if the historical and political differences among the three great Eurasian powers – China, India and Russia – will all be resolved quickly under the pressure of US and EU sanctions policies. Fundamental bilateral tensions among them will remain as limits to potential cooperation. But now, in the face of EU and US provocations on trade and political relations, the level of converging national interests among the three giant neighbours in Eurasia has created a new energy terrain on the ground.

The Tianjin summit and the POS-2 memorandum are not the end but the beginning of a realignment in energy flows in Eurasia. The permanent deflection of Russia’s Yamal gas supply – which was meant for Western Europe under Ostpolitik – to China reflects Brussels’s decline into geopolitical irrelevance and Germany’s vassalage to US interests. For the US, POS-2 puts a big hole on its LNG exports outlook as it loses a major market in China to Russian pipeline gas.

Brzezinski’s vision of US dominance in Eurasia – long the tenet of the US foreign policy establishment – has given way to a resilient Russia, a defiant India and a China poised for growing dominance in global manufacturing. The West’s hubris has sown the seeds of its own marginalisation, and the global energy map has changed irrevocably.