By Peter Tchir of Academy Securities
With the Fed Behind Us…
The 10-year Treasury sold off after the Fed bounced Thursday, only to resume selling, finishing the week just under 5%. Stocks, which seemed to move up and down with Treasuries, decided to move to the beat of their own drum into the close on Friday. Similarly, for the past few weeks, it seems that if you knew oil was up/down, you could predict yields would be up/down. Not on Friday.
On this special day we will build on Thursday’s post-FOMC report: Back to Regularly Scheduled Programming. You might be wondering “what makes today special”? Well, for the first time ever, the T-Report has the same access to the White House as CNN, though not quite how we hoped it would happen. The ban definitely seems weird. Not sure what to make of it, and maybe it will be nothing, but it does seem strange at the very least.
In Thursday’s report we touched on:
- Oil and energy prices, which we will focus on more today.
- Japanese Yen. Support has broken the 155 level solidly (closing at 156.9), which is likely to cause it to weaken further as a lot of people were willing to bet on I Am the House Now Bessent.
- Compute Build and AI Spend. Increasingly, this is likely to be a focus of this week’s Trump/Xi summit.
- Space. We need to do more to focus on the opportunities and risks (commercial and national security) for space. Working with some of Academy’s GIG members to more thoroughly assess this, as the national security aspect seems to be gaining more attention.
The Houthis and Saudi Arabia
Should we be treating what is going on between the Houthis and the Saudis as a subset of the Iran/U.S. war? The Houthis are, after all, a proxy of Iran. The Saudis have been working with the U.S. and the President, so are they merely just an ally? A subset, an extension, or something in its own right?
While Iran is likely influencing the Houthis and certainly has given them the tools to cause havoc and mayhem, the Houthis seem to be taking the initiative. Maybe they see the U.S. as distracted with Iran. Maybe they see the U.S. testing the Saudis’ loyalty as an ally. In any case, it seems like they have seen an opportunity and are taking strides to set their agenda in and around the Red Sea. They have seemingly gone out of their way to avoid any attack against U.S. assets. Instead, they are hitting the Saudis where it hurts: their energy industry. And according to reports, that includes jet fuel facilities at the airport.
We cautioned about getting excited that the pipeline damage inflicted on the “alternative to the Strait” pipeline would be repaired quickly. One, the damage seemed more extensive than just to the pipeline. Two, and more importantly, there is no evidence that new strikes could be thwarted. It seems like we should start pricing in “disruptions” to the energy complexes that are outside the scope of the U.S./Iran conflict.
Will the Saudis be able to defend themselves? Will they “beg” America to get involved more directly? If they do, will the U.S. get involved? Will they try to disrupt traffic through the Red Sea? If so, how much can they do before the U.S. gets involved? I’d ask how much before Europe would get involved, but that seems like it is too unlikely to even think about (they probably should, but it doesn’t seem imminent).
Markets seem to only react badly when actual events affecting energy prices occur. Markets seem to react positively to any story, rumor, or hope that is positive. That relationship may need to change…
Even My Mother Knows Diesel Prices are High!
Usually, by the time my mother knows something is affecting financial markets, it is a pretty good time to fade the trade as it has become totally consensus. I’m not so sure about that this time.
Since the war began, we’ve been focused not as much on oil, but more on LNG and Diesel. Both are “tighter” than oil itself. More susceptible to supply chain disruptions. Less flexibility to work around. So rather than “fading” something we’ve argued that people should focus on, we should just embrace that people (including my mother) are now thinking about the dangers of rising diesel prices: for industry, transportation, and agriculture (and maybe the “back up” generators at some data centers).
We already busted through the “red circle” that we had in last week’s version of this chart.
This is a big deal and has created some chatter about restricting diesel exports from the U.S. As discussed in prior reports, that is not likely to work (even with restrictions, the domestic price isn’t likely to deviate too far from Global Price minus Transportation minus Storage). It is also likely to hurt U.S. companies going forward as customers entering into new contracts need to consider this possibility (plus there are likely to be some legal challenges).
Rising diesel prices are high on my list of inflation pressures that are mounting and difficult to control (unless you are in charge of the war efforts).
One Path to Victory with Iran
Anything could happen. We could all wake up on Monday to find that there is a “deal” that is on the table and close to getting done. We did have an MOU after all (though from day 1, it seemed that although we all saw a written version, there were “unwritten” versions or promises made, that were inconsistent and it seemed like neither side had really listened to what the other side had said or wanted). I won’t discount some sort of “deal” but it seems difficult to believe that it will be one the U.S. can claim as a major victory, if it happens now (given the current news flow surrounding the war).
The economic sanctions could pressure Iran into a deal. The blockade has been very successful. Iran seems to be able to “contain” the amount of trade going through the Strait against their interests (some is going through, but Iran is still able to scare many into not trying to run through the Strait).
- Can the increased focus on sanctions work? Sure, but in a matter of weeks? Hmmmm…I find it difficult to believe that a nation that kills its own citizens on an industrial scale will collapse in weeks, or even a couple of months. They have had experience with evading sanctions for decades, albeit sanctions not being enforced as strictly as they are supposedly being enforced now.
- It remains unclear how sanctions will work unless the U.S. is willing to go after China (and Turkey) to the full extent of what Bessent has outlined. So far, that doesn’t seem to be happening. It will almost certainly be a discussion point this week for Trump and Xi.
Sanctions are helping and might be enough to force a good deal, but that doesn’t seem like a “tomorrow” sort of event.
Increasingly, we are being asked about “knocking out” Iran’s infrastructure. Could that happen? Yes, but here is a quick assessment:
- Anything clearly military focused has already likely been hit and destroyed.
- That leaves “dual use” facilities. Facilities that have both a military use and a commercial use. Let’s say energy sources close to military facilities that also service communities. Some of these are viable targets as the military usage is enough to justify going after them. Similar for some bridges necessary for moving troops or armaments. But this can be tricky: on a legal and humanitarian level. Global perception, while not necessarily at the top of the admin’s concerns, should still be a concern.
This is a possible path for the U.S., but it could be a difficult balancing act of doing enough to force change, without doing too much reputational (or even legal) damage.
Taking the Islands that control the Strait: after the midterm elections.
One theory that General (ret.) Bellon discussed this week is taking action to secure the islands that control the Strait, culminating possibly with Kharg Island.
The rationale is:
- Wait until after the midterms, because risks to U.S. troops will increase, but it won’t be as politicized as it would be prior to the elections. Prior to the election, IRAN WILL HAVE MORE OPTIONS than after the elections. Basically, if Iran believes the midterms represent a hurdle to Trump, they can take different actions than they can after the midterms have occurred. There is no longer some “deadline” for Trump, giving him more flexibility and changing Iran’s response function. This makes a lot of sense.
- Sanctions may work to create a deal, but anything resembling a different regime is not likely. Taking the islands that control the Strait, and eventually Kharg Island itself, would cripple their energy industry and demonstrate real weakness on their part. It will be difficult to do without loss of further life, but when so many other options leave us with a “kick the can” option, the President may decide an option that has horrible costs may be better than going through this effort every few years.
- Signaling the will to do this might be enough to change Iran’s negotiating stance. Taking even one small, relatively insignificant island that is the easiest to defend may also change the calculus for Iran. The U.S. might win not by taking every Island, including Kharg, but the start of turning a threat into reality could be enough.
What to watch for:
- The U.S. moving vessels with top-notch medical facilities into proximity (less than 1 hour by helicopter, say as a guideline) would be a good indication. The military’s commitment to saving each and every life possible, and providing the best care possible, is real. So, they would need to move these vessels that can perform state-of-the-art surgery and operations, close enough to help any soldiers needing aid.
Of all the discussions that I’ve heard around a “post-midterm” victory, this path seems reasonable. Maybe the theory would even be that once Iran sees the ships moving in, and knows the President isn’t potentially hamstrung by upcoming midterms, it capitulates and looks for a deal? Maybe a bit optimistic, but it resonates with me.
Greenland Deal
The President announced a deal. I will reserve comment until we see the terms of the actual deal (so far, as has become the norm, there are all sorts of assertions from a variety of sides, with little documentation).
The deal could be a real game changer, as the President implied via Truth Social. It might just be an updated formulation of agreements already in place (never hurts to update something that was written long before the polar ice caps were melting, when computers were the size of a house, and rare earths and critical minerals weren’t required in vast amounts).
A win in any case, but how much of a win remains to be seen. And could it have been done without all of the “annex” / “take” Greenland rhetoric?
Trump and Xi
We will provide a full take on this on Tuesday morning, as we work with the GIG to figure out what is likely the highest priority on both sides.
A few months ago, trade, rare earths, and critical minerals would have been high on that list. A few weeks ago, Iran and global energy had to be high on that list.
Now, cyber, AI, and compute have to be highest on the list.
At first blush, on most of these issues, the U.S. seems to need more from China than they need from the U.S. Never a great way to enter into a summit with China, but we will delve deeper on Tuesday.
Bottom Line
I’m running out of time in Vermont, and it might be nicer to spend it outside rather than at my laptop (and the Wi-Fi is spotty at best).
Diesel and the Middle East are key to rates.
For now, I think the path for energy prices (and stocks) and rates (globally) is higher. The news flow has not been positive this weekend, and it is difficult to see that changing quickly as Trump seems to be focused on dealing with Iran from a “stronger” position after the midterms (not stronger in terms of having the support of the House and the Senate, stronger because the perception that he has a deadline is gone).
For compute, Cheap Chinese Compute remains a concern.
It is difficult to get all “warm and fuzzy” about the outcome of this summit for markets. More choppiness seems to be the order of the day, with a bias to the downside for me on the compute spend story (though good for their credit spreads).
We get to bookend this week with a Monday morning appearance on CNBC and Friday morning on Bloomberg to analyze the results of the summit!
Should be another interesting week that we all have to navigate. Even with the Fed behind us, we will be paying attention to the data that may determine the next move for the Fed, but Iran, the Houthis, diesel, rates, and the summit are all going to move markets (hopefully in accordance with how we are recommending positioning).
