What Was A Japanese Spy Doing In Belarus?

Authored by Andrew Korybko via Substack,

Belarusian media reported earlier this month that their security services busted a Japanese spy. He allegedly entered into a fictitious marriage that helped him legalize his stay in the country, after which he set up a business in Gomel to explain his travels, including to the border. He also taught Japanese. The spy allegedly had over 9,000 photos of roads, bridges, and military facilities and was actively in contact with his embassy. These reports raised a lot of eyebrows since few expected Japan to spy on Belarus.  

As it turns out, his home base of Gomel is in Ukraine’s crosshairs as explained last month here, and it’s possible that the security services’ additional scrutiny on all activities there as part of their precautionary measures resulted in them finally catching him. His interrogation also revealed that he was involved in the failed summer 2020 Color Revolution and had been monitoring the socio-economic situation as well, including the availability and prices of goods as well as locals’ reaction to this.

Considering the importance of his activities, especially in the context of the special operation, there’s no way that he’d be allowed to continue operating if anyone had picked up on what he was doing earlier. It’s therefore almost certainly the case that he only came on their radar recently as was speculated above. This means that he was transmitting highly sensitive information during the past two years of the New Cold War’s top proxy war, thus raising the question of why Japan would want to do this in the first place.

What might have been going on is that Japan was passing everything along to its Western partners in the implied hopes of them then supporting it more in its own part of the world. His most recent activities might also have played a role in Ukraine’s recent drone provocations in Belarus. In fact, he might have been pressured by his handlers into taking more risks than usual because the West demanded more information for Ukraine, which could have contributed to him finally getting caught.

This explanation is the most logical since Japan couldn’t act on its own with what that spy hadn’t uncovered this entire time. It was also reported that he was spying on China’s Belt & Road Initiative investments too, of which its primary one in Belarus is the “Great Stone” industrial park, which could have disguised his more nefarious activities had he been caught earlier under different circumstances. It’s much better, after all, to be busted for conducting “business intelligence” than military intelligence.

In retrospect, there’s not much that the security services could have done better to have stopped him ahead of time.

He was legally in Belarus, had his own business, and was also teaching Japanese at a local university, thus making him a model immigrant. Nobody could have plausibly suspected that he was up to no good.

If there’s any silver lining to this case, it’s that the spy was finally caught and will no longer be sharing information with his handlers to pass along to the West and their Ukrainian proxies.