By Michael Msika, Bloomberg Markets Live reporter and strategist

The US equity market isn’t the only one with a heavy dependence on a handful of stocks. A positive start to the year in Europe has been down to mostly just three big caps — a concentration that some see as an opportunity.

Investors in the region have created their own version of the Magnificent Seven tech giants, with returns for the benchmark so far this year driven by bullish bets on three big names: ASML, Novo Nordisk and SAP. Without gains for the trio — which are all up at least 20% — the Stoxx 600 wouldn’t be in the green. It’s unusual for the regional benchmark, which is much more diversified than the S&P 500, with no stock exceeding a 3.5% weighting.

“Today, a group of very large market capitalizations enjoys dominant positions in products whose demand is exploding internationally,” says Syz chief investment officer Charles-Henry Monchau. He lists ASML in semiconductors, SAP in software, LVMH and Hermes in luxury goods, L’Oreal and Nestle in consumer goods, and Novo Nordisk, Novartis, Roche and AstraZeneca in health care.

“Going forward, we believe that European stocks might continue to perform well even if Eurozone growth disappoints. This is due to the superior business models of the aforementioned companies which should be seen as global champions rather than euro-centric ones,” Monchau says.

The high market concentration seen in Europe so far this year may be an opportunity, according to some. The trend toward large global champions seems likely to continue with a monetary policy shift, multiple elections and geopolitical instability all on the cards for 2024. That would make the Euro Stoxx 50 the best concentration play, with ASML, SAP and LVMH together accounting for more than 20% of the index and nearly 100% of its returns year-to date.

“The more cyclical tilt on SX5E Index, high index weight concentration, higher growth and momentum factor loading could result in SX5E delivering excess upside return versus the SXXP Index in the near term,” say JPMorgan derivative strategists led by Davide Silvestrini. They recommend buying outperformance calls on the Euro Stoxx 50 vs the Stoxx 600 as a leveraged play on the upside, should the earnings momentum for the top three performers continue.

The concentration of returns in a few names also has a direct impact on sectors — creating a dramatic performance gap this year. Tech is up 10%, while miners are down 8%, indicating clear investor preference for growth stocks as bond yields are expected to fall. Health care and staples outperforming also underlines a flight to defensive quality shares.

To be sure, reliance on a few large caps carries its own dangers: ASML’s stellar gains have been underpinned by the artificial intelligence boom, but it still faces risks in China, while Novo Nordisk is up against rising competition and issues with producing enough of its blockbuster drugs.

Deutsche Bank strategists Maximilian Uleer and Carolin Raab prefer sectors that seem less overbought after last year’s rally, can benefit from rates coming down and have the potential to turn from negative to positive earnings growth. They are overweight staples and telecoms and underweight utilities among defensives, and overweight chemicals vs underweight industrials in cyclicals.

Longer term, they see basic resources increasingly attractive after their weak performance last year, and as an essential sector for the energy transition. “We remain constructive on equity markets but expect little directional impulse tactically. Investing into relative trades is likely to yield higher upside than chasing directional market moves,” they say.

The European Commission has bent the knee to protesting farmers – and is dropping key passages in a proposal for a new 2040 goal aimed at cutting greenhouse gas pollution.

According to the EU exeuctive’s plan, “all sectors” need to now contribute to the effort – but the previously mandated 30% cut to agricultural production between by 2040 is gone. The revised draft has also excluded a mandate for citizens to make lifestyle changes – such as eating less meat, and a push to end fossil fuel subsidies, Politico reports.

Farmers’ protests have broken out in many countries across Europe in recent weeks, with the industry expressing discontent over the EU’s green policies. Some of the largest demonstrations have been in Germany, prompted by a cut to diesel subsidies. Brussels has faced calls from industry groups and some political parties to lay out a 2040 climate pathway that doesn’t ignite further anger.

The EU’s plan is set to be presented on Tuesday and will recommend a 90 percent cut in total EU emissions by 2040 from 1990 levels — a suggestion in line with scientific advice.

The updated version of the plan, which is still subject to change, framed agriculture in a more positive light compared to earlier drafts. The role the sector plays in the EU’s “food sovereignty” was also emphasized.

“We need to make sure we have a balanced approach,” said European Commission Wopke Hoekstra, who unveiled the revised proposal. “The vast majority of our citizens sees the effects of climate change, does want protection, but is also worried about what that implies for their livelihood.”

Meanwhile, the BBC reports that the EU has also scrapped plans to cut pesticide use in half across the EU – which was to take effect by 2030 as part of the so-called “Green Deal.”

The changes were spearheaded by the powerful center-right European People’s Party (EPP), the political family of top EU executive Ursula Von der Leyen, and constitutes the EU Parliament’s largest group.

“Our farmers deserve to be listened to,” said Von der Leyen in a Tuesday meeting of Parliament. “I know that they are worried about the future of agriculture and their future as farmers.”

EPP environmental spokesman Peter Liese said on Monday that the 2040 target for a 90% cut over 1990 levels was conditional on greater emphasis being placed on “positive opportunities” for farmers, and less on “new instruments that rather see the farmers as an enemy of climate policy.”

That said, one EU official told Politico that reality is hard to escape – which is that the agricultural sector ‘could and should’ contribute to the EU’s climate goals.

“Despite all the semantics in the [Commission], there is an unequivocal Impact Assessment making a very compelling (business) case for an ambitious headline target and all sub-targets for sectors,” said the official.

Authored by Patrick Drennan via RealClear Wire,

Lessons from the battlefields of Ukraine

Hundreds of expensive tanks of both sides are being destroyed on the battlegrounds of Ukraine by cheap UPV drones. These include the Russian T-90MS Tank (worth about $4.2million) and the German Leopard 2A6 Tank (about $6.3 million). They are being destroyed by ubiquitous Chinese UPV drones, and their local variants, that sell for about $3000. The U.S. has also supplied Ukraine with 155mm howitzer rounds known as Remote Anti-Armour Munitions (RAAM). Each shell scatters nine 2.3kg magnetically activated mines. Tanks with limited vision, especially Russian tanks, often hit these mines, damaging their tracks, and making them sitting targets. They are all then finished off by precision artillery and antitank guided missiles.

Several military experts have argued that tanks will always have a place because “lighter infantry organizations lack the combination of firepower and mobility to achieve early battlefield dominance and immediately exploit success.” They are likely correct. However, most of their previous examples they give are combined arms battles of the 20th Century. Equally, there is no doubt that against lightly armed foes like Hamas in Gaza, they can seize key objectives. However, Ukraine presents a different experience.

Primarily, the losses for both sides in Ukraine are extraordinary.

Moscow invaded Ukraine with an estimated fleet size of 3,417 main battle tanks, around three and a half times that of Ukraine.

Russia lost roughly 60 percent, about 2,000 of these by mid-2023, The Moscow Times reported in July, citing the Kiel Institute’s Ukraine Support Tracker.

They claim that Ukraine has lost the same number of tanks, but there is no source for that claim. GitHub – an American AI platform,  estimates  Russian tank losses have remained above 3:1 over Ukraine since the start of the war.

Of course, that figure is relative, considering the Ukrainians had a smaller fleet to begin with.

What about replacements?

Considering new tank production, recovery of old tanks from long-term storage and the need to make good steep armor losses in 2022, the Kremlin can afford to write off 50 or so tanks a month without depleting its overall arsenal of around 3,000 front-line tanks.

Around Avdiivka alone, the Russians are losing 60 tanks a month. And that number could grow as the 239th Tank Regiment rolls into battle—and runs into the same minefields and artillery and drone kill-zones that pulverized the tank units that came before it.

And they keep on coming.

The Russians plan to roll more tanks toward Avdiivka. “The concentration of the 239th Tank Regiment of the 90th Tank Division is ongoing southwest of Avdiivka,” the Center for Defense Strategies, a Ukrainian think-tank, reported. The 239th is the third Russian tank regiment on the Avdiivka front, after the 80th and 10th. On paper, the 239th has a hundred or more tanks in several battalions altogether manned by a few thousand people.

Which tanks are performing best on the battlefield?

The old 42-ton Ukrainian T-64 Tanks (worth about $1.12 million) are heavily armored and are performing well. The German Leopard 2A6 Tank (62 tons) and the British Challenger II Tank (64 tons) are both faster and superior to the Russian tanks. “They have better armor protection using advanced active protection systems, fire control, optics, and munitions,” Seth G. Jones, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) noted. Still tank on tank battles are very rare. The most powerful American tank in Ukraine’s armory, the M1 Abrams Tank has not seen action simply because at 73 tons it too heavy for the muddy Ukrainian roads. It is also too expensive to maintain. The U.S. has stopped all further production of new Abram models.

Ironically, one of the best American tanks on the battlefield, is not actually a tank. It is a Bradely Fighting Vehicle (worth about $2.4 million)  The M3 Bradley (27.6 tons) equipped with BGM-71 TOW missiles is more than  a match for many Russian tanks. Ther are several Telegram videos of Bradely’s destroying Russian armored columns. Originally developed as an infantry carrier, it has a V shaped base and is very protective of its crew. The Russians who partly destroyed and captured one, after the Ukrainian crew escaped, were amazed at the protective inner compartment.

Which raises the issue that few of us want to visualize.

We, of the Xbox generation of immersive video games like Call of Duty and the World of Tanks, see exciting explosions but never burnt and injured realistic victims.

In real life tanks crews are burnt, injured, concussed, and suffer long-term brain damage.  

There is small consolation for Russian tank crews, as the ammunition is stored right next to the crew, and death is often instantaneous.

So, what is the future for the tank?

If there is infantry, there will be tanks. Big tank battles, however, will not be common.

In the short term:

Tanks that are lighter in order to ease the logistic, with V-shaped floors, crewless turret, with minor heat signature, APS systems against drones (like Trophy or light Droneguns), more equal armor thickness all around since now top hitting kamikaze drones and missiles are the main enemy, not other tanks anymore.

They would all be armed high-trajectory indirect-fire weapons like rockets, missiles, or mortars. Many tank models would also have additional secondary weapons like rotary multi-barrelled autocannons, machine guns, anti-infantry explosive strips on the sides, side-firing ports for internally carried soldiers or crew, etc. They would also have various types of advanced computer brains, communications, systems, and sensors.

Increasingly they sound like the relatively inexpensive M3 Bradley and the variants America are about to produce.

In the long term:

Tanks will be AI controlled and/or remotely controlled, crewless vehicles, with light armor and focus on mass production and low maintenance.

The Russian T-14 Armata is the first MBT designed with eventual automation in mind. The Russians are developing  a robotic addition to the Armata platform, called the Tachanka-B, and even retrofitting existing manned units for automation. The crew compartment will be replaced with additional fuel and ammunition.

Possibly:

Single human pilots will be commanding entire units of robot tanks and planes from support stations or command vehicles near the front. The human operator/commander will give the detachments of robots mission directives and the robots will execute the directives autonomously. This will be more combat efficient and less prone to electronic jamming. The robots will communicate with all other robotic and manned assets on the field to coordinate their attack and improve efficiency, human input will gradually decrease in the race to improve the operational efficiency of these new robot armies.

Futuristic and fantastic? – Maybe – Long live the tank.

Authored by Edward Ring via American Greatness,

Wind and solar energy cannot lift humanity into prosperity.

But as an impressive fleet of private jets has recently migrated from the COP 28 Summit in Dubai to the World Economic Forum in Davos, carrying the hoi polloi of the world from one elitist summit to another, this delusion was the dominant sentiment.

In this three-part analysis, what can accurately be described as a collective, perhaps willful delusion will be exposed in excruciating detail.

It will be dry and tedious reading. And perhaps that’s why journalists, activists, bureaucrats, and politicians have accepted the delusion.

So buckle up. Here’s the other side of the story.

Part One quantified by how much global energy production will need to increase if humanity is to have any hope of achieving universal energy security, much less energy abundance.

Part Two calculated the infeasible degree to which wind and solar energy production will have to increase in order to hit that minimum target while still fulfilling the goals of COP 28.

Part Three will conclude by examining non-fossil fuel alternatives to wind and solar and, in so doing, demonstrate why global energy security is impossible to achieve without increasing, not decreasing, reliance on coal, oil, and gas.

If the delusional but dead serious demands coming out of the international climate crisis community are to be believed, and as documented in the earlier two segments of this report, achieving universal energy security in the world will require wind energy capacity to increase by a factor of 60, while solar capacity increases by a factor of 100. The mix between wind and solar can vary, of course, but the required overall increase is indisputable. As noted in Part One of this report, that would be a very best-case scenario, where extraordinary improvements in energy efficiency meant that total energy production worldwide would only have to increase to 1,000 exajoules per year, from an estimated 600 exajoules in 2022.

Finally, and as explained in Part Two, this is preposterous. Wind and solar energy cannot possibly increase in global capacity by a multiple of 50-100 times. It is utterly infeasible. As noted, “The uptick in mining, the land consumed, the expansion of transmission lines, the necessity for a staggering quantity of electricity storage assets to balance these intermittent sources, the vulnerability of wind and solar farms to weather events including deep freezes, tornadoes, and hail, and the stupefying task of doing it all over again every 20-30 years as the wind turbines, photovoltaic panels, and storage batteries reach the end of their useful lives—all of this suggests procuring 90+ percent of global energy from wind and solar energy is a fool’s errand.”

One may nonetheless argue that other forms of energy can supplement wind and solar in order to still fulfill the climate community’s goal to completely displace oil, natural gas, and coal. But what then, and in what proportions? Here are the alternatives:

Tripling nuclear power—which was resolved at COP 28—is an ambitious goal already. Going from 440 operating reactors worldwide to more than 1,300 will be an effort fraught with risk, not merely because of the impact of fuel sourcing, processing, and waste—all of which can be managed—but because of security considerations due to the dual use of the technology. And even tripling global nuclear power still only delivers a mere 3.1 percent of the target 1,000 exajoules.

As for hydroelectric power, to even suggest it might be doubled worldwide—again only to provide 2.9 percent of the target 1,000 exajoules—is a transgression of unspeakable magnitude. There are few topics that so thoroughly ignite both apoplexy and unanimity among environmentalists as the damming of a river. Expect the Chinese and the Indians to further develop their hydroelectric capacity, along with a handful of other nations powerful enough to be both indifferent to and immune from environmentalist pressure. It is possible that hydroelectric capacity might more than double worldwide by 2050, but even if it were to quadruple to generate over 60 exajoules, that would still only represent 6 percent of the target of 1,000 exajoules.

Other solutions carry with them consequences as well that limit their scalability. As it is, biofuel plantations consume nearly 500,000 square miles worldwide. While biofuel crops can yield co-products such as animal feed, this only reduces net land use by between 10 and 40 percent. That improves the equation, but the land required for biofuel nonetheless makes the consequences of even just doubling production problematic. And like all large-scale agriculture, biofuel also requires irrigation, fertilizer, pesticide, and herbicide. Claiming biofuel is “carbon neutral” is an obfuscating distraction from the fact that it is one of the highest-impact “renewables” of all. And even doubling production, as reflected on the chart, barely brings biofuel’s contribution to global energy production up to a paltry 1 percent of the 1,000 exajoule global target.

Much has been made of so-called “cellulosic ethanol,” a fitfully emerging technology that extracts ethanol from stems and branches of trees and crop residue. While this form of ethanol extraction is promising and may eventually become cost-effective, it raises an important question. How sustainable is it to remove all growth from forests and farmland year after year when, for millennia, the ashes and slash in forests and the plowed-under crops on farms would be left in place to decompose to restore soil nutrients? Cellulosic ethanol, should it become commercialized and used widely, may end up depleting and degrading arable land and forest ecosystems.

So-called “biomass” is already used to generate power and, indeed, in developing nations, is still a primary source of fuel for heating and cooking. More advanced systems have been built all over the world to generate “carbon-neutral” electricity—neutral, of course, because the carbon being released in the combustion is carbon that was relatively recently sequestered from the atmosphere when the plants were growing. But sustainable use of biomass—removing it and burning it only at the rate it grows in the forest or on farms—still raises the question of whether this deprives soil of natural replenishment.

As an aside, it might make compelling sense to burn the excess biomass that has been accumulating in California’s overgrown forests, and, presumably, anywhere else where similar conditions have developed. Nearly a century of fire suppression in America, combined with the regulatory diminishment of the logging industry over the past few decades, has turned many forests into tinderboxes. But once the excess is removed and burned in biomass power plants and a balance of logging and controlled burns is restored to forest management, ongoing biomass extraction from forests to feed power plants may do more harm than good.

Hydrogen has been hyped almost as a panacea to global energy challenges. But hydrogen is not without problems that may be insurmountable. To begin with, hydrogen is not a hydrocarbon. It’s just hydrogen, which is the lightest element in the universe. It is extremely difficult to store in large quantities because, as such a light gas, it has a very low energy density per volume. Storing compressed hydrogen in usable quantities, such as onboard a vehicle, requires a vessel capable of withstanding 10,000 pounds per square inch. By contrast, natural gas, a molecule with one carbon atom and four hydrogen atoms, has an energy so much higher that it can be stored in usable quantities at only 3000 pounds per square inch. In its natural state, natural gas only has one third as much energy per volume as hydrogen.

But hydrogen burns clean! No CO2 emissions!

That’s true, but hydrogen, just like electricity, is a manufactured energy that has to be produced using some other form of energy. The politically popular scheme is to use electrolysis to extract hydrogen gas from water, then pump the hydrogen into an onboard fuel tank, where it can be converted back into electricity by putting it through a fuel cell. Without describing the technology behind electrolysis or a fuel cell, suffice to say that only about 70 percent of the electrical energy going into electrolysis comes back out in the form of hydrogen, and then only about 70 percent of the hydrogen going into a fuel cell comes out in the form of electricity to power an EV motor. And then there’s the energy necessary to pump the hydrogen into that 10,000 PSI tank—another 10 percent. Hydrogen fuel for vehicles will never achieve an energy efficiency greater than around 45 percent (70% x 70% x 90% = 44%). So much for that 80 percent target.

Hydrogen is also a corrosive gas, meaning we cannot simply repurpose our existing natural gas pipeline grid to transport hydrogen gas. Everything would have to be rebuilt. At best, hydrogen displays interesting potential, but it’s no panacea.

Can humanity eventually overcome its reliance on fossil fuel? The answer to that is certainly yes in the very long run, but an emphatic no in the next 25 years. This is why the fossil fuel industry has proposed creative ways to keep operating. Carbon sequestration schemes, for which oil companies and thermal power generators are happy to collect government subsidies to implement, involve pumping CO2 emissions into underground caverns. Carbon offset schemes, also supported by fossil fuel interests, enable companies to continue to emit CO2 if they pay for projects such as, for example, reforestation, which reputedly “sequester” an equivalent amount of carbon in the form of growing trees.

History may judge harshly the efficacy of carbon sequestration and carbon offsets, judging them as useless apart from being avenues (ok, superhighways) for corrupt redirection of billions (oops, trillions) of dollars. Facing powerful adversaries committed to the annihilation of their industries, however, can explain why fossil fuel emitters have embraced these schemes. Why commit corporate suicide when you can collect subsidies? What would be undoubtedly most productive would be to continue improving practices that scrub emissions of all pollutants apart from CO2, harvest natural gas flares which otherwise are wasted fuel, and overall continue to make the process of extracting, refining, and burning fossil fuel as clean as possible.

Someday, it is possible fossil fuel will be a fuel of the past. Fusion energy has been 20 years away from commercialization for the last 50 years and is still at least 20 years away from commercialization. But if physicists ever do succeed in confining a star in a bottle, the dream of energy that is both abundant and inexhaustible will have been realized. There are other possibilities. Synfuel that is formulated by removing CO2 from fossil fuel emissions and combining it with hydrogen gas to produce a liquid transportation fuel with a high energy density is already feasible, although nowhere near commercialization. Geothermal energy is a wild card, possibly with the potential to put a major dent in achieving the overall energy production target. On the other hand, wave energy, heralded by its proponents as a promising renewable energy solution, would probably make an even bigger mess than wind turbines without making much of a difference.

The reality today is that coal, oil, and gas provided about 500 exajoules of energy in 2022, just over 80 percent of the roughly 600 exajoules of global energy production. To achieve universal energy security in the world, global energy production must increase to 1,000 exajoules at the very least. In 2022, wind and solar energy together produced 12.4 exajoules, a pittance. The reality is simple: to reach a reasonable target for worldwide energy production, we have to develop everything. An all-of-the-above energy strategy is the only feasible approach. Anything else is delusional at best.

It would be a mistake, oblivious to the unforeseen technological breakthroughs that define human history, to not be optimistic about the world’s energy future in the long run.

But over the next 25 years, fossil fuel is going to be with us, and in the near term, its use will most likely increase rather than decrease. Our challenge is to use it as responsibly and efficiently as possible, not get rid of it.

Authored by Michael Hochberg & Leonard Hochberg via RealClearWire.com,

Introduction

On January 2, 2024, Foreign Minister Israel Katz proclaimed “We’re in the middle of World War III against Iran [led] radical Islam, whose tentacles are already in Europe.”   He claimed that Israel, in engaging in a war against Hamas and other Iranian proxies, was defending “everyone.” Although his rhetoric may seem overblown to many in the United States and Europe, it should not be dismissed out of hand.  Sometimes, regional conflicts, such as the Japanese conquest of Manchuria of 1931-32 or the Spanish Civil War of 1936-39, foreshadow dangers that are more geographically extensive and militarily intense.  Do the barbaric events of October 7, 2023, and the Israeli military campaign in Gaza prefigure a broader, global armed conflict?  Or is this merely a local conflict, one that is likely unresolvable short of one side or the other engaging in genocide or ethnic cleansing? 

We have written this paper in a specific context. Over thirty months ago we made a geopolitical prediction regarding the emergence of a global conflict with four fronts.  However, social scientists rarely test their theories by predicting future political events.  Who wants to be characterized as a Jonah or a Cassandra?  As one eminent strategist argued, the future of war (in detail) is unknowable.  And, with perhaps one notable exception, social scientists rarely engage, on a routine basis, in disprovable prediction.  Without predictive tools, social scientists and strategists must rely on intuition, a knowledge of history, and good theories—all of which are often in short supply.

A Four-Front Global War?

On the anniversary of D-day, June 6, 2021, The Hill posted our paper, “Could the United States Fight a Four Front War? Not Today.”  We predicted that several autocratic powers would launch “simultaneous challenges” designed to diminish the power and influence of the United States.  These seemingly distinct conflicts, when viewed from the perspective of Halford Mackinder’s Heartland thesis, should be perceived as separate fronts of a single war by autocratic, territorial powers – either in close cooperation or piggybacking on one or another’s challenge to the established order – on the dominance of the United States and its maritime partners and allies situated along the Eurasian littoral.  We argued that the United States should rebuild its naval capacity, and by implication its military industrial capacity more generally.  Specifically, we wrote: “If we are to avoid a multi-front war, the United States must be ready to fight and win conventional conflicts in several places simultaneously and must invest in strengthening our allies’ ability to defend themselves.”

Written on the eve of the withdrawal from Afghanistan, August 31, 2021, our paper suggested that Vladimir Putin’s Russia might once again attack Ukraine to complete the conquest it had initiated in 2014 and thereby dominate the northern littoral of the Black Sea from Crimea to Moldova. To wit:

Russia continues to threaten Ukraine, aiming to consolidate its conquest of Crimea. When Ukraine surrendered its nuclear arms, the U.S. guaranteed Ukrainian territorial integrity in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. Russia has eloquently demonstrated the low value of such guarantees.

Regarding Iran, we argued that:

Rogue autocratic regimes are a growing threat. Iran sponsors Houthi rebels in Yemen, stokes Shi’ite discontent in the Gulf States and Iraq, dominates Lebanon and Syria through Hezbollah, and threatens shipping through the Gulf of Hormuz. Iran, through its many proxies throughout the Middle East, would seek to dominate the region and instigate further attacks by Hamas on Israel. 

Communist China, a new peer adversary for the United States, would be tempted to pile on, seeking to reunify Taiwan with the Mainland as a preliminary to securing control over the South China and East China Seas:

Chinese leader Xi Jinping has declared that Taiwan will be incorporated into China, by force if necessary. China is building a capacity to invade or blockade Taiwan, threatening U.S. reliance on Taiwan for advanced electronics, semiconductors, and as a port to contain Chinese ambitions in the Pacific.

Our intuition suggested that the current administration was squandering a key strategic asset, specifically the deterrence required to cause leaders of autocracies across Eurasia to refrain from testing the resolve of the United States.  More recently, we introduced the concept of ‘distributed deterrence’ as a strategy that the United States could leverage to generate more effective deterrence both quickly and inexpensively.

We offered these predictions in the hope that Western policy makers would strengthen the defenses of our allies in Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan, and that as a result, deterrence would win the day.  In effect, we were hoping to be proven wrong, as policy makers considered the dangers of a multi-front war in their planning.  Unfortunately, events have begun to unfold as we predicted, because the United States did not act in a timely way to adequately reinforce, train, and support our allies.

Taking Stock

After 30 months, we believe it is now necessary to take stock of our prediction.  To do so is not merely to provide a checklist of what we got right or wrong, but more significantly to offer an assessment of how our understanding of the strategic history of Eurasian autocracies led to these predictions.

The Ukraine Front

The 2014 Russian attack on Ukraine resulted in the conquest of Donbas – a territory along the eastern Ukrainian border with Russia – and the Crimea.  These areas were inhabited largely by ethnic Russians and Russian speakers, though some of them certainly had no desire to be ruled from Moscow.  Putin justified this attack as a response to Ukraine’s assault on a population that wished to remain Russian, in a cultural, linguistic, and ethnic sense.  The Russian failure to capture a land bridge to Crimea from its conquests in Donbas strongly suggested that another campaign would have to be launched to consolidate territory, provide another supply route to Crimea, and forestall a Ukrainian bid to enter the EU and NATO (here, here, here, and here). 

After Russia renewed its war in Ukraine on February 22, 2022, many Western pundits began to speculate on how this second phase would end.  The Russian drive on Kiev, designed to conquer the Ukraine capital, stalled, and then was turned back.  Ukraine forces launched successful counter attacks in the east and south, reconquering some lost territory and fueling a sense that a Ukrainian victory might soon be possible.  Meanwhile, as the United States became more committed to the Ukraine cause, few commentators offered an assessment of what the United States should seek as an outcome in line with its own interests, and what means should be deployed in order to generate such an outcome.  We indicated that there were essentially three geostrategic outcomes (here, here, and here) that should be considered: Sell out Ukraine to turn Russia from an ally of China into a client of the United States, secure a rapid Ukraine victory that would reinforce the international rules based order, or allow a stalemate to emerge that would grind down the Russian military machine.  After explaining the pros and cons for each, we argued that the most desirable outcome, from an American strategic perspective, was a rapid Ukrainian victory that would result in Ukraine retaking both the Russian naval base in Sevastopol and the Crimean bridgehead.  Regardless of the feasibility of reconquering Crimea, the destruction of the Russian Black Sea fleet is highly desirable.

To achieve this goal, the United States had to quickly supply Ukraine with advanced conventional military equipment, including long range missiles that would enable Ukraine’s forces to attack not only the logistics centers deep in Russian territory but also the Russian Navy.  Instead, the Biden administration has released ever more advanced equipment, haltingly and in dribs and drabs, which did not permit the Ukrainian troops to expel Russian forces from Donbas.  What weapons were provided were in many cases deliberately crippled so that they could not be used against Russian territory.  Extensive public discussions have preceded the delivery of advanced weapons systems, which has made it impossible for the Ukrainians to achieve surprise.   Instead of a rapid Ukrainian advance, the current position is one of stalemate, with trial balloons being released for diplomacy (here, here, and here) to restore (a faux) peace to Ukraine.  Initiating talks with Putin at this moment, when he has mobilized more manpower and is negotiating the purchase of weapons from Iran and China, signals Western weakness while emboldening enemies of the United States and disheartening Western allies across Eurasia.  With a significantly larger economy and population base than Ukraine, and with the ability to operate from a geographic shelter where they cannot be attacked, Russia has marked advantages in a long-war scenario.  If Russian propaganda and Western impatience can undermine Western popular support for Ukraine, even maintaining the current stalemate may become impracticable for the Ukrainians.  A steady and assured flow of Western support, including the provision of advanced systems is a necessity for the continued viability of the Ukrainian war effort. 

Hamas-Israel Front

Israel, the United States’ foremost ally in the Middle East, has once again come under attack by Hamas.  In a recent post, we argue that Hamas attacked Israel on the behalf of Iran to derail the Abraham Accords between Israel and the Arabic Muslim countries including, most notably, an upcoming negotiation with Saudi Arabia.  Such was the short-term occasion for the attack; over the medium run, Iran had engaged in a geostrategy of proxy encirclement, at two different scales: the local encirclement of Israel and a wider regional encirclement of Saudi Arabia.

Across the Middle East, Saudi Arabia faces adversaries: Iran and its clients and proxies across the Fertile Crescent – that is the lands from Iraq, through Syria, and on to the eastern Mediterranean coast in Lebanon – and in Yemen, to the south of Saudi Arabia, where the Houthis have launched rockets attacking Saudi pipelines.  Furthermore, Iran has become deeply involved in the civil war in Sudan and has cooperated extensively with Qatar.  Both are major supporters of Hamas, and Iran backed Qatar during the crisis in Qatari relations with Saudi Arabia in 2017.   In addition to this geographically extensive encirclement of Saudi Arabia, there is ongoing effort to encircle Israel: To the North, Iranian proxies in Lebanon (i.e., Hezbollah) and, across the Golan Heights, the client state of Alawite Syria; to the east, the Palestinians in the territories of Jordan and the Palestinian Authority; in Israel, the Arab Israelis as a potential fifth column; and, to the west, in Gaza, the terror group, Hamas.  An Israeli tie to Saudi Arabia would have provided Israel with legitimacy in the Arab Muslim world and, should the Iranians launch an attack on Saudi Arabia or Israel, shared intelligence, technology, and expertise could have contributed to mutual defense.  For the foreseeable future, while the war in Gaza continues, negotiations between Israel and Saudi Arabia are unlikely to yield any public results.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his war cabinet recognized in the aftermath of the slaughter of October 7, 2023 that Hamas and Gazan civilians were inspired by a culture of hatred to commit acts of barbarism (here, here, and here) – rape, beheadings, mutilation, kidnappings, etc. – previously deployed by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. To respond to this attack along the Gaza frontier, and to cope with the threats emerging on the northern border, on the Golan, and in the West Bank, Israel called up 300,000 reservists.  As of October 8, 2023, Israel’s standing army numbered 169,500, with the reserves numbering 465,000.  This call-up has deleterious economic consequences:  According to the Times of India, “JPMorgan Chase & Co. predicts that Israel’s economy may shrink 11% on an annualized basis in the last three months of the year due to the ongoing conflict with Hamas.”  The longer this war goes on, the greater the economic disruption.  The longer the desired political and military outcome, eliminating Hamas in Gaza, remains in doubt, the greater the likelihood that Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies will enter the fray in a significant fashion.  For Israel, deterrence, once lost in Gaza, must be forcefully and unambiguously restored, or its many regional enemies, including the Palestinians on the West Bank and potentially Muslims in Israel itself, may be inspired to launch intifadas, insurrections, and attacks.  For Israel, the attack on 10/7 and its aftermath presented an existential threat, because it altered regional perceptions of the competence of the IDF (contra here).

The Attack on International Shipping

In our prediction, we suggested that the Iranian regime would once again disrupt maritime commerce by attacking international shipping that passed through the Strait of Hormuz.  On January 11, 2024, Iran announced the seizure of a Greek-owned oil tanker in the Gulf of Oman, the waterway leading to the Strait of Hormuz.  It is too soon to tell if this event is a one-off or the opening of a campaign. 

However, we did not perceive that the Iranians would prompt the Houthis to disrupt maritime commerce in the Bab al-Mandab, the strait connecting the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea via the Red Sea and the Suez Canal.  The Iranians have allegedly supplied the Houthis with advanced weaponry – missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles – for attacking Saudi pipelines and international shipping.  Although the Houthis’ claim to be attacking Israeli shipping in response to the Gaza war, the fact that most of the ships that have been attacked are owned by non-Israeli nationals and are not traveling to or from Israel suggests that these attacks are part of an ongoing Iranian effort to disrupt flows of commerce passing through the Middle East.  Such attacks are particularly harmful to the Egyptian regime, which derives an outsized portion of their revenues from canal fees and associated activity.  Identifying the geographic particular, the disruption at the Bab al-Mandab instead of at the Strait of Hormuz, proved elusive; however, we anticipated the Iranian intention. 

Why did the Iranians turn to the Houthi proxy?  The Iranians may have become more risk averse, acting indirectly through the Houthis; attacks through proxies are less likely to generate repercussions or counterattacks at home, as they are deniable.  Meanwhile Iranian proxies are also engaged in repeatedly attacking U.S. outposts and military bases in Iraq and Syria, and most egregiously the U.S. embassy in Baghdad.  Iran has also issued a threat to attack shipping passing through the Strait of Gibraltar, presumably by mobilizing another proxy in Morocco.  Such geostrategic darts, for want of a better word, thrown at the United States and maritime commerce have demonstrated Iranian opposition to the Israeli war in Gaza and an intent to compromise the passage of shipping over the high seas.  It is unclear whether Iran’s leaders seek to drive the United States out of the Middle East, or whether they intend to draw the United States into a series of local counterinsurgencies against Iranian proxies, which would give Iran immense negotiating leverage.

As of the writing of this essay, these attacks at the Bab al-Mandab have led the United States and the United Kingdom to attack the Houthis, but the maritime coalition has not, as yet, used military force against Iranian interests or facilities to reestablish deterrence with regard to the sponsors of these proxy attacks.  Certainly, these attacks serve to increase open-market prices for oil and gas; this helps Russian economic prospects.  Also, China is likely paying fixed prices for sanctioned Iranian oil coming through the Straits of Hormuz; this likely helps explain why the Red Sea is being closed (to all but Chinese and Russian aligned shipping) but Hormuz has thus far remained open.

What is of utmost importance here is this: the earlier a prediction, the more difficult it is to specify the date and location of any adversarial event, particularly a military attack.  The fact that the Iranians have instigated attacks by Houthis at the Bab al Mandab instead of launching a campaign at Hormuz is less important than having correctly predicted Iran’s intentions amid a multi-front war.  We advanced the claim that the Iranians would once again disrupt international shipping, which they have done through a proxy.  Attacks at any major maritime choke point have consequences for supply chains across the world economy.    

China and the Taiwan Front

The jury is still out regarding a final geopolitical prediction:  Will Communist China resort to armed force to integrate Taiwan?  Recently, the Chinese regime has sent war ships into the seas near Taiwan to demonstrate a capacity to blockade that island.  In addition, Chinese fighter jets have tested Taiwanese aerial defenses, prompting Defense Minister Chiu Kuo-cheng to state, in October of 2022, that “[We] will view any crossing of aerial entities (into Taiwan’s territorial airspace) as a first strike.”  Kuo-cheng subsequently threatened to respond with force. 

CNN recently reported that President Xi Jinping told President Joe Biden, during their summit held near San Francisco on November 15, 2023, that “China’s preference was for peaceful reunification and laid out conditions under which use of force would be utilized.”  CNN failed to report on those conditions or may not have been privy to the specifics; nevertheless, CNN also reported that an unnamed U.S. official indicated that, when Biden suggested that “peace and stability” were U.S. goals for the region, “President Xi responded: Look, peace is all well and good, but at some point we need to move towards resolution more generally[.]” In the run up to the recent election in Taiwan, Beijing urged voters to choose “peace over war.”  The candidate who Beijing perceived as advocating for Taiwanese independence won, and now Xi may believe that China has to make good on the many threats (here, here, here, here, and here) issued regarding the Taiwan issue.

Such threats should not be ignored; rather, they must be understood as occurring during an ongoing confrontation with the United States, one that could erupt into another front in a global war should the United States continue dealing ineffectively with the seemingly separate conflicts in Ukraine, the Levant, and at the Bab al-Mandab.  As our prediction indicated, the greater the number of fronts in this emerging global conflict, the more difficult it will be for the United States to prioritize where to send depleted treasure – due in part to the rising national debt – and scarce weaponry – due in part to the failure to maintain an adequate industrial base to produce military hardware. 

Four Fronts, One War

At this point, the Russo-Ukraine war, Hamas’ attack on Israel and the Israeli response, the Houthis’ war against international shipping, and the 100 or more Iranian proxy attacks on American outposts in the Middle East would all suggest that a multifront war has been launched.   Was this multi-front war coordinated, sequenced, or merely the result of opportunism? 

Historians may one day be able to make a definitive determination.  For purposes of figuring out what to do next, this is a distinction without a difference: The perception among the enemies of the West is that the present moment is one in which they have an opportunity to exploit Western distraction and weakness.  What is known now is this: Russia, Iran and China have signed a series of bilateral economic agreements rendering their economies, including weapons acquisitions, more interdependent (here, here, here, here and here).  Such economic understandings often undergird emerging alliances. 

For further evidence that the prediction of four fronts is in fact one war, consider the following mutually reinforcing consequences.  The shipments of Ukrainian exports through the Suez Canal have fallen off since the Houthis compromised transport that passes through the Bab al Mandab.  Ukraine’s financial ability to prosecute its war against Russia is thus being impaired.  Russian and Chinese freighters have reportedly been given a free pass through the Red Sea by the Houthis (here), a preferential policy conferring a time and distance advantage over competitors who, to avoid the war zone, transport their cargoes round the Cape of Good Hope to European markets.  Meanwhile, Russian Defense Ministry has reportedly announced a soon-to-be-signed, anti-American, and pro-multipolar pact with Iran.  Meanwhile, the delivery of U.S. military hardware to Ukraine and Israel reduces available equipment for Taiwan.

Will Xi Jinping take advantage of America’s lack of preparedness for a multifront war across the Eurasian rimland?  For our prediction of a four-front war to be fully realized, Communist China would have to blockade or attack Taiwan even as these other conflicts take place, or in their immediate aftermath – once it becomes apparent that the United States lacks the will and/or the capability to respond effectively to yet another threat to the existing order.  At some point, these separate fronts may be perceived as a single world-wide war, though not, as the Israeli Foreign Minister claimed, a world war between the West and radical Islam.  Instead, this world-wide four-front war should be perceived as Eurasian land-power autocracies attacking maritime democracies and their allies, led by the United States. 

Geopolitical Theory of the Heartland

Beyond an intuition born of having read strategic history, what theory informs our understanding of strategic history and the relevant geography?  We rely on geopolitical theory, most notably Halford Mackinder’s theory of the Heartland, to assess the trajectory of events across Eurasia.  Despite differences across Mackinder’s three geopolitical statements (1904, 1919, and 1943), the essential feature of his geopolitical theory is this: With the completion of the Trans-Siberian Railroad, the economic isolation imposed on interior Eurasian settlements by virtue of the cost of overland transportation had come to an end.  Until that moment, a vast stretch of territory reaching from the Arctic in the north to the Iranian plateau in the south, from the Lena, Indigirka, and Kolyma River basins in the east and beyond Moscow to the west, was characterized by a shared geographic feature: the rivers in this area flowed north to the frozen Arctic Ocean or south to land-locked seas such as the Caspian Sea.  As a result of this landlocked situation, naval power, exercised by Great Britain or other seafaring nations, had little if any military impact on the course of events in the region Mackinder labeled ‘the Heartland.’  But with the completion of the Railway, Tsarist Russia – and later the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics – alone or in an alliance with European or Asian powers, might profoundly influence the course of global events due to access to new sources of minerals, the presence of virgin soil, and demographic expansion.  Ultimately, interior lines of transport and communication for the movement of armies overland across the expanse of the Heartland would enable whichever power occupied the Heartland to project power westward to the European Coastlands, southwestward to Arabia, and south and eastward into the Monsoon Coastland – three of the six natural regions of Eurasia (here and here).

Even more critical was Mackinder’s recognition that World War I led to a potential reshaping of the Heartland as one of these natural regions.  Mackinder posited that the region he labeled the “Strategic Heartland” included contested seas and river basins, as well as land routes suitable for invasion.  Hence, the Strategic Heartland encompassed the natural Heartland, and in Europe, it extended to the Danube Basin, the Black Sea littoral, the eastern stretches of the Northern European Plain, and the Baltic Sea littoral.  For Mackinder, the maritime outposts of naval power, the Black and Baltic Seas, might be turned into “lakes,” should the power occupying the Heartland capture a sea’s littoral through the successful domination by land power. 

Learning From Geopolitical Theory

We learned three lessons from Mackinder’s geopolitical theory.  First, Mackinder’s argument pertaining to the Baltic and Black Seas revealed that threatening or capturing the maritime chokepoints near the Bosporus and Dardanelles or the Kattegat and Skagerrak – the straits north of Denmark connecting the Baltic to the North Sea – was essential to controlling these seas.  By way of a geographic analogy, Mackinder’s theory enables the observer of geopolitics to appreciate how control over the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandab compromises freedom of the seas in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea approach to the Suez Canal and may eventually lead to control over the relevant coastlines.  However, modern missile technology requires only proximity to a strategic strait or narrow body of water for sea denial to be effective against commercial shipping (here).

Second, Mackinder’s 1920 Report on the situation in South Russia during the Bolshevik Revolution revealed the strategic importance of Ukraine’s territory.  A major invasion into the Russian cultural and demographic core around Moscow was launched north from Ukraine by the White Russian forces.  In addition, one glance at a “strategic map” of Europe, viewed from high above the Urals, reveals not only the importance of the Northern European plain as an invasion route into Russia but also the southern invasion route from the Crimea.  Before the recent outbreak of war, the United States allegedly began modernizing a Ukrainian naval base located east of Odessa  to accommodate larger warships.  Russian geostrategic planners must consider threats from both directions, particularly if the Baltics and Ukraine are aligned with what they consider to be an adversary.  For restoring the Russian empire and reestablishing Russian status as a great power, the conquest and incorporation of Ukraine is perceived as critical.  Russia seeks to dominate Ukraine for its manpower, its on-shore mineral and off-shore hydrocarbon deposits, its industrial base, its agricultural productivity, and its strategic location.  In geo-economic terms, the ongoing division of the world-economy into a sphere of maritime and the land-based Eurasian territorial powers puts Ukraine in the cross hairs.

Third, America, as the recent holder of the baton of thalassocracy, failed to forestall the formation of a proto alliance of the Heartland Power, Russia, with two powers that straddle the Heartland and the maritime rim, Iran, and China.  In Democratic Ideals and Reality (1919), Mackinder warned of the danger of the Heartland Power gaining control over the Baltic and Black seas and then, at some future date, securing power over Eurasia and Africa:

What if the Great Continent, the whole World-Island [i.e., Eurasia and Africa] or a large part of it, were at some future time to become a single and united base of sea-power?  Would not the other insular bases be outbuilt as regards ships and outmanned as regards seamen?  Their fleets would no doubt fight with all the heroism begotten of their histories, but the end would be fated.

Mackinder feared that the Heartland Power, alone or in alliance with powers controlling portions of the maritime rim of Eurasia, might go to sea, and become an amphibious power. 

Currently, in Ukraine, Russia seeks to reassert control over the northern Black Sea littoral, from Crimea to Moldova, thereby gaining control over the offshore hydrocarbons (here).  China and Iran, with their long coastlines, have decided to become amphibious powers while developing and deploying drones and land-based anti-ship missiles for sea control and denial.  Iran makes modern weapons systems for their Houthi proxies.  China threatens to reintegrate Taiwan, by force, if necessary, perhaps by blockade, even as it asserts exclusive control over the passage of shipping and offshore hydrocarbon deposits in the South China Sea.

NOW WHAT?

What of the near future?  Will there be any further challenges to the United States?  Venezuela placed a referendum in front of its citizenry questioning whether contested territory currently held by Guyana should be reincorporated into Venezuelan territory.  The response was in favor of reincorporation, with Venezuela reportedly mobilizing contingents of its military.  Guyana and Brazil have responded.  A nuclear armed North Korea continues to issue threats in response to alleged American and South Korean provocations.  The Russian regime has imperial ambitions beyond Ukraine.  Should Putin or his successor believe that the conquest of the Baltic States is achievable, it will certainly be attempted.  And there is a final point grounded in a comparative geopolitical speculation: In addition to compromising passage through Bab al-Mandab and the Strait of Hormuz, and the threat to shipping via the Strait of Gibraltar, Iran or another power may mobilize a proxy near another maritime choke point – the Strait of Malacca.  Certainly, the autocracies of the world are engaged in gray-zone warfare aimed at undermining Western support for Israel and Ukraine and aimed at mobilizing political extremists of all stripes.  With the very large number of Muslim immigrants in Western Europe, any instability in the Middle East can easily produce crippling riots and insurgent or terrorist activity, especially with financial and logistical support from Iran and other regional powers.  Western leaders are beginning to recognize that weakness in dealing with the threats that are already on the table will prompt new challenges in new locations (here and here).

Despite these ominous developments, the United States and its allies have generated one significant success and several potential successes in their attempt to thwart the designs of these autocratic Heartland regimes.  In response to the war in Ukraine, Finland has joined NATO and Sweden’s accession has recently been approved by a parliamentary committee in Turkey (though not yet by the Turkish state).  The anticipated consequence is to turn the Baltic Sea, but for the Russian naval base at Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg, into a NATO dominated lake.  In addition, should Ukraine manage to reverse Russian territorial conquests, secure its independence from Russia, and then join NATO and the EU, these events would represent an extension of European power.  Meanwhile, Ukraine has had great success in driving the Russian Black Sea Fleet out of Crimea and into home ports further from Ukrainian missile launching sites; we have argued that before the war is over, the Ukrainians should be furnished with the means to sink the remainder of the fleet and destroy the shipyards.  Ukrainian successes in attacking the Black Sea fleet have led the Russians to consider building a naval base in Ochamchire, Georgia.   In the Middle East and Arabia, the United States almost succeeded in fostering an extension of the Abraham Accords to include Saudi Arabia.  Finally, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”) is a potential maritime alliance of India, Australia, Japan, and the United States that may, in the coming years, act to secure the free passage of shipping in the South China Sea and defend Taiwan.  In short, across the maritime rim of Eurasia, the United States is slowly mobilizing partners and allies that are threatened by the revisionist and revanchist regimes of the Heartland.

Conclusion: Strategy and the Geopolitical Advantage

Our horrifying prediction, which may yet be fully realized, of a four-front war was made by attending to geopolitical theory, strategic history, and an intuition for how events might unfold.  Regardless of whether China undertakes kinetic action against Taiwan, the United States and our allies now need to rush preparations for such a war at the highest possible priority.  As we pointed out in the earlier article, being ready to fight a global, multi-front war is the only way to avert one.

Geopolitics provides the observer of international relations with several advantages.  First, it is an interdisciplinary and integrative field of study that aims to capture aspects of reality that impinge on the evolution of international crises.  Second, it juxtaposes persistent geographic structures, such as landed and maritime locations and activities, with trends and events, placing the ephemeral in the context of the enduring (here).  Third, geography and geopolitics deploy particularizing and generalizing methods to understand the relationships of places to spaces, locations to regions, and nation-states to the international system.  Fourth, geopolitics uses maps, including those generated by geographic information systems, to develop an appreciation of how states transform terrain into more favorable environments for the projection of power amid adversarial relationships, both potential and realized. 

Geopolitics is as old an approach to international conflict as Thucydides, Sun Tse, and Kautilya.   It may be that geopolitical analysis, if properly deployed, gives insight reminiscent of Galadriel’s Mirror, “For it shows things that were, and things that are, and things that yet may be.”

However, despite the advantages offered by geopolitical thought for the development of strategy, Mackinder is explicit (here): “Democracy refuses to think strategically unless and until compelled to do so for purposes of defense.” After at least a generation, now is the moment for Americans to once again use geopolitics to formulate strategy.

*  *  *

Acknowledgements:  The authors thank the speakers and participants in the Mackinder Forum seminars and lectures for sharing their insights.  Professors Brian Blouet, Athanasios Platias, Geoffrey Sloan, and Paul Rahe commented on an earlier draft of this paper.  We are grateful for their thoughtful suggestions.  Errors and misinterpretations remain ours.

Michael Hochberg earned his PhD in Applied Physics from Caltech and is currently a visiting scholar at the Centre for Geopolitics at Cambridge University.  He is the President of Periplous LLC, which provides advisory services on strategy, technology, and organization design.  He co-founded four companies, representing an exit value over a billion dollars in aggregate, spent some time as a tenured professor, and started the world’s first silicon photonics foundry service.  He co-authored a widely used textbook on silicon photonics and has published work in Science, Nature, National Review, The Hill, American Spectator, RealClearDefense, Fast Company, Naval War College Review, etc.

Leonard Hochberg taught at Stanford University (among other institutions), was appointed a Fellow at the Hoover Institution, and co-founded Strategic Forecasting, Inc. (i.e., STRATFOR).  He has published in Social Science History, The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, National Review, The Hill, American Spectator, RealClearDefense, Naval War College Review, Orbis, etc.   Len Hochberg earned his PhD in political theory and European history at Cornell University.  He is a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and serves as the Coordinator of the Mackinder Forum-U.S.

Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of ZeroHedge.

The words Islamic Republic of Iran and “porn star” aren’t two concepts one typically hears coupled in the same sentence, but this week controversy and confusion has been unleashed after adult film actress Whitney Wright made a bizarre visit to Iran.

Wright, whose real name is Brittni Rayne Whittington, also deems herself a pro-Palestinian activist, and presumably that is how she was allowed into Iran. At the start of this week she posted multiple photos of herself wearing – ironically enough – an Islamic hijab during her trip to tour the capital of Tehran.

“I’m extremely disappointed that the attention surrounding my visit [seems] to overshadow Israel’s ongoing genocide in Gaza,” Wright has told Newsweek, addressing the significant backlash online that followed her photos. The porn star says she’s “not backing down”.

According to EuroNews, Iranian opposition activists were especially outraged:

US-based activist Masih Alinejad, who faced assassination attempts by Iran, condemned Wright for making the trip and for alleged remarks where the actress said “if you respect the law, you will be safe in Iran.”

Alinejad took to X to point out that “American porn star Whitney Wright is in Iran, my birth country, where women are killed for simply showing their hair and being true to themselves.”

Also controversial were her posts seeming to glorify the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution which resulted in the long-running US hostage crisis. In one Instagram post…

She said she “HAD to visit” the embassy where Iranian students held staff members hostage for 444 days after the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

She’s been accused also by pro-Israel pundits of being a willing propagandists on behalf of Tehran, and for issuing anti-American statements and images at a moment US forces have come under attack in the Middle East.

Engaging in pornography can bring the death penalty in the hardline Islamic Republic. So how did this supposed “influencer” line up the strange junket which involved taking snaps (fully clothed) in and around the capital? Also did she have government-assigned minders to escort here (as is sometimes the case)?…

American porn star Whitney Wright is in Iran, my birth country, where women are killed for simply showing their hair and being true to themselves.
Whitney has published several photos on herself completely covered up on Instagram. On her post she called me a warmonger and tells… pic.twitter.com/MwBBsVorBJ

— Masih Alinejad 🏳️ (@AlinejadMasih) February 4, 2024

Strangely, even though there’s no doubt Iranian foreign ministry authorities deeply vet especially Americans and other Westerners who wish to enter, Iranian officials are claiming “they didn’t know” about her role in pornography:

In Tehran, foreign ministry spokesman Nasser Kanani denied any knowledge of her trip, but noted that despite the political tensions “it is not forbidden” for Americans to visit Iran.

A source told the Tasnim news agency that she was not invited by any organization in Iran and the visa system “was not aware of the nature of her immoral and obscene occupation”.

At this point Wright has moved on in her travels and is safely out of Iran.

The whole spectacle of a porn actress inside Iran certainly does not seem very in keeping with old fashioned hardline Iranian ‘Islamic Revolution’ principles.

Submitted by Gun Owners of America,

As the United States prepares for its most-watched sporting event of the year, anti-gun senators are pushing for a reauthorization of the Undetectable Firearms Act of 1988 in Congress.

Thanks to the support of our grassroots membership, Gun Owners of America and our allies in Congress were successful in removing a permanent reauthorization of the UFA from a must-pass military funding bill.

But the anti-gun lobby isn’t going to give up without a fight, especially with the law set to expire in just under a month.

In drumming up support for reauthorizing the UFA, anti-gun politicians have found some new allies: Professional sports leagues.

The NFL, NHL, NBA, and even NASCAR have written a letter to Congress in support of the reauthorization of the Undetectable Firearms Act.

While the letter states that the leagues “urge you to reauthorize this critical law so that our organizations can continue to keep our fans safe,” the evidence is that the UFA is an arbitrary and capricious law that only serves as a ticking time bomb for future gun control.

Under current law, all that a criminal would have to do to violate the Undetectable Firearms Act would be to 3D Print a gun and not epoxy the legally required amount of metal to the frame.

Believe it or not, criminals and terrorists have been committing crimes in the United States this past decade, but they’re not choosing fully plastic or 3D-printed guns.

Watch: Ben from GOA Demonstrates how a simple Garrett Security Wand can detect a .22LR bullet through layers of 3D-printed plastic and clothing.

How do we know criminals aren’t using “undetectable” guns? Well, we searched every criminal indictment, prosecution, and conviction since the 1990’s and no one has ever been charged—let alone convicted—of violating the Undetectable Firearms Act.

If Professional sports leagues were concerned about these types of firearms being snuck into their events, they could upgrade their security systems instead of relying on an unconstitutional law that criminals easily ignore. 

Millimeter Wave Scanners and other modern detection devices can detect non-metal—such as plastic guns. And common metal detectors like this garret hand scanner can easily detect metal weighing far less than the archaic 3.7oz of metal requirement from the 1980’s.

Professional sporting leagues like the NFL should stick to entertainment and stop attempting to infringe on their customer’s rights.

Gun Owners of America stands with our allies in Congress in opposition to the reauthorization of the archaic Undetectable Firearms Act. Please call your elected representatives and demand they do the same. 

*   *   *

We’ll hold the line for you in Washington. We are No Compromise. Join the Fight Now.

In less than 15 minutes, President Biden proved Special Counsel Robert Hur right and confirmed all concerns about his fitness for office.

As we detailed earlier, Hur wrote in his report that he would not suggest bringing charges against the president for his mishandling of classified documents because, “Biden will likely present himself to the jury, as he did during his interview with our office, as a sympathetic, well-meaning, elderly man with a poor memory.”

The president, having ‘seen dead people’ numerous times this week, was apparently displeased with the report, and decided the correct course of action was a (rare) press conference to set the world straight on his mental acuity.

It did not go well.

He welcomed the special counsel’s decision not to bring charges:

“The bottom line is the matter is now closed,” Biden asserted, with respect to the report.

But, then proceeded to throw his staff under the bus:

“I take responsibility for not having seen exactly what my staff was doing,” he said.

“Things that appeared in my garage, things that came out of my home, things that were moved, were moved not by me, but my staff, but my staff,” he continued.

Then he took issue with the special counsel report’s questioning his mental acuity around the timing of his son’s death, and angry-old-man mode was unleashed:

“How in the hell dare he raise that? Frankly, when I was asked the question, I thought to myself, it was none of their damn business,” Biden thundered.

Biden started to say he wore his son’s rosary every day since the day Beau died, but stopped, when he appeared to forget where the rosary came from.

“Every Memorial Day we hold a service remembering him, attended by friends and family and the people who loved him,” Biden continued, after a pause. “I don’t need anyone. I don’t need anyone to remind me when he passed away.”

The mumbling continued as opened up the press conference to questions – not a great idea in hindsight.

Constantly defending himself against allegations of failing memory, Biden appeared to snap when Fox News White House correspondent Peter Doocy asked Biden, “How bad is your memory?”

“My memory is so bad I let you speak,” Biden said.

“My memory is fine. Take a look at what I’ve done since I’ve become president.”

Doocy pressed, pointing to the Special Counsel’s description of Biden as an “elderly, well-meaning man.”

“I am well-meaning. And I’m an elderly man. And I know what the hell I’m doing,” Biden reacted.

“I’ve been president – I put this country back on its feet. I don’t need his recommendation.”

Biden’s rage reached its zenith when a CNN reporter began to ask a question about the American people’s concerns about his mental state (a perspective that is widely held according to many polls). “The American people have been watching and they have expressed concerns about your age,” the reporter said.

“That is your judgement! That is your judgement! That is not the judgement of the press!” Biden shouted back at her.

Biden also bizarrely claimed that he had vowed to be a “president” for everybody “whether they were from a red state or a green state.”

And then, as his piéce de resistance, after initially walking out, the president called Israel’s response in Gaza “over the top” and then mistakenly referred to Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi as the President of Mexico.

“Initially, the president of Mexico — Sisi — did not want to open up the gate to allow humanitarian material to get in. I talked to him. I convinced him to open the gate.”

He did not correct himself.

Egyptian drug lord. pic.twitter.com/4qrDcUgNGu

— Orda (@TheChaosEngine1) February 9, 2024

So to summarize:

In a press conference trying to prove that he is not senile and thus competent enough to stand trial.

Wild stuff. pic.twitter.com/8ugZNmDfbx

— Yossi Gestetner (@YossiGestetner) February 9, 2024

Watch the full (15 minutes from start to finish) shitshow here:

And believe it or not, it got worse as even CNN refused to provide cover for the president:

CNN’s Elie Honig on Biden’s denial he shared classified documents with his ghostwriter:

“He’s ON TAPE — after he’s out of the vice presidency — saying to his autobiographer, ‘the classified documents are in the basement.’ He knew it!” pic.twitter.com/pft2PbQ9oC

— RNC Research (@RNCResearch) February 9, 2024

Of course, the ultimate irony of all of this is that it occurred within minutes of Tucker Carlson releasing an unedited, wide-ranging two-hour long interview with Russian president Vladimir Putin.

By Tony Mulvey of FreightWaves

Dry season in Panama is in full swing, and the impacts to trade through the Panama Canal will remain challenged in the months to come. The situation in the canal, after a wetter-than-expected November, wasn’t as dire as many believed, allowing the number of daily transits to increase in January.

The Panama Canal forecast 24 daily transits in January, up from 20 previously expected for January and 18 previously expected for February. Throughout fiscal year 2023, 12,638 vessels traversed the canal, a daily average of 34 oceangoing vessels moving through the canal. 

In the first four months of the canal’s fiscal year 2024, there were 3,233 transits across all vessel types, with the vast majority being Panamax vessels. The run rate for fiscal year 2024 of vessels through the canal is 9,700, 23% lower than the 2023 fiscal year throughput.

While container traffic receives a lot of attention, the tanker and dry bulk market will be heavily impacted as well. Through the first four months of fiscal 2024, chemical tankers have made up 25.6% of Panamax-class vessels that have traversed the canal. Liquefied petroleum gas carriers made up 25.5% of the Neopanamax traffic through the canal.

The water levels within the Panama Canal are largely to blame, but any hope for a significant rebound in water levels to boost throughput will likely be met with a harsh reality over the next few months.

The water levels are going to remain a challenge that has the potential to continue to derail vessel throughput. Gatun Lake, the manmade lake that vessels must traverse, had water levels at 81.2 feet as of Tuesday. Water levels in this critical portion of the canal have started 2024 at the lowest level on record, dating back to 1965.

Projections are for even lower levels over the next two months, falling below 80 feet in early April.

Three of the largest five ports in the U.S. rely on shipments that navigate through the Panama Canal: the Port of New York and New Jersey, the Port of Savannah, Georgia, and Port Houston. Over the past month, these three ports combined to handle 30% of total twenty-foot equivalent unit throughput. For reference, the two largest ports in the country: the Port of Los Angeles and the Port of Long Beach, accounted for 32% of the total U.S. throughput.

Import demand has picked up steam ahead of the Lunar New Year, which will provide a boost to overall imports that are trending above last year’s levels. This boost is being felt by the East Coast ports, like Savannah, where the Ocean TEU Volume Index is up over 40% in the past month.

The water crisis is creating increased delays as backlogs around the canal remain.

The limiting effects of the low water levels have created an additional six-day delay on average to the Port of Savannah from all ports around the globe. These delays are adding an extra day and a half to the scheduled transit times, which have also increased — nearly four days longer than they were this time last year.

These delays are even more impactful the further up the Eastern Seaboard you go. The Port of New York and New Jersey is having similar delays, around the six-day mark, but are over three days longer than they were last year.

Comparing these East Coast ports to their West Coast counterparts, the port pair delays for the Port of Los Angeles are under three days and nearly a day less than they were this time last year.

Mother Nature is outside human control, and if the water level projection holds true, the next couple of months could add to the ongoing crisis.