Authored by Mollie Engelhart via The Epoch Times,

Last Sunday, I held a book signing at Pearl in San Antonio, the kind of place magazines love to feature. Old brick buildings have been transformed into beautiful restaurants, boutiques, apartments, and bookstores. It feels curated yet charming, historic yet modern, a vision of how we’re told that cities should look and feel.

My signing happened during the farmers market, so there was music in the air, families strolling, dogs on leashes, linen dresses, and heirloom tomatoes. It was lovely. Before I sat down, I stopped into the trendy grocery store nearby. Everything inside looked like how food should look: thoughtfully sourced, artfully displayed, and priced closer to what real food actually costs when someone grows it with care. I ordered a coffee and a pastry and pulled a $20 bill from my wallet.

“We don’t take cash,” the cashier said politely.

I nodded. I’ve worked in restaurants, and I understand the argument. With employees, cash can be seen as a liability, with risks of theft, accounting errors, and end-of-day discrepancies. Cards feel cleaner, easier, and more trackable. Still, something in me tightened. Every time we stop accepting cash, we normalize a world where every transaction is recorded, categorized, stored, and potentially scrutinized. Every purchase becomes a data point. Every cup of coffee leaves a digital trail.

I took my coffee, found my seat at the bookstore, and started signing books. Between conversations, I could hear the sizzle and chatter from a nearby empanada booth at the farmers market. The smell of warm pastry finally got me. I walked over, cash already in hand.

“Can I get a potato empanada?” I asked.

The woman at the booth said, with an apologetic smile, “We don’t take cash.”

Not a brick-and-mortar store with layers of management, a pop-up tent at a farmers market. That’s when it really hit me. This isn’t just about convenience or speed at checkout. Cash itself is becoming strange, inconvenient, outdated, and almost suspicious. We’re being trained to accept that every exchange must be mediated, approved, and recorded by a third party, and that third party isn’t free.

Most of the vendors there were using Square to process payments. The typical fee is about 3 percent to 4 percent per transaction. That might not sound like much, but that percentage is shaved off every single time money changes hands digitally.

If I hand $20 in cash to the empanada vendor, and he hands that same $20 to the barber who cuts his hair, and the barber gives it to a babysitter, and the babysitter uses it to buy a pizza, that same $20 bill keeps moving through the community at full value. No one skims anything off the top.

But in the digital system, that cut happens again and again, and the effect compounds. At a 3.5 percent fee, after one transaction, that $20 becomes $19.30. After two, $18.62. After three, $17.97. After four, $17.34. After five digital transactions, only about $16.74 remains in circulation. More than $3 of the original $20 has quietly disappeared in just a handful of everyday exchanges. That money didn’t go to the farmer, the barber, the babysitter, or the pizza shop. It left the community entirely.

It’s a quiet drain on small communities, a friction we barely see because it’s spread out, invisible, and normalized. There’s also a common belief that businesses are required to accept cash because it’s legal tender. The truth is more complicated. In most places, private businesses can choose what forms of payment they accept unless a local or state law says otherwise. So no, they aren’t necessarily breaking the law. But legality and wisdom are not the same thing.

Every digital transaction comes with processing fees and interchange costs. Small businesses quietly lose a percentage of every sale, and customers pay more over time as those costs are baked into prices. In return, we give up privacy, independence, and the simple resilience of being able to transact even when systems go down. Cash works during power outages. Cash works when the internet is down. Cash works without a corporate intermediary. Cash is anonymous, direct, and final.

When everything becomes digital, spending can be tracked, restricted, frozen, or flagged. We may not feel that pressure today when we’re buying coffee and pastries in beautiful spaces, but systems built for convenience can easily become systems of control.

What struck me most that morning was the irony. I was at a farmers market, a place that represents local food, small producers, and community resilience, and yet even there, we’ve accepted the idea that every transaction must flow through the same centralized financial rails. We tell ourselves that it’s about ease, but what we’re really trading is privacy, resilience, and a small but meaningful piece of our sovereignty over how we spend the fruits of our labor.

It happened so gradually that most of us didn’t even notice. Until one day you’re standing at a farmers market, cash in hand, and realize that the future has arrived quietly, and that it doesn’t include the simplest form of freedom we used to carry in our pockets.

Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times or ZeroHedge.

Shares of BHP Group, the world’s largest miner, jumped to a record high in Australia after it posted earnings at the top end of Wall Street expectations. The miner’s pivot into copper, aided by a surging rally in industrial metals, offset softer conditions in its iron ore unit.

BHP chief executive Mike Henry reaffirmed to investors earlier on a call that the miner is pivoting toward “future-facing” metals. In other words, he explained that the world’s largest miner’s shift away from operations focused on serving China’s steel mills has paid off, as copper has soared.

Henry said that acquisitions began to bear fruit, as did the improvements at Escondida, the world’s largest mine, all of which were helped by a record surge in the price of the industrial metal used heavily for power grids and AI-related applications. 

“This is the result of our deliberate actions to grow our copper business,” Henry told analysts, adding, “Now, BHP is, by design, a diversified miner rather than focused on a single commodity.”

At the time of writing, iron ore futures on the Dalian Commodity Exchange were trading at depressed levels below $100 per ton, while copper on the London Metal Exchange was trading around $12,850 per ton.

BHP earnings highlights:

• Underlying attributable profit rose 22% to $6.2 billion for the six months to end December. Shares in Australia jumped as much as 7.6% to a record.

• Copper contributed more than half of the profit for the first time, motly because of higher copper prices and steady output. Copper division underlying EBITDA climbed 59% to $8 billion.

• Iron ore earnings edged 4% higher and still make up close to half of the total, though BHP is dealing with “tough” negotiations with China’s state buyer, China Mineral Resources Group.

• The Jansen potash project in Canada remains on track for first production in the middle of next year, though first-phase capex has risen to $8.4 billion.

• On M&A: Recent gains include the 2023 purchase of OZ Minerals and the Vicuna joint venture with Lundin Mining. Attempts to buy Anglo American (and efforts around its tie-up with Teck Resources) were unsuccessful, so BHP is emphasizing organic growth and being more disciplined in deal-making.

• Reiterated its plan to unlock up to $10 billion through asset sales and other transactions. It announced a $4.3 billion long-term silver streaming agreement with Wheaton Precious Metals tied to byproduct silver from the Antamina mine in Peru (BHP owns 33.75%). It also recently sold a $2 billion stake in the power network supporting Pilbara operations.

• Declared an interim dividend set at 73 cents, equal to a 60% payout ratio

UBS analyst Dominic Ellis commented on BHP’s earnings, indicating “BHP Surprises With Dividend Bump.”

Ellis told clients:

BHP’s EBITDA beat by 3% in the first half of its financial year while EPS beat by 4%, but the surprise was the 16% increase in the dividend, on a 60% payout versus the baseline of 50%. Net debt stood at $14.7 bn, at the midpoint of the guided range, capex in line and guidance unchanged. Group EBITDA from copper was 51%, more than half of EBITDA for the first time. The stock has been a funding short for specialists, and while shares are performing well on these resutls, feedback from clients recently has been on the disconnect between iron ore (down sharply, now below $100/t) and iron ore equity resilience. BHP’s spot free cash flow yield is 3.5% this year versus Rio Tinto on 6.4%.

Reminder about the copper market:

• Copper’s Breakout Is Built On Much More Than Fundamentals

• Copper Hits Record High; Goldman Warns A “Circular Melt-Up” Is Now Driving Global Market

Strong earnings and a copper-led pivot that’s cushioning a softer iron ore business have rewarded shareholders with record-high share prices in Australia.

“In the last five years, the BHP CEO has set the business up with options,” said Glyn Lawcock, head of metals and mining research at Barrenjoey Markets Pty in Sydney. “Clearly, growth to 2030 is really potash and iron ore, but you hit the start of the new decade, it’s pretty much all copper.”

Submitted by Thomas Kolbe

Germany is the political engine of the Green Deal, yet it continues to fall short of its own CO₂ reduction targets. Now Germany’s Federal Administrative Court in Leipzig has ordered the federal government to tighten its climate targets by the end of March. The ruling follows a lawsuit filed by the German Environmental Aid (Deutsche Umwelthilfe), aimed explicitly at increasing political pressure. Germany is tightening the screws on its own catastrophe.

Germany in 2026: the economy has entered its eighth consecutive year of industrial decline. Companies are shutting down, and hundreds of thousands of jobs have already been lost in the core sectors of the country’s former prosperity—chemicals, mechanical engineering, and above all the automotive industry.

Climate change has struck—or rather, the ideologically skewed and socially unprecedented self-destructive frenzy of German politics has begun to shred any remaining hope of a return to normal economic conditions.

The attempt to free the country from conventional energy sources such as oil, gas, and coal through a rapid transition to CO₂-free energy—politically and psychologically inflated into a moral crusade to “save the planet”—has failed.

Given the devastating competitive position of the German economy, which now pays energy prices roughly three times higher than competitors in reference locations such as France or the United States, any rational observer would urgently recommend consigning the entire transformation agenda to the dustbin of failed political hubris and collective delusion.

What remains is damage control: a rapid return to a market-based energy system, an end to destructive environmental and social experiments, and an unavoidable restructuring of the welfare state to reflect new economic realities. Germany is getting poorer, productivity is falling, and GDP per capita is declining—realities that even the federal government’s massive debt-financed spending programs can no longer conceal.

Yet Germany in 2026 is no ordinary country. Its political elite, supported by an affirming media ecosystem, has entrenched itself in a self-referential system of emissions-centered economic control—a system now reinforced by judicial authority.

In its ruling, the court mandated that the government sharpen its environmental targets. Under current conditions, a gap of at least 200 million tons of CO₂ would remain by 2045, which must now be eliminated across Germany’s entire economic structure.

Judges who effectively substitute political objectives for democratic deliberation are now setting the framework for Germany’s continued decline.

The lawsuit was brought by the German Environmental Aid—an organization already known for launching the first serious legal assault on Germany’s automotive industry during earlier battles over particulate emissions in city centers. The pressure on Germany is now coming from within: from a taxpayer-funded NGO complex that appears determined to politically delegitimize key industries, with the state apparatus firmly on its side.

According to Deutschlandfunk, a leaked draft from the SPD-led Environment Ministry outlines a new climate program aimed at achieving climate neutrality by 2045. Spanning more than 330 pages, it appears the government anticipated judicial escalation and preemptively prepared the groundwork for a revised climate law. Political conflict has been outsourced to the courts, to the relief of Berlin’s climate hardliners amid worsening economic conditions.

Among the core measures is the intensified “heat transition” in the building sector. The ministry proposes increasing subsidies for low-income households—up to 40 percent of costs—for heating replacements and heat pump installations. A generous solution for the climate-policy establishment, conveniently rolled out during an election season.

The leaked strategy signals a general increase in transformation pressure. No fundamentally new instruments are introduced; instead, property owners are placed under tighter time constraints to replace heating systems.

Climate policy and financial affordability are colliding ever more sharply. Amid a prolonged recession, the government is deliberately provoking social conflict while attempting to pacify it through ever-expanding subsidies.

Germany’s public debt, at roughly 65 percent of GDP, still appears moderate by European standards. In Berlin, this is interpreted as ample room to finance the transformation through rising debt while simultaneously increasing pressure on the private sector.

Environment Minister Carsten Schneider speaks optimistically of new “climate jobs.” The overall picture, however, increasingly resembles political farce. A state that secures public consent for its transformation agenda through debt, subsidies, and higher taxes acts obscenely and invites long-term economic damage.

Plans even include methane measurement programs for livestock, modeled after New Zealand—yet another blow to farmers. German emissions policy is entering a manic phase, blurring the line between real policy and political satire.

The subsidy machine continues to spin. The government plans to support 800,000 electric vehicles in the coming years. Credit resources remain abundant after Chancellor Friedrich Merz effectively neutralized the constitutional debt brake with the previous parliament. By 2040, electric vehicles are supposed to account for 70 percent of Germany’s car fleet—despite the absence of any credible plan for supplying the required electricity.

Artificial, technocratic necessity has replaced political debate. From the outset, it was clear that the supposed softening of the combustion-engine ban was mere political theater—a sedative for citizens gradually awakening to the scale of the green ideological disaster.

The energy sector faces further tightening. Dozens of reserve gas power plants are to be added, while existing plants are to be converted to hydrogen capability. Offshore wind projects abroad are being accelerated. These measures amount to desperate rescue attempts for a failed energy transition—an assessment implicitly acknowledged even by the Environment Ministry itself. Model-driven hope has replaced rational judgment.

Germany’s climate policy, entangled in a feedback loop with Brussels, has ossified into an auto-referential system marked by a narrow temporal vision and growing argumentative poverty. Looming over it all is the threat of further litigation by the German Environmental Aid should the final legislation fail to meet its standards.

Germany now finds itself in the grip of green ideologues who have subordinated all parties behind an ideological firewall. The environmental lobby’s greatest success came when it elevated the Net Zero target to constitutional status.

How much greater must the economic pressure become before a majority forms—even in front of this firewall—to dismantle this manifest political folly?

* * * 

About the author: Thomas Kolbe, a German graduate economist, has worked for over 25 years as a journalist and media producer for clients from various industries and business associations. As a publicist, he focuses on economic processes and observes geopolitical events from the perspective of the capital markets. His publications follow a philosophy that focuses on the individual and their right to self-determination.

Nearly three-quarters of the world’s population now lives under autocratic rule, according to the V-Dem Institute’s 2024 Regimes of the World report. That’s the highest share since 1978.

The map below, via Visual Capitalist’s Bruno Venditti, classifies every country into one of four political systems: closed autocracy, electoral autocracy, electoral democracy, or liberal democracy.

The results point to a decades-long shift in global governance, with electoral autocracies now the most common regime type worldwide.

The Four Types of Political Regimes

-Dem classifies countries based on the competitiveness of elections, protection of civil liberties, and the strength of institutional checks and balances.

Here’s how the four categories differ:

1. Closed autocracies have no meaningful multiparty elections and suppress core democratic freedoms. Countries like China, Saudi Arabia, and North Korea fall into this group.

2. Electoral autocracies hold multiparty elections, but they are not free or fair. Media restrictions, weakened opposition, and limited civil liberties are common. This category includes countries such as Russia, India, and Turkey.

3. Electoral democracies conduct free and fair elections and protect basic rights, but may lack strong institutional constraints. Examples include Argentina, Poland, and the United Kingdom.

4. Liberal democracies go further, combining competitive elections with robust rule of law and checks and balances. Countries such as Germany, Japan, United States, and Uruguay are classified in this highest tier.

Scroll down to see how every country is classified.

Autocracy Is the Most Common Regime

Electoral autocracy is now the most common regime type in the world.

This category spans every continent, from Sub-Saharan Africa to South Asia and parts of Latin America. In many cases, democratic institutions still exist on paper, but their independence has eroded.

Large-population countries shifting toward electoral autocracy have an outsized effect on global trends. As a result, even if the number of democracies remains substantial, the share of people living under autocratic rule continues to grow.

Where Liberal Democracy Persists

Liberal democracies are concentrated in Western Europe, parts of East Asia, Oceania, and North America.

Nordic countries such as Sweden, Norway, and Finland remain among the strongest performers. So do nations like Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Taiwan.

However, even among established democracies, concerns about polarization, declining trust in institutions, and pressure on judicial independence have intensified in recent years.

While democratic systems still govern many countries, the overall global trend shows autocratic systems expanding their reach in terms of population.

Methodology

The classifications are based on the V-Dem Institute’s 2024 Regimes of the World dataset, which evaluates countries across indicators including electoral integrity, civil liberties, judicial independence, and executive constraints.

Countries are then grouped into one of four regime types to provide a simplified view of the global political landscape.

If you enjoyed today’s post, check out The World’s 50 Largest Economies by GDP in 2026 on Voronoi, the new app from Visual Capitalist.

Authored by Daniel Lacalle,

Inflation, bloating GDP with public spending and immigration and hidden unemployment are the ingredients of the so-called “economic miracle” of the Sánchez administration.

Spain closes 2025 with the consumer price index (CPI) rate above the euro area average and higher than all the large economies in Europe.

Cumulative inflation, measured by CPI, during Sánchez’s term reached 24.8%. Housing and food have risen by almost twice as much as the headline CPI.

The reality of Spain is that the loss of purchasing power and the impoverishment of Spaniards are the result of years of interventionist policies.

Home purchase prices have soared by more than 38%, housing-related expenses (rent, utilities, maintenance) have risen by more than 30%, and food prices are up around 38%.

The “real shopping basket” studies find increases of between 40% and 60% in basic products between 2019 and 2025, showing that inflation in essential goods has been far higher than the official average.

Between 2019 and 2025, real wages in Spain have fallen by 0.3%, according to CaixaBank, but the picture is much worse if we look at net real wages, which have fallen by more than double because the government refused to index taxes to inflation and has sharply increased the fiscal burden of families and businesses.

GDP growth, productivity, and the statistical mirage

Government propaganda claims that productivity and GDP per capita “grow” by using the pandemic collapse as the starting point of the series. In other words, because Spain fell more than anyone else, now it “grows.” The reality is very different.

Labour productivity per occupied person, compared with the EU average, has fallen from 99.8% in 2018 to 97%. Bouncing back is not growing, and even less so when the government is bloating GDP with government spending and immigration. 

A quarter of Spain’s net real GDP gain over 2019‑2025 is directly explained by higher public consumption, and more if you include EU‑funded public investment and subsidies classified under other items, according to CaixaBank Research.

Furthermore, real GDP per capita is expected to grow by a mere 1.1% between 2017 and 2026, according to the IMF. The large increase in immigration disguises a weak productivity model inflated by debt and public spending.

Spain’s socialist “growth” model, doped by immigration and public spending, leaves weaker productivity growth and stagnant GDP per capita

This is where the statistical mirage of Spain’s alleged “superior” growth becomes evident: headline GDP is inflated by a strong increase in immigrant population, a ballooning public sector, and the injection of one-off EU funds, while GDP per capita and productivity stagnate or worsen.

Spain’s socialist “growth” model, doped by immigration and public spending, leaves weaker productivity growth and stagnant GDP per capita, dependent on an annual net debt issuance of more than 50 billion euros. It is a recipe for ruin.

In purchasing power standards, Spain’s GDP per capita was 91% of the EU‑27 average in 2019 and is now around 90%, thus still below its pre‑Covid relative position despite the “strong growth” propaganda.

That implies an average annual real GDP per capita growth of only about 1.1–1.4% over 2019–2025. In other words, by 2025 Spain had finally surpassed its 2019 real GDP per capita, but the net gain per person after six years is modest, disguised by a large increase in government spending and one-off EU funds, and much smaller than the headline cumulative GDP growth figures suggest.

Hidden unemployment – another hallmark of the Sanchez government

In 2021, with the labour market “reform,” it became mandatory to convert short-term and seasonal contracts into “discontinuous permanent” contracts.

With this statistical regulatory change, people on this type of contract are not counted as unemployed even when they are not working, and also if they are receiving unemployment benefits.

Thus, it is no surprise that in nine provinces there are more people receiving unemployment benefits than officially registered unemployed.

Official labour office (SEPE) statistics show that in Almería, Huelva, Jaén, the Balearic Islands, Huesca, Teruel, Soria, Castellón, and Cáceres, the unemployment coverage rate exceeds 100%, meaning there are more unemployment benefit recipients than officially unemployed.

In January 2019, the number of jobseekers “with an employment relationship” was 280,389. In December 2025, the figure was 892,933, more than three times higher.

This means that effective unemployment has hardly improved at all since 2019, and the real effective unemployment rate is around 13.6% compared with the 9.9% official figure.

The activity rate has been stagnant at 59% since 2019, which is another example of a weak labour market.

At the end of December 2025, the total number of people registered with SEPE seeking work stood at 3,854,911, which means there are 1,446,241 more people not working than the official “registered unemployment” figure.

Thus, registered unemployment has fallen by 152,048, while real unemployment (the number of people registered with SEPE who are not working) would have increased by 50,609.

The number of people not counted as unemployed in SEPE data in December reached 1,893,134 and represents 44% of the total number of registered job seekers. The number of inactive people receiving unemployment benefits increased in 2025 compared with 2024 by 64,175.

A model based on propaganda, not reality

Spain’s economic miracle is just a statistical mirage. Spain’s “superior” GDP growth is not due to each person producing more (down, -1.7% 4Q2019-4Q2025, as the working population grew by 12.5%, but GDP by only 10.6%), and the unemployment reduction is distorted by the record number of inactive workers not considered unemployed even if they get an unemployment subsidy. The number has tripled since 2019.

Sánchez has implemented a model based on propaganda, not reality, sweeping real unemployment under the rug, doping GDP with debt, immigration, and European funds, and leaving a reality of worse net real wages and atrocious productivity.

Spain may seem like an economic growth miracle in headlines, but details show a time bomb that will explode once the placebo effect of debt fades and immigration’s net negative impact on public accounts soars.

Arctic security is now central to Europe’s stability, Finland’s defense minister has said, warning that Russia is rebuilding Cold War–style military infrastructure along Finland’s border while fortifying its nuclear stronghold in the High North.

He also made clear his view that United States military might is very much needed, at least in the short term. Defense Minister Antti Häkkänen said Moscow is doubling down on its Arctic posture: “Russia has most of their biggest strategic capabilities in nuclear, submarines, long-range bombers in the Kola Peninsula area,” he stated in a fresh interview.

“They are building new military facilities along our border, same as the Cold War. It would be wise to watch the Arctic and build Arctic capabilities” for deterrence, Häkkänen continued.

According to the publication he spoke to:

The Kola Peninsula – a 100,000 square kilometer region in far northwestern Russia – hosts the majority of the country’s sea-based strategic nuclear arsenal, such as submarines, as well as long-range aviation assets.

As for ongoing discussions within Europe to find an eventual alternative to the US nuclear umbrella, the Finnish defense chief explained his view that “In the longer term, it would be better that the Europeans have their strong capabilities.” He added: “But in the short, and even mid-term, we need the US. It’s crucial to European security.”

France and the UK offering to extend their nuclear deterrent across the continent is “good news” – Häkkänen conceded, but added that ultimately “That’s not the question now.”

Lately, Russia’s Foreign Ministry has sought to made clear that the Kremlin believes the Arctic should remain “a region of peace, dialogue and equal cooperation.”

The prior comment was issued related to the United States eyeing control over Greenland. A key part of the Trump administration’s argument is that Russia and China threaten waters off Greenland – a view firmly rejected by both Moscow and Beijing.

🇷🇺🇬🇱🇺🇸 Lavrov: If Greenland is militarized against Russia, we will respond with appropriate countermeasures, including military-technical ones. The Arctic must remain a zone of peace. pic.twitter.com/2JtnrGS3fS

— DD Geopolitics (@DD_Geopolitics) February 11, 2026

President Trump has also claimed on the subject of Greenland that the large island is “vital” to his proposed Golden Dome air and missile defense system. But again, Russia is vowing it would respond if such significant assets were placed on Greenland.

In their highly read First Things essay “Voyages to the End of the World,” Peter Thiel and Sam Wolfe use Francis Bacon’s utopian “New Atlantis” to argue that modern faith in unlimited technological progress has subtly redefined salvation as a human-controlled achievement rather than a divine gift, displacing religious understandings of human destiny with promises of security, abundance, and mastery over nature.

They warn that this Baconian project – disguised in Christian imagery – risks creating a seductive but spiritually impoverished civilization where technological power outpaces moral wisdom, potentially leading to an end-times trajectory of false salvation unless reintegrated into a framework that respects natural and spiritual limits.

Authored by William Brooks via The Epoch Times,

Founded in 1990 by the late Fr. Richard John Neuhaus, First Things magazine strives to promote a well-informed public philosophy in the Christian and Jewish traditions.

Last year, one of the most read essays in First Things was titled: “Voyages to the End of the World” by Peter Thiel and Sam Wolfe. Thiel is a tech entrepreneur, investor, and author. Wolfe is a writer and researcher at Thiel Capital.

These thinkers offer a probing examination of our modern technological ambitions. Using Francis Bacon’s unfinished 17th-century work “New Atlantis” as a point of departure, Thiel and Wolfe suggest that modern faith in scientific progress is corroding the religious understanding of human destiny. They contend that Bacon’s utopian tale about knowledge and prosperity contains a warning about the moral costs of unlimited technological mastery.

Thiel and Wolfe’s central claim is not that science itself is evil or that technological progress must be rejected. Rather, they argue that Bacon’s scientific project—and the modern world that has adopted it—rests on a redefinition of salvation. Whereas Christianity views redemption as a divine process that transcends history, Bacon relocates it firmly within human control. In doing so, modern technological civilization risks mistaking power for wisdom. This could have grave consequences as we enter an epoch defined by unprecedented technological advancement.

At the heart of their essay is a close look at Bacon’s fictional account of the island society of Bensalem. On its surface, Bensalem appears harmonious, pious, and benevolent. Its inhabitants are devout, orderly, and humane; its institutions promise healing, abundance, and stability. Its governing institution, Salomon’s House, is dedicated to the systematic investigation of nature for the “relief of man’s estate.” Bacon presents scientific inquiry as a quasi-religious vocation, cloaked in Christian imagery and moral restraint.

Thiel and Wolfe warn that this superficial harmony conceals a radical transformation of the human relationship to nature, knowledge, and God. They argue that Bacon’s true ambition was not merely to advance science but to replace the classical-Christian understanding of limits with a project of total technological mastery. Knowledge, in Bacon’s vision, is not ordered toward moral formation but toward domination and control. Nature is no longer something to be understood within an inherited moral order; it is something that can be conquered and redesigned.

This shift has profound implications. Bacon’s scientific method implicitly promises what religion once offered: security, healing, abundance, and even a form of immortality. By embedding these promises within a framework that appears Christian, Bacon disguised the degree to which his vision subtly marginalized the hand of God. In New Atlantis, God remains present, but increasingly as a symbolic guarantor of human progress rather than as the ultimate judge of human action.

Thiel and Wolfe interpret this displacement through an eschatological lens. Drawing on biblical imagery, they suggest that Bacon’s utopia resembles the deceptive peace promised in apocalyptic literature—a peace achieved not through repentance or divine reconciliation, but through human ingenuity and centralised power. The danger is not tyranny in its crudest form, but something more seductive: a world so efficient and secure that it no longer recognizes its spiritual impoverishment.

One of the essay’s most troubling conclusions is that modern technological civilization may be better understood as an end-times trajectory rather than a benign accumulation of new tools. Scientific progress does not merely extend human capacities; it reshapes human expectations about the future. When technology promises to eliminate scarcity, suffering, and even death, it inevitably assumes the role once played by theology. In this sense, modernity reconfigures the religious impulse by substituting technique for grace.

The authors argue that this substitution is inherently unstable. Technological power expands far more rapidly than moral wisdom, and the belief that every problem has a technical solution blinds societies to questions of meaning, responsibility, and restraint. The more humanity relies on systems it only partially understands—artificial intelligence, biotechnology, etc.—the more it risks becoming subject to forces it can neither fully control nor morally justify.

A further conclusion concerns the cultural conditions that allow this dynamic to persist. Thiel and Wolfe suggest that widespread biblical and philosophical illiteracy leaves contemporary society unable to recognize the spiritual dimensions of technological ambition. Apocalyptic language, once central to the Western moral imagination, is now dismissed as superstition.

Yet without such language, we lose a critical framework for discerning the difference between genuine progress and false salvation. The result is not rational clarity, but naivete—a readiness to accept sweeping promises of safety and efficiency without asking what is being sacrificed in return.

The relevance of “Voyages to the End of the World” becomes especially clear as we move deeper into the 21st century. Humanity now possesses technologies capable of reshaping life itself, from genetic engineering to autonomous systems that make decisions once reserved for human judgment. Political and economic leaders increasingly speak in utopian terms, promising that innovation will solve social conflict, environmental degradation, and even moral disagreement. These assurances echo Bacon’s vision of a world governed by knowledge rather than virtue, technique rather than tradition.

Thiel and Wolfe suggest we correct our course. They invite readers to reconsider whether the goals of technological civilization are as harmless as they appear. The question is no longer whether we can build more powerful tools, but whether those tools are shaping a conception of life that is ultimately compatible with human well-being.

The authors do not advocate withdrawal from modern life or a rejection of scientific inquiry. Their argument is one of discernment. Technological progress, they assert, must be reintegrated into a moral framework that acknowledges the natural limits of human power. Without such a framework, progress becomes self-justifying, and power becomes an end in itself. We are reminded that the future we build should not be merely technical. It should also be moral, spiritual, and ultimately related to the destiny of human souls.

As the second quarter of the 21st century unfolds, “Voyages to the End of the World” offers a timely caution.

The greatest danger facing technological civilization may not be catastrophe, but success—the achievement of a techno-managed world that no longer knows why or for what it exists.

Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times or ZeroHedge.

With tensions between Washington and Tehran soaring, the US Air Force has moved to restock its GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) bunker-buster bombs, which is the same weapons used in June during Operation Midnight Hammer, when several – some reports say over a dozen – were dropped on three Iranian nuclear facilities.

Along with the ongoing US military build-up in the US Central Command (CENTCOM) region of responsibility, this is another big sign that Trump-ordered military action could be imminent, despite that the Iranians have not attacked the United States or its bases abroad. On that, the below is where things stand in terms of deployments…

After the Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group transits the Atlantic, the U.S. will have 2 aircraft carriers and 15 destroyers (plus a few subs) to work with across combatant commands.

Approx. 33% of the deployed U.S. Navy fleet is represented below, which can carry 600+ TLAMs. pic.twitter.com/1vPf9akqTY

— Ian Ellis (@ianellisjones) February 16, 2026

A partially redacted federal notice posted last week confirms the Air Force awarded Boeing a sole-source contract to replenish the depleted stockpile.

The Air Force stated the move was necessary because “this procurement and sustainment activity is critically needed to replenish the inventory of GBU-57’s, ended during Operation Midnight Hammer (21 June 25).”

The notice further explains the Pentagon bypassed a competitive bidding process because Boeing has “uniquely acquired expertise over a period of 18 years of adapting this specialized weapon to meet evolving mission needs as MOP transitioned from proof-of-concept to Full Operational Capability.” Also, any alternate decision might have resulted in delays.

Boeing is the only manufacturer of the 30,000-pound GBU-57 MOP, the deep-penetration bomb designed to destroy hardened underground targets.

“No delay in award is acceptable for this effort. Delaying this requirement would undermine force readiness and efficient acquisitions for this key weapons program. A delay undermines Combatant Commanders’ capabilities, jeopardizes force readiness and strategic deterrence, hinders nuclear proliferation prevention efforts, and could result in loss of life,” the notice stated.

That is one big bomb…

One remaining key detail from the June war which has been shrouded in contradiction and ambiguity is whether the initial bunker busters really obliterated Iran’s nuclear development capability. President Trump certainly claimed this several times soon after the fact, and yet now warns the Iranians against moving forward with their nuclear program.

Authored by Daniel Lacalle,

The latest social financing figures from China show an economy that is increasingly relying on government debt while private demand for credit remains weak. The strength of the Chinese technology sector and its exporting companies gives enough room for leverage. However, behind the weak private sector credit demand lies an evident economic slowdown that the Chinese government acknowledges, challenging consumption patterns, a significant overcapacity problem, and the depth of the housing crisis.

The current economic model, focused on delivering 5% real economic growth, requires larger doses of debt to achieve smaller increments of growth, especially productive sector growth. The government has focused on reducing debt and overcapacity imbalances while reorienting its exports and financial system to lessen dependence on the US dollar; however, the main challenge for the Chinese economy remains boosting consumer demand, despite rate cuts and easing financial conditions.

To understand the intensity of debt of the Chinese model, we must go to the year 2000 and see the acceleration in the flow of debt, not just the current stock. At that time, real GDP growth was around 8–9%, so each percentage point of growth came with roughly 13–16 points of debt‑to‑GDP. Government debt was very low, at around 25% of GDP, and most leverage sat in the state-owned corporate sector with modest household debt. China was able to deliver near‑double‑digit growth with a total non‑financial debt ratio barely above 120% of GDP.

By 2023, non‑financial sector debt had risen to about 285% of GDP, more than doubling its level of 2000. Chinese think‑tanks and official commentators put the “macro leverage ratio” closer to 300% of GDP by 2025, according to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The macro leverage ratio rose by 11.8 percentage points to 302.3 percent in 2025, exceeding the 10.1-point increase reported in 2024.

Over the same period, the trend of real GDP growth has slowed to roughly 4–5%, so each percentage point of growth now requires around 60–75 points of debt‑to‑GDP, more than three times the debt per point of growth required in 2000. Furthermore, it comes mostly from government debt.

In January 2026, aggregate social financing jumped by 7.22 trillion yuan, significantly higher than in the same month of 2025 and above market expectations, consistent with 5% annual GDP growth and a larger composition of the public sector in the mix. Outstanding social financing reached 449.11 trillion yuan at the end of January, rising 8.2% year‑on‑year, while money supply (M2) rose by 9%.​

New yuan bank loans were 4.7 trillion yuan, about 420 billion less than a year earlier and significantly below consensus, showing the weak private‑sector credit demand and the prudent approach of Chinese customers and businesses to debt addition. RMB loans outstanding stood at 276.62 trillion yuan, up only 6.1% year‑on‑year, clearly below the pace of overall financing and money growth.

The driver of credit growth in China is no longer households and private firms but the government and state-owned companies.

The real estate problem has impacted Chinese families in numerous ways. Not only did most of them see the value of their homes decline, but many families invested in the attractive yields of real estate developers’ commercial paper, which led to large losses and even the wipe-out of savings for many. Additionally, despite the excess in supply of houses, prices have not fallen enough to warrant enough appetite for new mortgages, as affordability remains an issue and the traditional prudence of Chinese citizens when it comes to consuming and borrowing adds to the challenge.

Beijing plans to issue 4.4 trillion yuan in local government special‑purpose bonds in 2025, 500 billion more than in 2024, looking to boost government investment and a “proactive fiscal policy,” knowing that raising taxes would be exceedingly negative for growth and consumption.

Local governments are expected to issue more than 10 trillion yuan in bonds in 2025, including refinancing, general bonds, and new special bonds.

The Chinese government knows that it can manage more debt but also sees the weak investment and household spending and acknowledges that large tax increases would be counterproductive.  However, to prevent future debt-driven stagnation, a focus on productivity is necessary.

The official budget sets a deficit of 4% for 2025. However, once all budget items are consolidated, including government funds, special bonds, and off‑budget vehicles, this true fiscal deficit in 2025 is closer to 9%, up from 7.7% in 2024, according to Rhodium Group and JP Morgan. China increasingly relies on hidden or almost fiscal borrowing to support growth.

With outstanding social financing now around 449 trillion yuan and real growth around 4–5%, each incremental point of GDP is increasingly linked with a much larger stock of debt than a decade ago. This rising credit intensity of growth may prevent a significant slowdown but may create a significant fiscal challenge in the future. The Chinese model demands high growth and low taxes; any change to the fiscal system will be negative.

For years, local governments relied on the sale of land for property development to collect tax receipts. Thus, the drag from real estate is evident in the economy and in fiscal sustainability. Real estate development investment fell 13.9% year‑on‑year in the first three quarters of 2025, with residential investment down 12.9%, the steepest drop since 2021, according to official figures. Property investment and sales both posted double‑digit declines in 2024, and forecasters expect real estate investment to fall another 11% and sales to drop 7.5% in 2025, according to Reuters, with further declines in 2026 before stabilizing only in 2027… if it happens as fast as consensus estimates.

The property sector, once a key engine for economic growth and tax receipts, absorbs new credit to stabilize its accounts without boosting growth or creating a multiplier effect.

Additionally, China’s industrial capacity utilization remained at 74.9% at the end of 2025, well below the 78.4% peak reached in 2021. Overcapacity is clear in steel, autos, legacy chips, and parts of sectors like green tech, where expansion has surpassed domestic and external demand. Thus, the purchasing managers’ indices show weak new orders and foreign demand, while bankruptcies and insolvencies have risen, although not to levels that would indicate a financial crisis.​

The Chinese economy needs to reopen, improve investor and legal security and allow the housing slump to materialize fully to see the type of productive economic growth it needs to avoid much larger increases in debt. Otherwise, the risk of stagnation will likely be elevated as population growth stalls, overcapacity remains, and the stock of unsold property becomes a larger liability.