Authored by Cyril Widdershoven via OilPrice.com,

• The Iran war and Hormuz disruption have turbocharged U.S. LNG exports, giving Washington a major short-term energy dominance boost as Asia and Europe scramble for alternative supply.

• China, however, enters the crisis from a position of greater energy resilience after years of investment in domestic production.

• The U.S. still has a major long-term opportunity, but sustaining dominance will require turning crisis-driven demand into lasting partnerships.

The Iran war has handed the United States a rare opportunity: a new dawn of energy dominance in an increasingly fractured world. With coordinated US-Israeli strikes disrupting the Strait of Hormuz from late February, roughly 20% of global LNG supply has been stripped from the market since early March. Prices have surged across Asia and Europe. And into that vacuum, American gas has flowed.

The numbers speak for themselves. US LNG exports to Asia jumped sharply in April, with nearly a quarter of all American cargoes heading to a region that simply cannot afford to go dark. Deals are being signed, pipelines planned, and $100 billion in private investment is pouring into liquefaction plants and terminals, putting the US on a trajectory toward 220 MTPA of export capacity within five years. The administration’s energy dominance agenda, backed by promises to streamline permitting, has given producers a powerful political tailwind and reassured global buyers seeking reliability. Washington’s case for American LNG has never been easier to make.

But dominance built on a crisis is not the same as dominance built on trust. And there is a competitor watching this moment very carefully.

China entered this crisis in a structurally different position. Two decades of sustained investment in domestic energy production, spanning generation, storage, and distribution, have left Beijing considerably less exposed to the supply shocks rattling Western and Asian markets alike. Its economy has not been immune, but it has been buffered. That resilience has not gone unnoticed by governments scrambling to explain surging energy bills to their populations. While the US capitalises on the immediate demand surge, China is quietly accumulating something more durable: the perception of strategic foresight.

Yet beneath the boom lies a fault line. The conflict has been a short-term windfall for American producers; cash is flowing and the geopolitical case for US LNG writes itself. But the longer the crisis persists, the more urgently governments around the world will prioritise the same fundamental objective: never being held hostage to a single chokepoint again. The Hormuz disruption has concentrated minds in a way that years of energy dialogues have never quite managed. Countries across Asia and Europe are now accelerating plans to diversify supply sources, build strategic reserves, and develop domestic generation capacity across every available technology. The goal is insulation from the kind of shock this war has delivered, and that shift in priorities will outlast the conflict itself, because the memory of this vulnerability will not fade quickly.

This does not mean the window for American gas has closed. The transition to more resilient, independent energy systems will take decades, and reliable LNG from a powerful economy is precisely what energy-hungry Asian economies need throughout that journey. The US has the reserves, the infrastructure, the financial markets, and the geopolitical credibility that no other supplier can currently match. But Washington cannot afford to mistake a crisis-driven demand surge for a permanent structural advantage, because what buyers are ultimately building toward is a system in which no single disruption, whether in the Strait of Hormuz or anywhere else, can send their economies into shock again. The US needs to be architected into that system as an indispensable partner, not treated as an emergency option.

That requires more than competitive pricing and export capacity. It requires the kind of long-term supply relationships, infrastructure partnerships, and government-to-government commitments that turn a transaction into a dependency, the good kind, built on reliability rather than vulnerability. It requires Washington to show up as a strategic partner invested in the energy security of its buyers. And it requires the Iran conflict to reach a resolution that restores stability to global flows, because sustained disruption ultimately accelerates the very diversification strategies that could reduce the world’s reliance on any single fuel source.

That is why forums like Gastech matter far beyond the conference floor. At Gastech 2025 in Milan, a high-profile US delegation led by Secretary of Energy Chris Wright and Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum used the event to demonstrate Washington’s commitment to the global market and deepen long-term partnerships with European buyers. This September, the same strategic imperative shifts to Asia, as Gastech convenes ministers, industry CEOs, and technology leaders in Bangkok around the urgent supply security and resilience priorities now defining the global energy agenda. Bangkok demands the same level of engagement, but with even greater stakes. Positioned at the heart of the world’s fastest-growing demand region, it is where the contracts signed today will shape the architecture of energy relationships for the next decade. It is where the US can arrive not only as the world’s largest LNG exporter, but as the partner that helped Asia build the resilient, diversified, and secure energy systems its economies need, with American technology, American capital, and American gas at the centre of that architecture.

The use of energy as a diplomatic instrument, as a foundation for alliances and a signal of long-term intent, has already demonstrated its capacity to stabilise relationships and strengthen the position of reliable partners. But leverage only holds if buyers believe the relationship will endure beyond the current emergency. And that is ultimately what is being decided right now: whether the world organises its energy future around American reliability, or looks elsewhere for the security guarantees it needs.

American energy dominance is real, and the Iran war has made that case powerfully. But dominance has to be earned continuously, through the infrastructure being built, the contracts being signed, and the diplomatic relationships being deepened, conference room by conference room, deal by deal. The window is open. What matters now is how Washington chooses to use it.