One Reason This Energy Shock Is Not Like The One 15-Years Ago

Arend Kapteyn, the global head of economics and strategy research and chief economist at UBS, told clients that one key reason the current Middle East conflict-driven energy shock “is not like 2011-2014” will be the absence of a comparable response from the shale patch, suggesting consumers are more likely to bear the brunt of the pain. 

Kapteyn noted that, on an inflation-adjusted basis, oil prices in 2011-2014 were actually higher than they are today, yet the U.S. economy absorbed that shock because the shale boom provided a lift to the industrial base. Soaring WTI crude prices at the time spurred oil/gas companies to increase drilling activity, production growth, and energy-sector investment. This helped create a tailwind for the US’ manufacturing base and offset some of the drag from higher fuel costs.

However, this is where the bullish U.S. economic case starts to look a little shaky. As Kapteyn noted, “The oil sector is much less responsive to prices than a decade ago.” 

The Trump administration has indicated that the oil price shock is temporary, suggesting shale drilling is unlikely to increase meaningfully or provide much of a tailwind for the manufacturing base.

That means this time, the pain from higher energy prices is more likely to hit consumers directly through weaker spending power, with less offset from booming domestic oil investment.

The shock at the gas pump begins:

We warned:

• $5 Diesel Means A 35% Jump In Prices For US Consumers

Kapteyn continued:

A common question is why current oil prices should be a concern for the U.S. economy when prices were substantially higher in 2011-2014 and growth held up well. Over that earlier period, Brent averaged around $110/bbl—close to $145/bbl in today’s dollars, roughly 23% above today’s spot prices—yet U.S. GDP growth still averaged just over 2%.

There are, of course, many differences relative to then: today’s labor market is weaker, households are more liquidity constrained, and the inflationary impulse is sharper, reflecting a much faster run-up in prices (oil prices never rose more than about 55% year-on-year in 2011-2014, versus close to 100% if today’s prices are sustained). But the key difference—and the focus here—is shale.

At the start of 2010, the U.S. mining sector (largely oil and gas) accounted for roughly 14% of industrial production. By 2012-2013, it was generating well over half of total U.S. IP growth, with brief periods in which mining effectively accounted for all of it. After oil prices collapsed in 2015-2016, U.S. mining output rebounded mechanically from a low base—but shale did not return to its pre-2014 investment or rig intensity. Oil production still responds to prices at the margin—via well completions, higher utilization, and productivity gains—but investment has become far less elastic. In other words, if current oil prices are perceived as temporary, the U.S. is unlikely to see anything resembling the 2011-2014 shale-driven supply response to offset the net income erosion that is likely to hit consumers.

Overnight developments, including Israeli and Iranian retaliatory strikes on upstream energy infrastructure across the Gulf area and Qatar’s warning that Iranian attacks on its LNG complex – the world’s largest – could leave capacity offline for months, if not years, only reinforce the view that global energy markets are set to tighten further. The risk now is a pump price shock, which could begin to weigh on sentiment in the weeks ahead if energy market turmoil persists. At the same time, signs of stress are emerging in credit markets, adding to concerns that the broader economic outlook could deteriorate.