Authored by Steve Watson via Modernity News,

Britain’s prisons are becoming recruitment grounds for Islamic gangs, with white inmates converting under threat of violence while the system frees terrorists early, jails protesters longer than child sex attackers, and racks up hundreds of millions housing foreign offenders.

New Ministry of Justice figures have exposed a stark reality inside England and Wales’ jails. One in five Muslims behind bars is white – nearly four times the 5.8 per cent rate in the general population.

The number of white Muslim prisoners has climbed from 2,767 in 2022 to 3,218 by the end of June 2025, a 16 per cent rise. Overall Muslim inmates rose 14 per cent in the same period, from 14,037 to 16,051, now making up roughly 18 per cent of the prison population despite Muslims comprising just 6.5 per cent of the country.

? Read more https://t.co/b8r0O97xDs ??

— Daily Mail (@DailyMail) August 25, 2026

Shadow Justice Secretary Nick Timothy laid out the numbers and the implications. “The percentage of Muslims who are white in our prisons is so vastly higher than in the general population it raises serious questions,” he said.

Islamist gangs control many of our prisons.

Conversion to Islam is the only way to stay safe from them.

I obtained data showing 1 in 5 Muslim prisoners are white.

That’s four times higher than in the general population.

This cannot continue. pic.twitter.com/G87pfD7EoI

— Nick Timothy MP (@NJ_Timothy) August 25, 2026

“We know that experts have warned repeatedly about forced conversions taking place behind bars, driven by Islamic gangs. We need to be honest that something is not right here – Labour must urgently investigate and stamp out forced conversions in prison,” he further urged.

Government advisers have documented the pattern for years. Jonathan Hall KC, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, described Islamist terrorists operating as “self-styled emirs” who controlled prisoners through “leadership and recruitment.”

This included targeting “vulnerable or lonely prisoners, using guidance, sharing of food or material gifts” and “conversion backed by implicit or actual violence.”

The London Bridge attacker Usman Khan, while inside, encouraged prisoners to take Muslim names and wear Muslim dress while trying to convert others.

Ian Acheson, who reviewed Islamist extremism in prisons, said conversions often occur “as a pragmatic response to who controls power and space in our prisons.” In high-security jails especially, safety is at a premium and large numbers of violent young men seek belonging. “So Islam in this case has gang characteristics.”

‘We need to have much tighter regulation and control of the prison system’

Fiyaz Mughal, founder of Muslims Against Antisemitism, warns the UK prison system is failing to control violent Muslim gangs, leaving staff and inmates powerless. pic.twitter.com/TVdJzSr6Pa

— GB News (@GBNEWS) December 22, 2025

A 2023 government-commissioned review by Colin Bloom found gangs ordering new arrivals to become Muslim or face consequences. “Failure to identify as a Muslim meant that at best the new prisoner would be denied ‘protection’ from the dominant Muslim gang on that wing, or at worst the new prisoner would be subjected to violence and intimidation from that same gang.”

A lawyer who regularly visits top-security prisons reported the process starts almost immediately. “This is something which will happen hours after arriving on a wing. Immediately they arrive in prison they slot into the gang hierarchy. In some cases there are entire floors dominated by Muslim gangs.”

Some conversions are opportunistic – “convenience Muslims” seeking extra time for prayers or better halal food. Others are coerced. Qurans left on beds carry a clear message.

The Ministry of Justice insists it does not tolerate intimidation or faith-based coercion and claims prisons act swiftly. Yet the numbers keep rising, and there are now 140 Muslim chaplains compared with 87 for the Church of England.

This is the same prison system that continues to house thousands of foreign national offenders at enormous cost to the British taxpayer.

Figures show 10,487 foreign national offenders costing £629 million a year – money that could fund 16,500 police officers or 15,000 NHS nurses.

Albania tops the list, followed by Ireland and Poland. Deportations remain slow, tangled in missing documents, uncooperative origin countries, and European Convention on Human Rights claims.

Reform UK’s prisons adviser Vanessa Frake called the bill “staggering.” She noted the drawn-out process: discarded passports, slow diplomatic correspondence, refusals by origin countries, and Article 8 family-life claims. Even a deal to return 200 Albanian prisoners came with conditions and lower daily payments to Albania than the UK pays to keep them.

While foreign offenders and Islamist networks embed inside the system, the authorities have shown a different urgency when it comes to early release.

Zahid Iqbal, convicted in 2013 for plotting to bomb an Army base using an Al-Qaeda manual, was approved for release three years early despite previous non-compliance and warnings from prison and community managers.

Colin Sutton, Reform UK’s crime adviser, called the decision “baffling.” “This wasn’t a guy in his bedroom cooking something up. This was somebody who arranged training. He had links with al-Qaeda. He was a proper terrorist.”

Labour’s broader early-release schemes have accelerated the emptying of cells to manage overcrowding. Thousands of offenders, including those convicted of violence, have been freed earlier than previous tariffs allowed. Even after partial pauses and exclusions for certain sex offences, the direction of travel remains clear: capacity management takes priority over consistent public protection.

Contrast that with the treatment of British citizens who protest the consequences of mass migration or speak out online. Lucy Connolly, already imprisoned for a single X post after the Southport attacks, faced the threat of recall to prison for reposting a satirical comment about Donald Trump and Keir Starmer. Probation officials treated the joke as “inciting violence” after an anonymous complaint.

In Essex, protests outside an asylum hotel housing Ethiopian migrant Hadush Kebatu erupted after he sexually assaulted a 14-year-old girl and a woman. Kebatu received 12 months. British protesters involved in the subsequent disorder received far longer terms.

Charlie Land got 32 months. Jonathan Glover got 30 months. Lee Gower, a local father and youth football coach, received two years and nine months. Other locals drew sentences of 22 to 33 months. Combined custodial terms for several of them exceeded 17 years – longer than the perpetrator who triggered the unrest.

Judges stressed that violence against police is unacceptable. Yet the sentencing disparity is unmistakable. Locals reacting to a sexual assault on a child by a small-boat arrival spend more time inside than the man who committed the assault.

Meanwhile white prisoners report pressure to convert for survival, foreign national offenders cost hundreds of millions, and convicted terrorists walk early under capacity rules.

Prisons reflect the wider failures of open borders and selective enforcement. Gangs exploit the vacuum. Vulnerable inmates adapt or suffer. Taxpayers foot the bill.

Ordinary Britons who notice and object face the sharp end of the law. The figures on white Muslim prisoners are not a statistical curiosity. They are the measurable result of a system that has lost control of its own institutions.

Authored by Luc Lelièvre via Mises Institute,

Loïc Wacquant and Murray Rothbard come from completely different worlds. Wacquant, in Punishing the Poor (2009), analyzes how modern states manage marginalized populations through policing and incarceration. Rothbard, in The Ethics of Liberty (1982), argues that the state is a monopoly of coercion and that real justice means restitution to victims rather than punishment imposed by the government. At first glance, they seem to have nothing in common. Yet, when you look closely at what each says about crime and punishment, they describe remarkably similar institutional dynamics: a penal system that does not exist to deliver justice but to maintain political power, control vulnerable communities, and satisfy the public’s desire for punishment.

Wacquant argues that modern punishment targets not crime itself but people with low incomes. In Punishing the Poor, he writes that “it is not so much crime that is being fought, but the poor themselves.” He attributes this dynamic to welfare retrenchment and what he interprets as neoliberal restructuring. This is Wacquant’s interpretation. My purpose here is not to defend or refute it, but to summarize his institutional analysis and compare it with Rothbard’s critique of state power. Wacquant’s central point is that the penal system expands as social protections shrink, turning prisons into warehouses for people pushed out of the labor market. He portrays the United States as an expansive apparatus of social control in which punishment falls primarily on street crime while much white-collar wrongdoing is managed through administrative and legal processes.

Rothbard approaches the issue from a different angle. For him, crime is fundamentally an aggression against a person or their property. Justice should repair the victim. That means restitution – returning what was taken, plus a penalty for the harm done. In Rothbard’s view, prison is a double injustice. It fails to compensate the victim and forces taxpayers to pay for the criminal’s room and board. As one Mises Institute essay summarizes, “the victim receives nothing and is then ‘robbed’ once more through taxes to feed and house the criminal.” Rothbard sees the prison system as wasteful, immoral, and fundamentally misaligned with justice. His alternative is clear: restitution, even if it must be paid through supervised work when the offender has no money.

Rothbard’s critique is not only moral but also economic. In his landmark article “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach” (1968), Gary Becker reached a similar conclusion from a different perspective. Every sanction carries costs as well as benefits, and incarceration is among the most expensive. If restitution, fines, or compensated labor can deter crime while restoring victims, prison becomes difficult to justify except for dangerous offenders. Becker’s analysis complements Rothbard’s argument by showing that restitution is not merely ethically preferable – it is also economically superior.

Wacquant and Rothbard share an understanding of the state’s role. Wacquant views the penal state as a bureaucratic arm of what he calls neoliberal governance, used to control marginalized populations. Rothbard views the penal state as a predatory institution that thrives on coercion. Both agree that the penal system tends to neglect victims, expand state power, and generate political legitimacy rather than genuine justice.

Their agreement becomes even more striking when viewed through the lens of institutional incentives. A penal bureaucracy does not merely administer justice; it sustains a network of police agencies, prosecutors, correctional officers, prison contractors, and public budgets, all of whose continued existence depends on the expansion of penal institutions. Restitution threatens this logic by shifting attention from the state to the victim. A system centered on repairing private harm requires fewer bureaucracies and leaves less room for political theater. From this perspective, incarceration persists not merely because citizens demand punishment, but because governments have institutional incentives to provide it.

René Girard, in Violence and the Sacred (1972), helps explain how punishment operates. Girard argues that societies have always used scapegoats to relieve social tension. In modern times, the criminal becomes that scapegoat, and the prison becomes the altar. As one Mises Institute essay notes, “the real product of the penal system is collective catharsis.” Punishment is not a rational policy, it is a ritual. This is why voters demand harsher penalties even when prisons fail. This is why mass incarceration persists despite its cost and lack of results. Punishment satisfies a symbolic need, not a practical one.

Girard also helps explain why governments find this ritual politically useful. If societies repeatedly seek symbolic victims to restore social cohesion, the state becomes the institution that organizes and legitimizes those sacrifices. Public fear creates demand for punishment; political institutions supply it. Rothbard exposes the institutional side of this relationship, while Girard reveals its anthropological foundation. Together, they show how emotional expectations and bureaucratic incentives reinforce each other, enabling the penal system to expand even when it fails to reduce crime or compensate victims.

This is where Rothbard offers something Wacquant does not: a way out. Restitution replaces the sacrificial logic of punishment with a logic of repair. It shifts the focus from the offender to the victim, closes the moral account rather than leaving it open, and satisfies the need for justice without feeding the bureaucratic machine. In To Serve and Protect (1990), Bruce Benson shows that pre-state legal systems, such as Anglo-Saxon weregild, relied on restitution to prevent feuds and maintain peace. These systems worked because they focused on compensation rather than punishment.

Wacquant advocates “radical penal minimalism,” a model that narrows the scope of punishment while preserving its democratic legitimacy. Rothbard calls for a justice system based on restitution rather than incarceration. Girard calls for an end to sacrificial violence. Benson shows how restitution can be implemented. Becker argues that incarceration is often less economically efficient than restitution, fines, and other alternative sanctions.

Despite their profound philosophical disagreements, all five raise serious doubts about the effectiveness and legitimacy of a prison-centered model of justice. Becker questions its efficiency. Benson presents historical alternatives. Girard exposes its sacrificial logic. Wacquant reveals its bureaucratic expansion. Rothbard offers restitution as a principled alternative.

The penal Leviathan will not disappear through abolitionist slogans or bureaucratic reforms. It will disappear only when justice ceases to be a ritual of punishment and becomes a process of repair. That requires reexamining the assumption that crime should be understood primarily as an offense against the state rather than as an injury to identifiable victims. Once the victim again becomes the central figure in justice, restitution naturally replaces punishment as the primary objective.

As long as governments monopolize punishment, they retain incentives to expand the penal apparatus, regardless of its effectiveness. Restitution reverses that logic. It limits bureaucratic power, restores the victim to the center of justice, and transforms punishment from a political ritual into a genuine process of moral and legal repair. Whether approached through sociology, economics, anthropology, or libertarian political philosophy, the victim – not the state – emerges as the indispensable starting point for any coherent theory of justice.

Soda purchases fell about 13 percent among Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) beneficiaries after 10 states restricted purchases of sugary drinks with SNAP funds in 2026, a study found.

SNAP restriction waivers banned non-nutritious items like soda and candy to ensure that taxpayer dollars are directed toward nutritious options that improve health outcomes, the U.S. Department of Agriculture stated on its website.

The August study from the National Bureau of Economic Research – not yet peer-reviewed – evaluated the immediate effects of SNAP food restriction waivers in 10 states that implemented the bans.

Researchers used a Nielsen consumer dataset of about 5,000 SNAP households from July 2025 to June 2026.

Before the ban, the average SNAP household bought about 185 ounces of soda per month. That’s about 15 cans. The 13 percent drop is about 24 ounces, or two cans less per month.

Purchases of energy drinks also decreased by 4 ounces per household per month.

Interestingly, as Sylvia Xu reports for The Epoch Times, the study found that even households having enough cash to offset the restrictions reduced soda consumption by 18.5 percent, down 40 ounces per month.

When states labeled soda as an unapproved purchase, it acted as a powerful psychological signal, according to the report.

Arkansas shelf tag…

Instead of bypassing the ban with cash, families reconsidered their habits.

The policy changed what they viewed as appropriate foods to buy, leading to a significant drop in overall soda purchases, according to the study.

These findings indicate that simple administrative restrictions can effectively steer dietary choices and potentially improve public health outcomes, the researchers concluded.

Texas shelf tag…

However, it’s not clear how big the impact on sugar consumption will be.

A similar study in 2024 predicted a decline of up to 20 percent in soda purchases when the soda bans went into effect, but also forecast a 7 percent increase in juice consumption.

That would mean an overall decrease of just 7 percent in the intake of sugar from beverages.

Data on the current level of juice consumption by SNAP users is not yet available.

In fiscal year 2025, SNAP distributed $102.6 billion to nearly one in eight Americans, more than 42 million people. That’s about $2,400 per person per year.

Until this year, those funds could be used to purchase nearly all foods except for alcoholic beverages and hot prepared foods.

As of August, 23 states have implemented SNAP restriction waivers and prohibit recipients from purchasing junk food such as beverages and candy.

This is the first time in the program’s history that the Department of Agriculture has granted waivers allowing states to restrict SNAP benefits.

Authored by Kyle Anzalone via Antiwar.com,

An Ecuadorian official confirmed that US Green Berets were engaged in anti-cartel operations. Earlier this year, President Donald Trump formed a coalition, dubbed Shield of the Americas, that was aimed at combating cartels in Latin and South America.

A local official told AFP and UPI that US special forces have been conducting direct operations against suspected cartels in the Esmeraldas province. “We are with the 7th (Special Forces) Group of the US Army. We are working together in the fight against narcoterrorism,” Esmeraldas Provincial governor Juan Jaramillo said last week.

Ecuadorian Defense Minister Gian Carlo Loffredo added that two US warships were operating in the region.

In March, President Donald Trump said that a dozen Latin American nations had enlisted in the Shield of the Americas coalition to fight cartels in the region. Ecuador is a member of the bloc.

That month, the US and Ecuador conducted joint military operations against alleged drug targets. “The operations are a powerful example of the commitment of partners in Latin America and the Caribbean to combat the scourge of narco-terrorism,” U.S. Southern Command said following the raid.

However, The New York Times reported that the target of the operation was a dairy farm, not a drug lab. “The military strike appears to have destroyed a cattle and dairy farm, not a drug trafficking compound, according to interviews with the farm’s owner, four of its workers, human rights lawyers, and residents and leaders in San Martín,” the outlet explains.

The military activity in Ecuador is part of Operation Southern Spear. Trump ordered the Department of War last year to expand military operations in Latin America to curb narcotics trafficking to the US.

The US has conducted dozens of airstrikes against suspected drug boats in the Caribbean Sea and Eastern Pacific Ocean. The operations have killed over 200 people and over 60 vessels.

The White House has asserted that the targeted boats are operated by narco-terrorists attempting to smuggle fentanyl into the US. However, the administration has not offered the American people any evidence to support the claim.

Additionally, some evidence suggests that at least some of the vessels that have been attacked were not involved in narcotics trafficking. The family members of several victims have said their slain relatives were fishermen.

Last month, The Washington Post reported reviewing a DEA assessment that found the strikes on vessels operated by alleged narco-terrorists have not changed the amount or price of cocaine entering the US. US military officials also admitted to Congress that the operations have had no impact on purity.

The Trump administration is overhauling rules governing the length of stay for international students and exchange visitors, replacing a decades-old system with a fixed period of up to four years.

Beginning Sept. 15, most people entering on F-1 and J-1 visas will no longer be admitted for “duration of status,” which generally allows them to remain in the country as long as they maintain their academic or exchange programs.

Instead, students and scholars will receive predetermined admission periods based on the length of their programs, capped at four years. Any extension needed to complete a degree, including for many doctoral candidates, will require an application to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.

The new four-year visa cap could be damning for some colleges and universities that rely heavily on international students.

A new report from local outlet The Baltimore Banner warns that the University of Maryland “could face a decline of as much as 30% of its newly admitted graduate students this fall, thanks to a new visa restriction proposed by the Trump administration this summer.”

University officials disclosed a new estimate in court filings supporting a federal lawsuit seeking to block the four-year visa cap. The University of Maryland and University of Baltimore face similar contractions in international enrollment. 

According to the report, international students contributed an estimated $240.4 million to the University of Maryland and the surrounding economy during the 2024-25 academic year. At the University of Maryland, Baltimore, that figure was around $14 million.

Whether the four-year visa cap proves to be the final pin that finally punctures America’s higher-education bubble remains to be seen. But certaintly may cause hardships for universities that heavily rely on foreign enrollment. 

Authored by Tamuz Itai via The Epoch Times,

For months, the assumption that the Strait of Hormuz was Tehran’s ultimate card dominated commentary on the war.

As a narrow waterway through which roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil and a substantial share of liquefied natural gas had historically passed, it appeared to be a chokepoint Iran could close or severely disrupt at will. It did not need to destroy every tanker. Hitting a small percentage with drones, cruise missiles, speedboats, or mines would spike insurance rates, deter crews and companies, and effectively shut the strait without continuous physical control.

This idea was not new for 2026. It had long been a feature of the Iranian strategic posture, treated as both a military instrument and a political myth-proof that even under pressure Tehran retained a decisive lever over the global energy system. Parts of the Western media and independent analysts amplified the same narrative.

Relying on incomplete open-source shipping data, especially once vessels began sailing dark, many concluded that the United States had been caught unprepared and lacked a realistic path to reopen the waterway. Hormuz, they argued, was effectively closed or closable at Iran’s discretion. That framing was powerful, but also incomplete.

How the Threat Has Been Eroded

The assumption that Iran’s detection and targeting system could not be dismantled without dramatic escalation proved wrong. Under the U.S. Central Command, also known as CENTCOM, and with significant involvement from the Fifth Fleet and Air Force components, the United States ran a sustained effort to degrade the sensors Iran needed to find and hit ships.

Iran relied on mobile truck-mounted radars, drones, cruise missiles, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) speedboats, and naval mines. Inside the narrow strait, ships move in relatively predictable lanes. Iran combined active radars with passive electro-optical and infrared cameras on elevated terrain and islands such as Qeshm, Larak, and Abu Musa.

Mobile radars would radiate briefly to locate shipping, then shut down and move before anti-radiation missiles could arrive. Once a ship’s approximate position was known, strike systems could be sent to search.

The vulnerability was that every radar emission could be detected. American aircraft responded systematically with anti-radiation missiles while visual and intelligence efforts located the passive sensors. This was the core of what some involved called “draining the swamp.”

Iran had redundancy, but the number of sensors was finite. Hundreds of precision strikes gradually reduced Iran’s ability to see traffic in the strait. As the detection layer thinned, the effectiveness of the strike systems declined with it.

Parallel efforts neutralized mines with unmanned vessels and declared the southern lane near Oman largely clear. Convoys moved under escort, often at night with the automated information system (AIS) off. Arleigh Burke-class destroyers with Aegis radars and standard missile (SM)-family interceptors formed the backbone; drones and Apache helicopters armed with laser-guided rockets provided additional cover. American ships also engaged IRGC speedboats that closed on the convoys.

On the commercial side, the United States addressed insurance barriers. In early March, President Donald Trump directed the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) to provide political risk insurance and guarantees for maritime trade.

The DFC, working with the Treasury and CENTCOM, established a revolving reinsurance facility of roughly $20 billion-later expanded with private partners including Chubb-focused on hull, machinery, and cargo cover. Early uptake was limited. As Iranian success rates fell, more vessels joined.

Results have been significant. CENTCOM has reported assisting well over a thousand commercial vessels and moving hundreds of millions of barrels since the spring. Independent trackers often showed lower numbers because much of the traffic sailed dark. Pre-war throughput was 20 million to 21 million barrels per day.

Flows through Hormuz remain below that, but combined with the Abu Dhabi-Fujairah pipeline and Saudi Arabia’s pipeline to Yanbu in the Red Sea, volumes recovered enough to keep oil prices in the $85 to $95 range-elevated, but far from the predicted catastrophe.

Not Seeing the True Picture

Public data lagged for both technical and psychological reasons. Ships that went dark during transit normally turned their AIS trackers back on afterward, so theoretically they could have been tracked and counted, yet matching was imperfect amid overlapping night movements, incomplete satellite reception, intermittent signals, and ship-to-ship transfers.

Commercial trackers attempt corrections using imagery and other data, but confidence thresholds still produce undercounts relative to what escorting forces could see.

There was also a narrative reason. The story of Iranian success and American failure fit expectations many already held. Contradictory evidence produced cognitive dissonance. The common response was to protect the original frame-by applying greater skepticism to inconvenient details and treating quieter progress as temporary.

In a contested information environment, narratives that confirm prior expectations often outlast those that require revision.

The General Principle

Hormuz illustrates a broader pattern. Leverage is often strongest while latent. The threat shapes behavior; the target hedges or hopes the card is never played. Once used at scale, incentives change. Real costs appear, and the value of neutralizing the threat rises sharply.

Adaptation follows: sensors are hunted, escorts are organized, alternative routes are accelerated, commercial workarounds are found. Over time, the original leverage delivers diminishing returns. The coercer frequently ends up weaker than before.

The pattern is not unique. In 1973, Arab oil producers cut exports and raised prices. The short-term shock was severe; the longer-term response included efficiency gains, strategic reserves, non-OPEC production, and the shale revolution.

Russia’s gas cut-offs against Europe from 2021 to 2022 produced a similar arc: LNG expansion, storage, demand reduction, and alternative suppliers collapsed Moscow’s share of the European market, forcing it to sell more of its supply with heavy discounts to China and others.

China’s 2010 rare-earth restrictions against Japan spurred alternative mining, recycling, and substitution. In recent years, the United States has also accelerated the shift with CHIPS Act funding, Department of Defense equity stakes and loans, price-floor and offtake arrangements, and Project Vault, which includes equity stakes in key producers and a strategic minerals reserve, while expanding cooperation with partners such as Australia.

Remaining Levers and Their Limits

If the Hormuz card is already delivering diminishing returns, what options remain for Iran?

The most consequential underused lever is a more systematic campaign against Gulf energy production itself-fields, processing plants, refineries, and downstream industries. Iran has already struck these targets at a meaningful scale. What has not been fully attempted is a sustained multi-country effort at lasting destruction of capacity.

Other potential levers include intensified proxies, cyber operations, pressure on Bab el-Mandeb, residual nuclear signaling, and heavier strikes on U.S. bases or critical infrastructure. Each retains some potential.

Yet the same logic applies. Further large-scale use would accelerate the responses that reduce effectiveness. At the same time, the regime faces continuous economic pressure from the U.S. naval blockade, oil-export enforcement, and broader “Operation Economic Outcast” sanctions. Escalation under that siege significantly raises costs and shortens the runway.

Another option might be a distraction elsewhere, perhaps initiated by another country in the emerging axis of Chinese Communist Party-dependent countries, such as Russia, North Korea, or China itself.

The battle for the strait is not the entire war. It has, however, illustrated a recurring feature of strategy: geographic and resource levers look most formidable while they remain latent. Once put into continuous action, they often set in motion the forces that ultimately reduce their power.

Two people have died in connection with measles in Pennsylvania, state health officials announced on August 25.

The Pennsylvania Department of Health said the deaths were “related to measles.” Both individuals lived in Lancaster County and had not received a measles vaccine. Officials declined to release further details, citing the need to protect the privacy of the deceased and their families.

Nationally, measles cases in 2026 have already surpassed the total recorded in 2025 and stand at the highest level since 1991. Pennsylvania has confirmed 393 cases so far this year. These are the first measles-related deaths reported in the United States in 2026, and Pennsylvania’s first in 35 years, The Epoch Times reports.

In 2025, three people died from measles, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Health Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. and others have said medical records showed those patients died from unrelated conditions or from health problems that were worsened by measles. Texas health officials attributed both children’s deaths to measles and said neither had underlying conditions.

Kennedy and health officials have encouraged people to receive the measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR) vaccine. At the same time, Kennedy has stressed that vaccination should not be mandatory and that doctors should be prepared to treat measles cases.

Asked about the current measles situation earlier this month, Kennedy told reporters: “We’ve done better than any country in the world in controlling it.” He also said that the outbreak has been almost entirely confined to religious communities that decline vaccination.

Authored by Jeremy Portnoy via RealClearInvestigations,

The federal deficit will be $2.1 trillion when fiscal year 2026 ends on Sept. 30, the Congressional Budget Office projected in its monthly budget review.

The deficit – the gap between what the government spends and what it collects from taxes and other revenue – has never surpassed $1.8 trillion, except during the Covid-19 pandemic.

Key facts: Federal revenues are up 3% in 2026 compared to last year. Even though corporate income tax revenue has declined, income and payroll tax collections increased.

But federal spending is up 5%, according to the CBO. Interest on the national debt increased 14% compared to last year. Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and defense are also facing increased costs.

The CBO originally projected this year’s deficit would be $1.9 trillion. The estimate was changed “mostly because of smaller-than-expected collections of tariff duties” after the Supreme Court struck down tariffs imposed by President Donald Trump in February.

Though Trump later imposed new tariffs, the CBO still expects federal revenue to be $250 billion less than originally anticipated. About $100 billion has been refunded to companies so far, under an order from the U.S. Court of International Trade.

Critical quote: “We’ve borrowed an astounding $1.8 trillion this fiscal year, with $431 billion in the month of July alone, and equating to nearly $6 billion per day,” said Maya MacGuineas, president of the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget. “We’re on track to surpass $2 trillion in borrowing this fiscal year despite not being in a recession. That is not normal.”

Background: The University of Pennsylvania recently estimated that under current policy, it will likely be mathematically impossible for the U.S. to pay off its debt by the year 2048.

That was before Trump asked Congress to increase discretionary spending by 19% next year, which would be the second-largest spending increase in at least 60 years.

Summary: America’s affordability crisis is the most prominent political issue in the country, yet neither party has committed to reducing government deficits. Until then, the crisis is likely to only worsen.

The #WasteOfTheDay is brought to you by the forensic auditors at Open the Books. Search all federal, state and local salaries and vendor spending with the world’s largest government spending database at OpenTheBooks.com.

On Wednesday Ukrainian forces struck a Wildberries facility deep inside of Russian territory for the second time this summer.

The warehouse in the central Tambov region city of Kotovsk was first targeted in July, but this time the large complex has been “completely” destroyed in the resulting fire, Governor Yevgeny Pervyshov confirmed.

The city’s mayor, Alexey Plakhotnikov, wrote on social media that “A massive fire at the Wildberries warehouse complex, smoke and smog are quickly spreading throughout the city.”

He urged residents to shelter in place as a massive black cloud of smoke has reached high into sky, and enveloped the city and its environs.

“To avoid carbon monoxide poisoning and combustion products, I strongly urge you to refrain from active movement around the city for the next two days. Keep your windows and balconies closed,” he instructed.

Regional media recounts of the same site, “The Ukrainian Armed Forces previously attacked the Wildberries logistics center in Kotovsk. On July 18, seven employees were killed and 23 more were hospitalized.”

At this point over a dozen key Wildberries logistics hubs have been hit. The online retailer is considered to be the Amazon of Russia, but Ukraine has argued it is assisting the Russian military with supplies and so is fair game for targeting. The latest overnight drone onslaught across Russia killed three people overnight.

Ukraine also struck Russia’s NORSI oil refinery in Kstovo, Nizhny Novgorod region in the overnight attack. It is a Lukoil refinery that is one of the most important in Russia, and Ukraine’s military says it is now up in flames.

President Zelensky is vowing to keep up these punishing long-range drones strikes, but also as residents of the Ukrainian capital brace for potential Russian ballistic missiles.

Regional unconfirmed reports say the Norsi complex has suffered a forced shut down as diesel prices soar near all time highs. DropSite News reviews of the significance:

• Ukraine’s General Staff said its forces struck Lukoil’s Kstovo (NORSI) refinery in Russia’s Nizhny Novgorod region about 250 miles east of Moscow.
• It is Russia’s 4th-largest oil refinery and 2nd-largest gasoline producer, and can process roughly 125 million barrels annually, or about 320,000–340,000 barrels per day. The strike sparked a fire and forced the refinery to suspend crude oil processing, according to Reuters.
• U.S. retail diesel prices meanwhile have surged near historic highs, reaching a national average of $5.62 to $5.65 per gallon. 
• Prices jumped by 20 cents per gallon this week alone, driven by a global supply crunch linked to the Middle East conflict and refinery disruptions there and in Russia. 
• Current diesel prices are nearly $2.00 per gallon higher than they were at this time last year. 

While there’s still yet to be official Kremlin confirmation of the Norsi refinery attack and destruction, videos like the below have been spreading quickly online:

🔥 15 to 17 million metric tons.

That’s the annual crude throughput at Lukoil’s NORSI refinery in Kstovo, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, which is now burning after local Telegram channels and residents reported an air raid alert, drones overhead, and then a drone strike overnight.… pic.twitter.com/t5kwRxEbGA

— Jack Prandelli (@jackprandelli) August 26, 2026

“The war must return to where it came from. Ukraine responds to Russian strikes, and we do so in a way that ensures the cost of the war for the aggressor inevitably rises.” Zelensky wrote in a post on X.

Authored by Ioannis Vlahos via Antiwar.com,

Israel is currently prepared to begin development of offensive space capabilities, including systems designed to defend Israeli satellites from hostile spacecraft, and weapons (including lasers) capable of striking targets from space.

It is part of the Defense Ministry’s multiyear budget plan for the space sector, which will include upgrading and expanding IDF (Israel Defense Forces) intelligence and communications capabilities. The plan will also dedicate a budget to support offensive space operations, which will focus on weapons designed to protect Israeli satellites as well as weapons designed to strike targets on Earth.

Defense Minister Israel Katz spoke earlier this summer about Israel’s commitment to becoming the world leader in space-attack capabilities, a realm of warfare that has experienced a surge in Israeli military interest given its extensive use for intelligence gathering in Iran.

“One of the central goals that the prime minister [Benjamin Netanyahu] and I set is that we are recruiting the best minds,” he said. “As of today, no country has the ability to mount attacks in space. We must be the leading country in the world with this capability.”

“If we achieve this, it will ensure the advantage of deterrence, of the ability to attack, destroy, and all of the other matters versus our enemies with large resources.”

Global space warfare development has been on the rise in recent years, and some speculate that Israel’s recent activity is an effort to catch up with China and Russia, who have been testing their own offensive space capabilities. US President Donald Trump has also expressed his desire for America to do the same, by signing Executive Order 14369, “Ensuring American Space Superiority.”

However, experts warn that Israel and others’ offensive space weapon programs have increased proliferation concerns. Satellite miniaturization, falling launch costs, and the commercialization of the space industry have also allowed more countries to create their own space programs, and not all of them are peaceful. Furthermore, space weaponry not only threatens satellites and other non-military technologies operating in space, but the growing prevalence of and reliance on the latter will make cyberattacks all the more dangerous.