By Abishek Vishnoi, Bloomberg Markets Live reporter and strategist

A rotation from growth to value stocks is more pronounced in Asia than anywhere else globally, as doubts grow over the chip rally’s staying power.

MSCI’s gauge for value stocks in Asia Pacific has risen about 6% this quarter, compared with a 2% drop in its growth counterpart, on track for its biggest outperformance since January-March 2022, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. The gap is wider than the swings in the US and Europe over the period.

The divergence shows how Asia’s growth trade had come to rely on a handful of chip stocks, with their reversal now prompting investors to look for cheaper options. Asian value stocks remain inexpensive relative to both growth shares and global peers. A nearly 20% weighting of financials in the regional gauge offers another potential tailwind from higher yields.

“The value rotation in Asia is set to expand and extend as semiconductor’s downtrend is not yet finished,” said Hao Hong, chief investment officer at hedge fund Lotus Asset Management in Hong Kong. “The market has clearly entered a new phase as funds will favor those names with solid growth and track records.”

Value stocks in Asia are trading at 10.8 times their one-year forward earnings estimates, compared with 17.9 times for the US and 12.3 times for Europe, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. The multiple for Asian growth stocks is 13.

A rise in bond yields across major markets can potentially support bank earnings by widening lending spreads. That gives the region’s value trade an additional earnings lever at a time when higher yields and Federal Reserve rate-hike bets are putting pressure on long-duration growth stocks.

MSCI’s financials gauge has climbed 12% in Asia this quarter, while information technology, which comprises about a third of the regional index, is down 5.6%. It was dragged by a recent selloff in some of the global best performers of the past year, including SK Hynix Inc. and Samsung Electronics Co. Among value stocks, Genscript Biotech Corp. has surged more than 150% this quarter in Hong Kong.

More recently, value has been Asia’s best-performing investment style even on a long-short basis. The strategy buying cheap stocks and shorting expensive ones returned about 1% over one week ending Sept. 5, while growth was the worst performer with a negative return of -1.3%.

“The encouraging story is the valuation gap and regional stickiness as Asian value stocks remain cheap relative to global peers, giving investors both a defensive buffer today and a coiled spring for when risk appetite rebuilds,” said Hebe Chen, a senior market analyst at Vantage Global Prime in Sydney. “And in Asia, when the tide turns, it rarely walks — it runs.”

Authored by Max Blumenthal via The GrayZone

As the US prepares to mark 25 years since Sept. 11, 2001, Donald Trump has removed top Al Qaeda figures from the US list of designated terrorists. Among those he delisted was Abdullah Muhaysini, a Saudi cleric who recruited child fighters and teen suicide bombers to wreak havoc across Syria.

The Trump administration has removed the names of some of the world’s most notorious commanders, recruiters and financiers for the Syrian branch of Al Qaeda from its list of specially designated terrorists. Among those relieved of US sanctions this August was Abdullah Muhaysini, a Salafi-jihadi cleric from Saudi Arabia who participated in videotaped massacres of captive soldiers and recruited droves of foreign youth to carry out suicide bombings throughout Syria over the past decade.

The delisting of the jihadist recruiters came as part of the Trump administration’s removal of the government of Syrian President Ahmad Al-Sharaa as a State Sponsor of Terrorists. “These actions represent another historic step by President Trump to give the Syrian people a path to prosperity,” Secretary of State Marco Rubio declared on August 24, 2026.

Formerly known as Abu Mohammad Al-Jolani, Al-Sharaa is the co-founder of ISIS and founder of Jabhat Al-Nusra, the Syrian branch of Al Qaeda. Under the guidance of Western advisors, Al-Sharaa rebranded Al-Nusra as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or HTS, before he toppled the government of President Bashar Al-Assad in December 2024.

By the time he seized power, Al-Sharaa had been groomed by his NATO handlers as a reliable local enforcer. When Trump hosted Al-Sharaa in the Oval Office in November 2025, playfully misting him with Trump Cologne and asking how many wives he had, it was clear the US was ready to lift the sanctions that had devastated Syria’s economy. Two months later, Trump pitched a half-baked plan for the Syrian military to attack Iran. Washington had finally found its man in Damascus.

This August, the Trump administration went a step further, lifting sanctions on Al Qaeda propagandists, funders and fighters responsible for gruesome atrocities during the dirty war on Syria. These figures include Abu Sulayman al-Muhajir, a top Al Qaeda recruiter in Australia who fled to Syria; Shafi Sultan Mohammed al-Ajmi, a major Kuwaiti financier of Al-Nusra; and Abdul Samrez Jashari, an Albanian foreign fighter who has taken on a senior role in Syria’s military under Al-Sharaa.

Here’s President Trump spraying Al-Sharaa with his cologne, asking him how many wives he has..at the Oval Office. pic.twitter.com/ojFHEIZmmT

— Olga Nesterova (@onestpress) November 12, 2025

Perhaps none of the Al Qaeda bandits who received sanctions relief from the Trump administration oversaw as many acts of sadistic violence as the Saudi-born, Turkish-backed cleric Abdullah Muhaysini.

Prolific recruiter of teenage suicide bombers earns sanctions relief from Trump

In 2015, Muhaysini was filmed in camouflaged battle dress uniform, glowering over a group of blindfolded, exhausted Syrian army regulars taken captive at an airbase in Syria’s Idlib province. In a videotaped message, he justified massacring them in cold blood because, despite being Sunni Muslims, they had fought for Syria’s secular government.

“I don’t like to call them Sunni,” Muhaysini declared. “They were once Sunni but became apostatized once they enlisted in the Alawites’ regime.” Moments later, the 56 men were lined up and riddled with bullets.

Office of Foreign Assets Control

Muhaysini studied under Sulayman Al-Alwan, the Wahhabi cleric who oversaw what his Muslim critics have called a “terrorist factory” in Saudi Arabia’s Al-Qassim Province. Al-Alwan also happened to be the instructor of the 9/11 hijacker Abdulaziz Alomari.

As The Grayzone reported, Muhaysini recruited thousands of young men as fighters and suicide bombers, promising them heavenly deliverance for sacrificing their lives in attacks on government targets. The foreign demagogue managed to find time for televised sermons counseling followers on when it was appropriate to beat their wives, while urging them to kill Shias and members of other minority groups wherever they found them across Syria.

After moving to Syria in 2014, Muhaysini embedded himself among the rebels’ most powerful factions and worked to unite them under a single banner. At first, he helped cobble together the coalition known as Jaish al-Fatah, or the Army of Conquest. (The Trump administration has lifted sanctions on a successor group to Jaish al-Fatah as part of its delisting of Al-Sharaa’s HTS).

Through his connections with wealthy Salafis in the Gulf states, Muhaysini organized the “wage jihad with your money” fundraising effort that raised some $5 million for the armed opposition’s push to take the northern Idlib governate from the Syrian army in 2015.

In an online interview, Muhaysini thanked “a group of brothers in Islam from Riyadh (Saudi Arabia), some from our brother Abu Ahmed from Kuwait, some from our brother Abu Joud from Qatar.”

Muhaysni congratulates mother of a boy he is about to send on a suicide mission in #Aleppo & assures her he will get his virgins 😂 #Syria pic.twitter.com/p4XQKsphSy

— Ibn Walid (@walid970721) October 29, 2016

In 2018, Muhaysini’s Jihad Caller’s Network recruited child fighters inside the Atmeh Refugee Camp on the Syrian-Turkish border, a squalid redoubt for some 30,000 war victims, handing the adolescent volunteers rifles before trucking them off to Idlib and elsewhere. (Video of the child soldier recruitment drive has been removed from the internet). Earlier programs on the cleric’s network featured small children training for combat.

On December 12, 2024, days after Al-Sharaa’s forces stormed into Damascus following the collapse of Assad’s government, Muhaysini materialized again in Damascus. From inside the Umayyad Mosque, the Al Qaeda propagandist proclaimed, “I truly believe that in Paradise there are entire villages for the people of the Levant.”

Almost two years later, Muhaysini received another blessing. One day after Trump announced plans to skip the ceremony memorializing the 25th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks at New York City’s Ground Zero, his administration lifted sanctions on Muhaysini and his closest partners in crime.

They might have once been designated terrorists who joined the organization credited with bringing down the Twin Towers. But now, they’re officially our terrorists.

At the start of the year, we warned about the prospect of humanoid robots moving beyond factory floors and into military operations.

China’s World Humanoid Robot Games last month showcased advances in robotic speed and mobility, while reports of Beijing’s expanding military research suggest preparations for eventual battlefield deployment are gathering pace. The prospect of humanoids operating alongside troops and one-way attack drones presents an unsettling new view of warfare’s next phase: the rise of the machines.

China’s humanoid robots are crashing, falling—and pushing the future forward.

At this year’s robot games, some humanoids have slammed into walls or fallen halfway through races, leaving many asking: Are these robots disposable? And what’s the point of making them run so fast?…

— China pulse 🇨🇳 (@Eng_china5) August 23, 2026

Reuters published a new report on Monday that said:

China’s defense establishment is accelerating research into humanoids’ military uses and planning for their eventual wartime deployment, according to a Reuters review of more than 100 Chinese military procurement notices, academic studies, patents, official publications, government records and defense-company materials.

While the world marveled at China’s World Humanoid Robot Games, which showcased robots sprinting, jumping, dancing, and participating in sporting events, the Chinese military urged researchers to accelerate the transfer of advanced technologies from laboratories to military training grounds for robotic “combatants.”

China is testing humanoid robots for jobs far beyond factories.

At the World Robot Conference in Beijing China Ordnance is showing its Fuxi humanoid robotdesigned for security and emergency response tasks. https://t.co/8YptW2f50R pic.twitter.com/zv3PzBNtCa

— Techniahqrobot | humanoid robots (@techniahqrobot) August 18, 2026

China’s largest robotics company, Unitree, published a video on X on Monday morning showcasing “Fully Autonomous Humanoid Robot Combat.”

Unitree Breakthrough: The World’s First Real-Time World Model-Driven Fully Autonomous Humanoid Robot Combat🥊
UnifoLM-X2-1.0 breaks through world-action foundation models’ bottlenecks in instant planning, decision-making, and dynamic interactive execution, achieve high dynamics,… pic.twitter.com/xqAodjuD1m

— Unitree (@UnitreeRobotics) September 7, 2026

We reported on February 2 that “humanoid warfare nears,” and a TIME magazine article in early March later confirmed our report about the American humanoid robotics company Foundation testing its robots for war.

Then, in July, we reported:

• Ukraine Plans To Hyper-Innovate Humanoid Robot Soldiers

And in mid-August:

• Humanoid War Robots Could Soon Patrol US Southern Border To Combat Weaponized Migrant Flows

The prospect of “Skynet-like” warfare is becoming more real by the week as humanoid robotics advances alongside one-way attack drones, unmanned ground vehicles, and increasingly automated kill chains. If integrated at scale, these robots could further accelerate the shift to an automated modern battlefield.  

Authored by Ziaulhaq Tanin via RealClearWorld,

Three decades after their independence, Central Asia is still often viewed through outdated geopolitical lenses – a region once called “Russia’s backyard” and more recently as an arena of competition among Russia, China, and the West. Yet this familiar narrative no longer captures the region’s strategic reality. Central Asian states are increasingly using great-power rivalry not simply to navigate external pressure, but to expand their own choices and strategic room for maneuver.

This transformation is driven not by a single event but by the convergence of several trends: the war in Ukraine, new connectivity corridors, China’s growing role, deeper engagement of Europe, Türkiye, and the Gulf states, and regional efforts to reduce dependence on a single power. Together, these developments are reshaping the traditional framework of regional politics and creating new space for Central Asia to redefine its position.

The central question is no longer who will dominate Central Asia, but whether its states can turn this changing geopolitical environment into greater strategic autonomy. This article argues that the region is moving from the logic of “backyard” toward that of a “crossroads” – a transition shaped not by the departure of major powers, but by the growing agency of Central Asia itself.

The Ukraine War and the End of Geopolitical Monopoly

For decades, Central Asia was viewed largely through the lens of Russian influence. The legacy of the Russian Empire and then the Soviet Union created deep security, economic, and cultural ties between Moscow and the region – ties that endured after independence through institutions such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Commonwealth of Independent States. Yet today’s transformation does not reflect the collapse of these connections; it marks the end of an era in which a single power could define Central Asia’s strategic trajectory.

The war in Ukraine did not initiate this shift, but it accelerated existing trends. Even before 2022, regional states were diversifying foreign relations, reducing traditional dependencies, and seeking alternative routes of connectivity. The war exposed more clearly the risks of relying on a single partner or corridor, prompting governments to reshape their security, trade, and connectivity policies around a wider range of options.

For years, Central Asia faced a geopolitical paradox: despite its central position in Eurasia, access to the global economy depended largely on Soviet-era networks. These historical, infrastructural, economic, and security links reinforced Russia’s position as the region’s dominant external actor.

The war did not dismantle this structure, but it revealed the costs of dependence on traditional routes. Western sanctions on Russia and disruptions to established trade corridors pushed regional governments to pursue alternatives. The central question became whether its geography would remain a historical constraint or become a source of strategic choice.

This shift is most visible in the growing importance of the Middle Corridor, linking China and Europe through Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, and Türkiye. More than a trade route, it offers alternative to Soviet-era connectivity and allows Central Asian states to turn geography into a strategic asset. Kazakhstan, with its location and natural resources, stands at the center of this transformation, illustrating how the region is increasingly using great-power competition to expand its own choices.

At the same time, competition around Central Asia has broadened. China has expanded its presence through investment and infrastructure, Russia remains a security actor, while the West, Türkiye, and Gulf states have strengthened their roles in energy, trade, and strategic resources. The wider external engagement has increased regional room for maneuver, but it has also made balancing competing interests more demanding.

From Balance of Power to Balance of Options

In Central Asia, independence has never meant complete freedom from great-power influence. Geography, history, and economic ties have made such separation unrealistic. The challenge has therefore not been to sever these ties, but to prevent any single partnership from becoming source of decisive dependency. In this context, independence is increasingly defined not by distance from any power, but by the ability to preserve multiple options and manage competing relationships.

This shift is evident in the foreign policy of Central Asian states. Rather than choosing between major powers, they are using the simultaneous presence of different actors to expand their strategic room for maneuver. This is a form of practical autonomy: not on isolation from great powers, but the ability to engage with several partners at once.

The region’s transformation also extends beyond the traditional Russia – China – West triangle. Gulf states have become increasingly active in Central Asia through investments in energy, infrastructure, transport, mining, and trade, with the United Arab Emirates emerging as an important partner in renewable energy, logistics, and infrastructure projects. For the Central Asian states, these ties offer opportunities to diversify economic partnerships and attract new investment; for Gulf countries, the region’s strategic location and role in the emerging Eurasian connectivity routes have made it increasingly important.

Kazakhstan is a prominent example of this approach. Despite its long border with Russia and deep historical ties to Moscow, Astana has expanded its economic ties with China while strengthening cooperation with Europe and other partners. Its goal is not to replace one partner with another, but to maintain diversified relationships to increase strategic flexibility and reduces overdependence on any single power.

Uzbekistan has followed a similar path since 2016, gradually opening its economy and pursuing a more active regional diplomacy. Tashkent’s has sought to broaden cooperation with multiple partners including Russia, China, Europe, and the United States while increasing its strategic flexibility.

The experience of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan shows that Central Asia’s transformation is not only a result of changing great-power behavior. It also depends on whether regional states can turn this evolving geopolitical space into bargaining power.

Beyond Geopolitics: The Return of Identity

For decades, Central Asia was largely defined by narratives shaped outside the region itself – from the legacy of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union to contemporary perspectives based on great-power competition. Today, however, regional states are increasingly seeking to define their history and place in the world beyond the lens of external powers. This shift shows that the struggle over Central Asia’s position is not taking place only through trade routes and security calculations; it is also unfolding at the level of the historical and political identity.

Central Asia’s departure from the logic of “backyard” is visible not only in the change in its foreign ties, but also in efforts by regional states to redefine their historical standing. Since independence – and especially in recent years – the Central Asian states have gradually tried to adjust their national narratives beyond the frameworks left over from the Soviet era.

From Tajikistan’s emphasis on its Persian heritage, to strengthening cultural ties among Turkic-speaking states, and Uzbekistan’s renewed engagement with its historical past, this trend shows that the competition over the region’s future is not limited to economics and security. It is also a competition over narratives, and identity. Ultimately, it shows that Central Asian states are trying to define their status based on historical experience and their own interests.

Central Asia’s Future: Sphere of Influence or Hub of Connectivity?

For decades, Central Asia’s geography was seen as a constraint – a region caught between great powers, whit its security, economic, and connectivity shaped largely by external interests. Today, that same geography is becoming a strategic asset, expanding the region’s choices and influence.

Central Asian governments are no longer merely adapting to geopolitical changes; they are using it to widen their strategic options. More diverse partnerships and new connectivity corridors have expanded their diplomatic flexibility.

Great-power competition has not disappeared. Russia remains the principal security actor, China the leading economic partner, while west, Türkiye and the Gulf states continue expanding their presence. What has changed is that no single relationship can define the region’s future. Geography alone is insufficient; without stronger institutions and independent decision-making, new routes of connectivity could simply produce new form of dependence.

Ultimately, Central Asia’s transformation is not about replacing one dominant power with another, but about expanding regional agency. Russia, China, and other actors will remain influential, yet no single power is likely to define the region’s future alone. The region’s states are turning geography into leverage – not to escape power competition, but to shape the conditions in which they have more choices.

Ziaulhaq Tanin is a University lecturer, researcher, and analyst specializing in international security, regionalism, and foreign policy.

NEC has ended its effort to develop a working quantum computer, reportedly deciding that the project would take too long to deliver an acceptable return on investment, according to a new report by Nikkei.

The move represents a significant change in direction for a company that has been involved in quantum computing research for more than three decades.

NEC was among the earliest companies to pursue the technology, beginning its research in the 1990s and achieving a major breakthrough in 1999 with the first demonstration of superconducting qubits. Those qubits remain one of the principal approaches used in quantum computer development today. Despite that early lead, NEC discontinued work on its own physical quantum computer at the end of March.

Nikkei reported that the company will continue pursuing quantum-related technologies and services, including quantum annealing, which is used to find efficient solutions to complex optimization problems. NEC also plans to expand services that use conventional computers to simulate quantum computing.

The shift suggests that management sees a more immediate commercial opportunity in applying quantum-related techniques than in funding the lengthy and expensive development of its own hardware.

NEC’s retreat comes as other major players continue investing heavily in the field. IBM and Google remain prominent competitors in the United States, while China is advancing quantum computing through coordinated public- and private-sector efforts.

In Japan, Fujitsu is continuing its research and signed an agreement in August with an Australian university and government research institution to collaborate on quantum-related projects.

The industry has nevertheless made meaningful technical progress over the past two to three years. Google’s Willow processor, introduced in 2024, demonstrated that error rates could decline as additional qubits were added, an important step toward building larger and more reliable systems.

Microsoft and Quantinuum have also reported advances in error correction, while Amazon’s Ocelot prototype, unveiled in 2025, was designed to reduce the hardware required to produce reliable logical qubits. Increasingly, the challenge is not simply to build machines with more qubits, but to make those qubits stable enough to perform useful calculations.

That progress has yet to resolve the commercial question. IBM’s experimental Loon chip, unveiled in November 2025, forms part of its effort to develop a fault-tolerant quantum computer by 2029, while Google reported another quantum-advantage demonstration in October.

Such milestones show that the technology is advancing, but they do not establish when quantum computers will become broadly useful or economically viable. NEC’s decision therefore illustrates the distinction between scientific progress and investment returns: the industry may be moving forward, but the timetable for turning those advances into a profitable business remains uncertain.

Authored by Milton Ezrati via The Epoch Times,

Some 28 provinces and separate jurisdictions increasingly have had to turn to Beijing for help closing budget gaps, according to China’s Ministry of Finance.

It is not unusual for Beijing to have to chip in. It gets the lion’s share of the country’s tax revenues. But the growing need to turn to Beijing nonetheless points to the economy’s imbalances and other problems.

Some transfers from Beijing have occurred since the country’s tax-sharing reforms were implemented in the 1990s. Beijing gets all income tax revenues from both individuals and companies, all securities trading levies, and all customs duties.

Provinces and like entities must depend almost entirely on deed and land appreciation taxes. Even during the boom years of property development, some provinces needed help. Few had what the Chinese call budgetary “self-sufficiency ratios” at 100 percent.

Outlining the most recent data from this year’s first quarter, the deputy director general of the finance ministry’s budget department, Tang Zaifu, downplayed the troubling direction of provincial finances. The figures, however, make clear that self-sufficiency has deteriorated and dependency has grown.

Now, Beijing must cover half the budget needs of the 22 provinces under its control and an additional five separate jurisdictions. (Beijing claims 23 provinces, but one, Taiwan, manages its own budget and obviously is not subject to the People’s Republic of China’s governance.)

The needs of this large number of jurisdictions vary greatly. It is significant, however, that even Shanghai – one of the country’s richest areas – failed to meet its own budget needs during this year’s opening quarter – this for the first time since the pandemic.

Some areas have done comparatively well. Zhejiang, for instance, managed a self-sufficiency ratio of just over 96 percent. Other rich areas, such as Shandong and Guangdong provinces, showed self-sufficiency ratios exceeding 70 percent.

Other areas did less well, a lot less well. Filling all the budget gaps will cost Beijing some 10.5 trillion yuan, more than a third of the government’s entire budget.

Though arcane in many respects, these budget needs and burdens offer yet other perspectives on the imbalances in China’s economy and finances.

The first point that becomes clear is how much China’s economic reality has changed since the still-prevailing budget reform rules of the 1990s. Those revenue-sharing arrangements, implicitly dependent on a booming property development sector, are simply no longer viable. The still-ongoing property crisis has thoroughly reordered the economy.

These budget figures also point, albeit obliquely, to how narrowly focused China’s economy has become. The only reliable growth lies in the mostly high-technology sectors favored by Beijing’s “Made in China 2025” program.

Broad-based development has received short shrift, including the Chinese consumer and investments in other, mostly privately owned sectors, making China’s economy narrower and more export-dependent than ever.

Labor Day is a time to recognize the contributions of American workers, but it also draws attention to the risks many face on the job.

Logging was the most dangerous occupation in America in 2024, with 110.4 fatal work injuries per 100,000 full time equivalent workers, more than 33 times the national rate of 3.3, according to a new study by Moneygeek.

Fishing and hunting workers ranked second at 88.8, followed by roofers at 48.7, structural iron and steel workers at 37.8, and refuse and recyclable collectors at 37.4. Each of the five occupations had a fatality rate at least 11 times the national average, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries.

The Labor Day reminder is especially stark when looking at the national toll. A total of 5,070 workers died from job related injuries in 2024, equivalent to one death every 104 minutes. That was a 4% decline from 5,283 deaths in 2023 and marked the second consecutive annual decrease. The national fatality rate also fell from 3.7 per 100,000 workers in 2022 to 3.5 in 2023 and 3.3 in 2024.

The occupations with the highest fatality rates are not necessarily those with the most deaths. Logging recorded 51 fatalities, while driver/sales workers and truck drivers accounted for 950, the largest total of any occupation, despite a substantially lower rate of 25.7 per 100,000.

Moneygeek wrote that construction laborers recorded 334 deaths at a rate of 15.8. The difference reflects workforce size, since a smaller occupation can carry a much greater risk per worker without producing the largest number of fatalities.

The dangers also vary considerably by occupation. Contact with objects and equipment accounted for 40 of the 51 logging deaths, while falls, slips and trips caused 83 of the 104 roofing fatalities.

Transportation incidents were the leading cause in several other high risk occupations, including truck driving, fishing, refuse collection and grounds maintenance. Nationwide, transportation incidents caused 1,937 fatal work injuries, representing 38.2% of all workplace deaths.

The data also highlights the growing toll among older workers. Workers age 65 and older recorded 824 fatal work injuries in 2024, a five year high and a 21.9% increase from 2020. Their share of all workplace deaths rose from 14.2% to 16.3% over that period.

The under 25 group also saw a 19.3% increase, while workers ages 55 to 64 were the only age group to record a decline.

Fatality risk and nonfatal injury rates tell different stories. Forestry and logging had a nonfatal injury rate of 1.3 per 100 workers, below the private industry average of 2.3, despite logging’s exceptionally high fatality rate.

Mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction showed a similar contrast, with a nonfatal rate of 1.2. Waste collection and transportation and warehousing, meanwhile, recorded higher nonfatal injury rates of 4.7 and 4.4, respectively. The figures show that the jobs with the greatest risk of death are not always those reporting the most nonfatal injuries.

Workplace risk also varies by state. Wyoming had the highest fatality rate in 2024 at 13.9 deaths per 100,000 workers, followed by Mississippi at 8.0, Alaska at 7.1 and North Dakota at 6.8. Rhode Island had the lowest rate at 1.1, while Texas stood above the national average at 3.9. These differences reflect where hazardous industries and work activities are concentrated rather than where workers permanently reside.

For workers in dangerous occupations, the risks highlighted by Labor Day can also raise questions about financial protection for their families. A hazardous job does not automatically prevent someone from obtaining life insurance.

According to Ethos Chief Underwriter Nichole Myers, underwriting focuses on the specific activities a worker performs, such as working at heights or operating heavy machinery, rather than relying solely on a job title. Ethos reports that approximately 86% of applicants in dangerous job categories are approved for coverage, close to its overall approval rate.

Occupational risk may affect how an application is evaluated, but it does not necessarily make coverage unavailable.

Authored by Naveen Athrappully via The Epoch Times,

A district court denied a motion from three Stars and Stripes journalists that sought to block the Department of War from firing them.

While plaintiffs argue that the terminations “violate their First Amendment rights to communicate as citizens on matters of public concern,” such rights have “some limitations” when applied to people employed in public service, Judge Trevor N. McFadden, from the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, said in the Sept. 4 order.

“When government employees provide public commentary in their official capacity, their speech is government speech, and the First Amendment does not apply,” the judge said, adding that the plaintiffs have not demonstrated any “irreparable harm.”

The journalists – Max D. Lederer, Erik A. Slavin, and Lara S. Korte – filed their lawsuit on Aug. 27.

On July 5, Korte and Slavin gave interviews to CBS News. The program discussed changes to Pentagon regulations governing Stars and Stripes and their impact on its independence.

Korte said that restrictions may come on her reporting. “I’m working for Stars and Stripes … not for the Pentagon, not for any administration, not for any policymaker. I’m here to cover the military community,” she said.

Meanwhile, Slavin said he would not comply if the Pentagon requested depictions of the story that were inaccurate.

On Aug. 11, Stars and Stripes published a story about “deteriorating conditions” aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln, according to the lawsuit. The vessel had been on extended duty amid the U.S.-Iran war.

On Aug. 12, a day after the article was published, Lederer was allegedly ordered to give Slavin and Korte Notices of Separation, citing insubordination for statements made in the July 5 interview.

However, Lederer did not deliver the notices. Instead, he announced his retirement.

Moreover, on Aug. 18, Lederer gave an interview with Stripes, raising concerns about the “direction” of the publication, the complaint said.

On Aug. 21, the Pentagon delivered Notices of Separation for all three plaintiffs, accusing them of insubordination and violating other Department of Defense rules, according to the lawsuit. Defendants in the case include the Pentagon and officials from the department.

“Defendants seek to terminate Plaintiffs because they publicly expressed their personal opinions about Stripes’ operations as citizens and because Defendants disapproved of Stripes’ publication of the Lincoln Story. The terminations violate Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights,” the lawsuit said.

The U.S. Central Command has accused media reports of publishing false reports regarding USS Abraham Lincoln, including one which claimed multiple sailors died aboard the ship in a fight. “No service members aboard the aircraft carrier have died,” the Central Command said.

According to the recent court order in Slavin and Korte, the judge held that the plaintiffs failed to show that they participated in the CBS News interview as private citizens.

As for Lederer, the judge observed that his “failure to carry out a directive from a supervisor finds no shelter under the First Amendment.”

The judge denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction.

The Epoch Times reached out to the legal representative for Slavin, Korte, and Lederer for comment and did not receive a response by publication time.

The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, which provides free legal services to news organizations and journalists, said in a Sept. 4 statement that the court should block the War Department from terminating the three employees.

“The government’s actions in this case pose a threat to the historical independence of a news outlet that publishes stories of interest to the U.S. military community,” the group said.

Meanwhile, the USS Abraham Lincoln arrived in Thailand this week after spending 286 days at sea. The roughly 5,000 sailors and Marines aboard the vessel got the chance to be on land for the first time since November last year.

One of the reasons why the price of oil failed to soar during the “actively kinetic” phase of the Iran war, when shipments through Hormuz were effectively halted and the world faced a shortage of about 10-15mmb/d, is that Chinese oil demand plunged. Whether due to a sharp slowdown in the economy (which after the sudden “recap” of China’s banks appears very likely) or due to an aggressive drain of China’s strategic reserve, the reality is that, as discussed here extensively, both Chinese oil imports…

… and local product refining…

… cratered for much of 2026, signaling that Chinese oil demand has indeed plunged.

But no more: one of the telltale signs of the period of weak Chinese demand was the collapse in the Brent-Shanghai crude spread, which traded as negative as -$20 in late April. However, in the past few weeks, we have seen a dramatic jump in Shanghai crude, which is trading just shy of the highest level hit since the Iran war, well above $100. More importantly, it now trading a sizable premium to Brent, indicating that the period of weak Chinese demand is finally over. 

And sure enough, as Bloomberg report, China – the world’s largest oil importer – is now aggressively bidding up crude prices across Africa, Canada, and Latin American markets as disruptions in the Hormuz chokepoint and limited Iranian supplies intensify competition for alternatives. The scramble is squeezing smaller Chinese refineries that once relied on heavily discounted Iranian barrels; the same refineries simply shut down a few months ago when there was not enough domestic demand.

But now, something has finally flipped, and demand for oil is suddenly soaring, sending Shanghai crude above $100 and threatening to push Brent prices – earlier today rising above $97 for the first time in over a month – also above $100 for the first time since May. 

The renewed Chinese buying marks a major shift from a period when subdued Chinese buying helped restrain crude oil prices. With Iranian exports almost entirely shut off by the US blockade and fighting flaring again, as seen Monday when Saudi Aramco’s Jizan oil facilities were reportedly hit, the race to find replacement supplies around the world is becoming an increasingly expensive task for the Chinese. 

Here is what some traders who spoke with Bloomberg had to say: 

The turnaround is producing spikes in the price of various grades. Congo’s Djeno crude was offered to Chinese buyers at premiums of as high as $20 a barrel over ICE Brent this week, up from around $15 a couple of weeks ago, according to traders who asked not to be named as they’re not authorized to speak to the media.

Chinese buyers are also buying tanker loads of crude from Canada, Brazil, and Argentina, while stronger demand has lifted prices for Russia’s ESPO crude. Asian buyers are also pushing Dubai crude futures toward $100 per barrel.  

While Chinese seaborne crude imports are still below prewar levels and are currently trending toward 10 million barrels per day, the Shanghai crude spread indicates that imports are aggressively rising, and that the race for alternative supplies may still intensify. 

Bloomberg pointed out that the rebound in crude imports comes as refinery math improves and inventories are being rebuilt in China. Improved processing margins, the resumption of fuel exports, and commercial restocking are encouraging refiners to ramp up purchases, according to GL Consulting founder Liao Na. 

Smaller independent refiners, known as teapots, face the greatest pressure because their traditional sourcing channels for Iranian and Venezuelan crude have eroded this year as access to those supplies has collapsed amid the Trump administration’s push to rewire global energy markets. 

Liao said, “China’s robust buying lately is largely driven by refiners taking advantage of decent margins,” adding, “Active restocking by commercial players has also helped, but it’s not necessarily a sign of stronger underlying demand that’s supporting the recovery.”

Separately, Goldman Sachs energy expert Daan Struyven expects China’s ability to adjust purchases to prices to help moderate any spikes in crude prices, although he also warned that Brent may rally to as much as $120 a barrel if attacks on shipping in the Middle East increase.

“Events over the last few days do suggest that the risk of shipping disruptions broadening and intensifying is an important one,” Daan Struyven, co-head of global commodities research, said in an interview on Bloomberg TV.

Goldman’s preferred way to trade another oil spike is buy going long natural gas and diesel as a way to capture gains:  “While we see meaningful upside to crude oil prices, we do recommend to investors to hedge geopolitical risks by going long in global natural gas and refined-oil products,” Struyven said, referring to bets on gains. “The supply shocks are bigger than in the crude market.”

Authored by Turner Wright via CoinTelegraph.com,

Hunter Biden will reportedly distribute 200 million of the LAPTOP token to his substack subscribers, members of a mailing list and investors in President Donald Trump’s memecoin.

Hunter Biden, son of former US President Joe Biden, announced that he plans to launch a memecoin based on the reports of his infamous laptop, which has been subject to intense media scrutiny.

In a Monday announcement on X, Hunter Biden posted the memecoin’s ticker symbol, $LAPTOP, signaling a Wednesday launch. The Wall Street Journal reported that Biden would send 20% of the one-billion token supply to substack subscribers, members of a mailing list and investors in President Donald Trump’s memecoin, Official Trump (TRUMP), whose value has dropped by about 97% since reaching an all-time high price in January 2025.

Source: Hunter Biden

The basis for the memecoin’s namesake is Biden’s computer, whose existence and contents were subject to scrutiny before the 2020 election, in which his father was running against Trump. The laptop continues to be invoked by many right-wing media figures and was the subject of two lawsuits filed by Biden over privacy laws. 

Since his father left office in January 2025, Biden has stepped up his rhetoric on crypto and blockchain, specifically criticizing the Trump family’s entanglements with the industry through its World Liberty Financial business. 

In August, he called World Liberty “corruption at a scale we’ve never seen,” comparing its business practices with those of defunct crypto exchange FTX and pointing to its ties to foreign governments like the UAE. Biden also said in June that “decentralized digital currency and the blockchain are the inevitable future.”

The LAPTOP founders, holding 30% of the token supply, will reportedly burn up to 30% of the memecoins depending on the outcome of events, including a Democrat winning the presidency in 2028, the price of Bitcoin (BTC) reaching an all-time high and LAPTOP’s fully diluted value exceeding TRUMP’s.

CLARITY Act vote set for later this month

The LAPTOP memecoin, if launched as planned, could shine more of a spotlight on Trump’s crypto ventures at a time when lawmakers in Congress are considering a comprehensive market structure bill to regulate the digital asset industry. The Digital Asset Market Clarity Act, also known as the CLARITY Act, is scheduled for a cloture vote in the Senate on Sept. 15.

Cointelegraph reached out to the White House for comment but did not receive an immediate response.